THE U.S. IN WORLD AFFAIRS

Who makes United States foreign policy, and how is it made? Who decides what the nation shall do in its relations with the rest of the world? How are such decisions made?

They are not made by the military; the military neither creates nor decides upon the application of foreign policy. By our constitution, by precedent and by custom, the military in our democratic society is, and must be, subordinated to the established civilian leadership. However, the military does have the assigned mission of supporting the foreign policy of the United States.

In our governmental system, the foreign policy makers are the President, the Congress, the Department of State, and--the American people themselves.

We have a government "of the people, by the people, for the people"--which means that all decisions must ultimately pass the test of public acceptance. It also means that the men who make the decisions must pass their acceptance test, too. This latter is an important fact, for it puts the world on notice that America is capable of continually revitalizing its leadership with fresh, new and vigorous men, armed with a clear mandate from the people.

When we talk of U. S. foreign policy in the new decade of the 1970's, we are talking about a mix of continuity and change. Friend and foe alike take it for granted the U.S. will live up to its obligations and responsibilities. Without this element of continuity, world affairs would certainly be more unstable and more dangerous. Yet there must be change also. World events demand a flexible, imaginative and dynamic foreign policy if we are to maintain our national security.

For background information on U. S. foreign policy, there follow some pertinent extracts from President Nixon's May 3, 1973, report to the Congress entitled: U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's--Shaping a Durable Peace.

"TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:

"This Administration attaches fundamental importance to the articulation as well as the execution of foreign policy.

"Public understanding is, of course, essential in a democracy. It is all the more urgent in a fast changing world, which requires continuing, though redefined, American leadership. One of my basic goals is to build a new consensus of support in the Congress and among the American people for a responsible foreign policy for the 1970's.

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"These were the reasons that I began the practice of annual Presidential Reports to the Congress. This fourth Review, like the previous ones, sets forth the philosophical framework of our policy and discusses major trends and events in this context. other important documents complement this one with the more detailed record of current questions and policies. The Secretary of State's third annual report of April 19, 1973, covers our specific country, regional, and functional policies and provides basic documentation. The Secretary of Defense's yearly report of April 3, 1973, presents a thorough accounting of our policies and programs for national defense.

"It is my hope that this Report will inform and lift the national dialogue on our purpose and our place in the world.

RICHARD NIXON

The White House

May 3, 1973

"INTRODUCTION

"In January 1969, America needed to change the philosophy and practice of its foreign policy.

"Whoever took office four years ago would have faced this challenge. After a generation, the postwar world had been transformed and demanded a fresh approach. It was not a question of

our previous policies having failed; indeed, in many areas they had been very successful. It was rather that new conditions, many of them achievements of our policies, summoned new perspectives.

"The World We Found

"The international environment was dominated by seemingly intractable confrontation between the two major nuclear powers. Throughout the nuclear age both the fears of war and hopes for peace revolved around our relations with the Soviet Union. Our growing nuclear arsenals were largely directed at each other. We alone had the capacity to wreak catastrophic damage across the planet. Our ideologies clashed. We both had global interests, and this produced many friction points. We each led and dominated a coalition of opposing states.

"As a result, our relationship was generally hostile. There were positive interludes, but these were often atmospheric and did not get at the roots of tension. Accords were reached on particular questions, but there was no broad momentum in our relationship. Improvements in the climate were quickly replaced by confrontation and, occasionally, crisis. The basic pattern was a tense jockeying for tactical advantage around the globe.

"This was dangerous and unsatisfactory. The threat of a major conflict between us hung over the world. This in turn exacerbated local and regional tensions. And our two countries not only risked collision but were constrained from working positively on common problems.

"The weight of China rested outside the international framework. This was due partly to its own attitude and its preoccupation with internal problems, and partly to the policies of the outside world, most importantly the United States. In any event, this Administration inherited two decades of mutual estrangement and hostility. Here the problem was not one of a fluctuating relationship but rather of having no relationship at all. The People's Republic of China was separated not only from us but essentially from the world as a whole.

"China also exemplified the great changes that had occurred in the Communist world. For years our guiding principle was

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containment of what we considered a monolithic challenge. In the 1960's the forces of nationalism dissolved Communist unity into divergent centers of power and doctrine, and our foreign policy began to differentiate among the Communist capitals. But this process could not be truly effective so long as we were cut off from one-quarter of the globe's people. China in turn was emerging from its isolation and might be more receptive to overtures from foreign countries.

"The gulf between China and the world distorted the international landscape. We could not effectively reduce tensions in Asia without talking to Peking. China's isolation compounded its own sense of insecurity. There could not be a stable world order with a major power remaining outside and hostile to it.

"Our principal alliances with Western Europe and Japan needed adjustment. After the devastation of the Second World War we had helped allies and former adversaries alike. Fueled by our assistance and secure behind our military shield, they regained their economic vigor and political confidence.

"Throughout the postwar period our bonds with Europe had rested on American prescriptions as well as resources. We provided much of the leadership and planning for common defense. We took the diplomatic lead. The dollar was unchallenged. But by the time this Administration took office, the tide was flowing toward greater economic and political assertiveness by our allies. European unity, which we had always encouraged, was raising new issues in Atlantic relations. The economic revival of Europe was straining the Atlantic monetary and commercial framework. The relaxation of tensions with the Communist world was generating new doctrines of defense and diplomacy.

"The imperatives of change were equally evident in our Pacific partnership with Japan. Its recovery of strength and selfassurance carried political and psychological implications for our relationship. Its spectacular economic growth had made it the world's third industrial power; our entire economic relationship was undergoing transformation. The earlier paternalism of U.S.Japanese relations no longer suited either partner.

"The Vietnam war dominated our attention and was sapping our self-confidence. Our role and our costs had steadily grown

without decisive impact on the conflict. The outlook at the confer ence table was bleak. The war was inhibiting our policy abroad and fostering dissent and self-doubt at home. There was no prospect of either an end to the fighting or an end to our involvement.

"Although the historical imperatives for a new international approach existed independently, the war made this challenge at once more urgent and more difficult. More than any other factor, it threatened to exhaust the American people's willingness to sustain a reliable foreign policy. As much as any other factor, the way we treated it would shape overseas attitudes and American psychology.

"The context for our national security policy was fundamentally altered. From the mid-1940's to the late 1960's we had moved from America's nuclear monopoly to superiority to rough strategic balance with the Soviet Union. This created fresh challenges to our security and introduced new calculations in our diplomacy. The U.S. defense effort remained disproportionate to that of our allies who had grown much stronger. The threats from potential enemies were more varied and less blatant than during the more rigid bipolar era. These changes, combined with spiraling military costs and the demands of domestic programs, were prompting reexamination of our defense doctrines and posture. They were underlining the importance of arms control as an element in national security. They were also leading some in this country to call for policies that would seriously jeopardize our safety and world stability.

"Around the world, friends were ready for a greater role in shaping their own security and well-being. In the 1950's and 1960's other nations had looked to America for ideas and resources, and they found us a willing provider of both. Our motives were sound, the needs were clear, and we had many successes. By 1969, scores of new nations, having emerged from colonial status or dependency on major powers, were asserting themselves with greater assurance and autonomy.

"Four years ago this growing capacity of friends was not reflected in the balance of contributions to security and development. This meant that others could do more, and the United States need do proportionately less, in the provision of material resources.