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"The reorganization would thus group most port-of-entry inspection functions in a single Cabinet department. It would reduce the need for much day-to-day inter-departmental coordination, allow more efficient staffing at some field locations, and remove the basis for damaging inter-agency rivalries. It would also give the Secretary of the Treasury the authority and flexibility to meet changing requirements in inspecting the international flow of people and goods. An important by-product of the change would be more convenient service for travellers entering and leaving the country.

"For these reasons, I am convinced that inspection activities at U.S. ports-of-entry can more effectively support our drug law enforcement efforts if concentrated in a single agency. The processing of persons at ports-of-entry is too closely interrelated with the inspection of goods to remain organizationally separated from it any longer. Both types of inspections have numerous objectives besides drug law enforcement, so it is logical to vest them in the Treasury Department, which has long had the principal responsibility of portof-entry inspection of goods, including goods being transported in connection with persons. As long as the inspections are conducted with full awareness of related drug concerns it is neither necessary nor desirable that they be made a responsibility of the primary drug enforcement organization.

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Reading List

1. Altshulur, Alan A. Community Control: The Black Demand for Participation in Large American Cities. New York: Pegasus, 1970.

2. Brekman, Peter. The Limits of Protest. Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill, 1970.

3. Brown, Frederick J., LTC, USA. "The Army and Society." Military Review, March 1972, pp. 3-17.

4. Geltman, Max. The Confrontation: Black Power, Anti-Semitism, and the Myth of Integration. Englewoood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970.

5. Graham, James J. The Enemies of the Poor. New York: Random House, 1970.

6. Hesburgh, Theodore M. "Resurrection for Higher Education. Educational Record, Winter 1972, pp. 5-11.

7. Klein, Alexander. Dissent, Power and Confrontation. New York, McGraw-Hill, 1971.

8. Packard, Vance Oakley. A Nation of Strangers. New York: McKay, 1972.

9. Ramo, Simos. "The Coming Social Industrial Complex. Signal, March 1972, pp. 12-15.

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10. U.S. National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of
Violence. Violence in America. Report on Task Force on
Historical and Comparative Perspectives. Washington,
D. C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969.

11. Will, Robert Erwin. Poverty in Affluence: The Social, Political and Economic Dimensions of Poverty in the United States. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1970.

WESTERN EUROPE

1973 has been characterized by American foreign policy makers as the "Year of Europe. Certainly, with the winding down of U.S. activities in Southeast Asia, increasing attention has quite properly been focused on activities across the Atlantic. The dynamic and expanding Common Market is presenting us with some major trade headaches. The 1973 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) will bring varying interpretations of what East-West detente in Europe is all about. In this connection, both the future of NATO and the continued desirability of maintaining U.S. forces in Europe will be questioned in many quarters. In sum, 1973/74 will very likely be a period of considerable challenge for U.S. foreign policy in this traditional center of world power.

For your background information on Western Europe, there follow some pertinent extracts from President Richard Nixon's May 3, 1973, report to the Congress entitled: U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's--Shaping a Durable Peace.

"Europe and the Atlantic Alliance

"The United States has regularly renewed its commitment to the flourishing of trans-Atlantic unity with our oldest and closest allies. I carried this message to Europe immediately after taking office in 1969. It is a central element of this Report to the Congress, for no aspect of U. S. foreign policy commands greater attention and care than our relations with Western Europe.

"I have referred to 1973 as the year of Europe, not because we regarded Europe as less important in the past or because we expect to overcome the problems of the Atlantic Community in any single year. This will be a year of Europe because changes in the international environment, and particularly in Europe, pose new problems and new opportunities.

"The alliance between the United States and Western Europe has been a fundamental factor in the postwar era. It provided the essential security framework for American engagement in Europe and for Western defense. It created the political confidence that

allowed the countries of Europe to recover from the devastation of the war. It helped to reconcile former enemies, a prerequisite for European unity. And it was the principal means of forging the common policies that were the source of Western strength in an era of tension and confrontation.

"When the alliance was created, power relations, economic factors, and political conditions were far different than today: traditional power centers in both Europe and Asia were greatly weakened, and the United States and the Soviet Union had emerged with vastly enhanced strength and influence as leaders of hostile coalitions in Europe. Western Europe looked to America for protection and for leadership. The alliance came to rely on American prescriptions and became accustomed to ratifying American solutions to the major military, political, and economic problems.

"When this Administration took office, a period of transition had begun; new trends affecting America's relations with Europe were already evident:

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Western Europe's economic and political revival coincided with deepening divisions in the Communist world. The bipolar confrontation of the postwar period no longer dominated international relations. Alliance relationships in Europe coexisted with increasingly fluid international relationships. Both sides of the Atlantic had to recognize that a new balance of power in the world would challenge our unity.

In Europe, as the military vacuum was filled by the strength of the Atlantic coalition, the danger of war receded. But the altered strategic environment created totally new problems of deterrence and defense.

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The European unity forged by the original six members of the Common Market made Europe a formidable economic power. Expansion of the European Community to include the United Kingdom, Denmark, Ireland, and other European countries added a new political dimension to economic integration.

"In these conditions, America's relations with the new Europe were bound to change. In the three fundamental aspects-

economic, military, and political--trans-Atlantic relations had come to be based on different principles that led to different modes of action:

-- In economics, members of the European Community, individually and collectively, stressed regional autonomy, while the United States remained dedicated to the integrity of an open international system.

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Militarily, unity was the predominant factor: the NATO allies operated on the principle of integrated forces and common strategic planning, but forces designed when the United States enjoyed an unqualified strategic advantage had not been fully adjusted to the reality of a more nearly equal strategic balance with the Soviet Union.

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Politically, the Western Allies shared abstract goals of detente, but we had not developed new principles to reconcile national objectives with demands for a unified Western policy. "Now, America and Europe are challenged to forge a more mature and viable partnership in which we cooperate:

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in developing a new and more equitable international economic system that enables the Europeans to reinforce their unity, yet provides equitable terms for the United States to compete in world markets;

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in providing a strong defense with the forces necessary to carry out a realistic strategy in light of the nuclear balance of the 1970's while meeting our mutual defense commitments with an equitable sharing of the burdens;

-- in building a common framework for diplomacy to deal with fundamental security issues--such as mutual and balanced force reductions--in the new international environment, reconciling the requirements of unity with those of national interest.

"In the past four years we have progressed toward these goals. The advances have been more pronounced in diplomacy and defense because habits of consultation were long-standing in these

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