National Governing Council on May 1, 1972. The Council will rule until new elections are held in 1974. "Nicaragua protested the signing on September 8, 1972, of a U.S.-Colombian treaty by which the United States will renounce its claims to three small areas in the western Caribbean. Nicaragua was concerned that in settling a U.S.-Colombian dispute, the treaty had given insufficient attention to Nicaraguan claims in the area. The United States replied that in signing the treaty it had not prejudiced Nicaragua's position on sovereign rights. "In economic relations, a cotton textile agreement was signed regulating the entry into the United States of Nicaraguan textiles for five years. A.I.D. assistance focused on health, education, and agriculture projects. Nicaragua with A.I.D. assistance has started an analysis of the agricultural sector for planning and outlining areas for foreign assistance. "U.S. support for Guatemala's development efforts continued through 1972. Technical assistance valued at over $4 million was extended during the year, including about $700,000 for population programs. A.I.D. also authorized development loans totaling $8.4 million for rural health services and for private industrial and agricultural activities. "Guatemalan action was encouraging toward productive U.S. and other foreign investment. In April the government reached an agreement with the Boise Cascade Corporation to purchase the company's Guatemalan subsidiary, Empresas Electricas, for an immediate cash payment of $18 million. In October the government approved the sale to the Del Monte Corporation of the banana lands and plants of the United Brands Company (formerly United Fruit Company holdings). As the year ended, negotiations were under way between the government, the International Nickel Company, and international financial agencies on the establishment of a nickel mining and processing operation near Guatemala's Caribbean coast. 508-367 O-73-3 Reading List 1. Anderson, Charles W. Politics and Economic Change in Latin America: The Governing of Restless Nations. Princeton, N. J.: Van Nostrand, 1967. 2. Berton, Pierre. The Last Spike (subject: Canada). Toronto: McLelland and Stewart, 1971. 3. Cantori, Louis J. and Spiegel, Steven L. eds. The International Politics of Regions: A Comparative Approach. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1970. 4. Cohen, Ronald and Middleton, John. Comparative Political Systems. Garden City, N. Y.: Pub. for American Museum of Natural History, 1967. 5. Connery, Donald S. The Scandinavians. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1966. 6. Duchacek, Ivo D. Nations and Men: An Introduction to International Politics. 2nd ed. New York: Holt, 1971. 7. Field, George L. Comparative Political Development -- The Precedent of the West. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell, 1967. 8. Friedrich, Carl J. and Brzezinski, Zbigniew K. Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1965. 9. Hughes, Henry Stuart. Contemporary Europe. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1966. 10. Johnson, Chalmers, ed. Change in Communist Systems. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 1970. 11. Leiden, Carl and Schmitt, Karl M. The Politics of Violence: 12. West, R. C. and Angelli, J. P. Middle America: Its Lands and People. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1966. DEFENSE MANAGEMENT The past two decades have seen far-reaching changes in the organization and management of the Armed Forces. Successive legislative and administrative actions reflected progressively bolder steps to integrate the defense establishment and consolidate power in the Secretary of Defense. Why has the movement toward Service unification been so tortuous? It must be appreciated that unification was much more than a matter of reorganization. It required new viewpoints, new doctrine, and new habits of thinking throughout the military establishment. For almost 150 years before the enactment of the National Security Act of 1947, the two major Departments--the Army and Navy--had evolved as distinct and separate entities. They had been established and organized by separate legislation. They looked directly to the President for leadership. They were monitored by separate congressional committees. They drew their funds from separate appropriations and got on as best they could with their own peculiarities, preoccupations, friends, and enemies. No well-established habits or instruments of collaboration and cooperation existed. Where disagreements on questions of planning or policy arose, only the President could make decisions effective on both. It was left largely to the President also to link foreign policy and military planning. The experience of World War II provided strong impetus for the unification of the Armed Services. While unified commands were established in the theaters of operations, no comparable unified direction or command existed in Washington. The Joint Chiefs of Staff emerged early in World War II as President Roosevelt's principal staff instrument for forging allied strategy and directing global warfare. The need for joint action by the Services and for objective recommendations on military matters inevitably brought increased authority to this one joint and most nearly objective body. However the JCS was a committee dependent for its success upon the voluntary cooperation of its members. The same high degree of cooperation achieved under the stress of war was not apt to be forthcoming in peacetime. Furthermore, with the Air Corps certain to achieve independence from the Army, the President would face the prospect of having to coordinate three separate military departments. As Commander in Chief, the President could not delegate responsibility for decision on the truly fundamental issues of defense policy. With all the other problems before him, however, the President needed a single civilian at the Cabinet level to help him coordinate the Services and to contribute, along with others, to the combined judgment which the Chief Executive uses in formulating the administration's fundamental policies. Being a strictly military body, the JCS was not the proper agency to serve the President in this way, although he would certainly want its advice and counsel on basic defense problems. With their missions and roles no longer clear cut, the three military departments could be expected to fight hard for what they considered their legitimate interests and a proper share of tightened defense appropriations. In such a situation the JCS as then structured could hardly be expected to function as effectively in the formulation and execution of defense plans as it had during World War II. Insofar as the departmental Secretaries were concerned, each would personify the time-honored concept of civilian control of the military. With the three military departments likely to clash on fundamental issues, however, the departmental Secretaries would be cast in the role of partisans of their respective Services. If civilian control was to be truly meaningful, there would have to be someone who could transcend individual Service interests and try consistently and imaginatively to serve the President in his broadest constitutional responsibilities. It soon became equally clear, moreover, that the U. S. leadership role in the postwar world would have to be exercised in an environment of Soviet hostility toward the West, political turmoil, and seemingly endless insurgencies. And in the background was the prospect of nuclear warfare with its horrifying implications for the future of all mankind. The National Security Act of 1947 gave statutory recognition to a new and broadened concept of national security involving a close, interlocking relationship between the military and civilian elements of the Government. Organizationally, this concept was reflected in the creation of three agencies outside the military establishment to effect "coordination for national security"--a National Security Council, presided over the the President himself, to advise him concerning "the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security;" a Central Intelligence Agency, under the Council's direction, to insure a sound and adequate intelligence base for the formulation and execution of our national security policies; and a National Security Resources Board to advise the President concerning "the coordination of military, industrial, and civilian mobilization." Under this concept, the guardianship of the Nation's security was to be the collective responsibility of the entire Government. Military defense, though playing a most vital role, would function within this larger framework of national defense. Besides the coordination of the Armed Services, there would have to be the coordination of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security. Support from the Executive Branch and Congress for the concept came readily. An entirely different atmosphere, however, surrounded the design of the postwar military establishment. In this area, proponents of organizational reforms faced the formidable job of winning acceptance of departures from deep-rooted institutional patterns, customs, and traditions. The vastness of the issues and the complexity of the problems involved served as warnings against precipitate action in adopting changes in military organization. Initially, agreement could be obtained only on a loose federation of the three departments in a "National Military Establishment. Over the ensuing years, experience and a steady progression of top-level studies laid the foundations for repeated reorganizations (in 1949, 1953, and 1958) which brought the Services closer toward a more truly integrated Defense structure. The emerging pattern of Defense organization was shaped by many forces, not all strictly organizational: accelerating changes in the technologies and techniques of warfare and disagreements over strategic concepts, roles and missions, force levels, and weapon systems; the |