Reading List

PROBLEMS of NATIONAL SECURITY

1. Brewster, Kingman, Jr. "Reflections on our National Purpose." Foreign Affairs, April 1972.

2. Cavagnaro, David. This Living Earth. Palo Alto, Calif.: American West, 1972.

3.

Current History. A monthly magazine of world affairs. All issues. New York: Current History.

4. Moosbrugger, Bernhard and Weigner, Gladys. Voice of the Third World. Paramus, N. J.: Paulist-Newman Press, 1972.

5. Secretary of State. United States Foreign Policy, 1972. Washington, D. C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973.

6. Trager, Frank N. and Kronenberg, Philip S. National Security and American Society. Kansas: Univ. of Kansas Press, 1973.

7. Walton, Richard J. Congress and American Foreign Policy: the Presidential-Congressional Struggle. New York: Parents, 1972.

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

The problem of managing research and development in the Department of Defense is a formidable one. The Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) presented his annual statement to the 93rd Congress, First Session on 12 April 1973. Chapter three of this statement outlined the Management of Research and Development and is excerpted here to assist your understanding of the methods used to justify, manage and control the development of weapon systems.

"Management Controls

"We have developed a framework of management controls and policy on defense systems acquisition over the past few years and are now concentrating on their implementation. A major improvement in the management of the total RDT&E program and the defense systems-acquisition process has been realized, and we expect to continue improving along these lines. Here is a brief historical and status report on the controlling documents and processes:

"Technology Coordinating Paper: The TCP, which originated in 1970, tells us what can be done with existing technology, defines priorities for work on new technology, and presents up-todate plans for doing the essential work. Seven TCPs have already been completed and approved; another is in draft form and being reviewed; and three new ones are in preparation.

"Area Coordinating Paper: Originated in 1970, the ACP is a mission-oriented paper that tells us where we stand, what our limitations are, and alternative ways to remove them. There are now four approved ACPs, and 36 are in preparation.

"Development Concept Paper: The DCP is the document that defines a particular major defense-system program. It is the cornerstone in the Secretary of Defense's decision making. Since 1967, a total of 53 DCPs has been approved, of which 46 are still active. In addition, 27 new DCPs are being prepared. Last year,

systems developments covered by the DCPS accounted for roughly 66 percent of the RDT&E dollars; this year, the proportion is 69 percent.

"Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council: The DSARC advises the Secretary of Defense, making recommendations at three major decision points--program initiation, start of full-scale engineering development, and start of production. The DSARC has conducted 65 systems reviews since 1969, of which 22 took place in 1972.

"Management Review: A one-time management review of each major defense system is performed by the DSARC. Starting in 1969, 61 of these reviews have been conducted, eight in 1972.

"During the past year, we have continued to improve working communications between my office and that of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The basic objective is to come to grips with the difficult problem of identifying critical deficiencies that can be remedied by RDT&E. We have accomplished a great deal, focusing attention on the extremely complex problem of assuring that the acquisition of major systems responds to valid military requirements. We have taken steps to more closely relate ACP mission areas to those of the Joint Strategic Planning System, as contained in the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan. Also, the Joint Research and Development Objectives Document has been improved to indicate the relative military importance of each R&D objective.

"By efficiently identifying and solving critical deificiencies, we can achieve a more cost-effective capability to attain our national security objectives. As we attempt to balance the concept of designing to a cost with the equally valid military concept of designing to fight the assignment of meaningful priorities is essential to trading off performance requirements and affordable costs.

"With respect to management policy, DOD Directive 5000.1, entitled 'Acquisition of Major Defense Systems, ' has been in effect for a year and a half. In it, primary importance is given to selecting competent people, clearly defining their responsibilities, and giving them the authority they need to do the job. I believe that the policies of participatory management, defined decentralization and delegation of authority under specific guidance are sound, and

we will continue to insist on their implementation at all levels. In 1972, the Military Departments published internal documents

implementing DOD Directive 5000.1: Army Regulation 1000-1 was issued in July SECNAV Instruction 5000.1 in March, and Air Force Regulation 800. 2 also in March.

"The Weapon-Systems Acquisition Process

"The Senate Armed Services Committee has held special meetings for the purpose of more clearly understanding the issues involved in the weapon-systems acquisition process. I was pleased to note that six of the seven main themes of the hearings were the same policies established in our DOD Directive 5000.1, or were very similar to them. As we are now implementing all of the suggested new policies, I would like to discuss each of them briefly.

"Less concurrency: We are following the strategy of incremental acquisition, in which achievement must be demonstrated at established milestones before the program proceeds from one major phase to the next. Our newest programs have been structured to reduce concurrency to the practical minimum, and the older programs have been similarly restructured--except for those that are constrained by contractual features such as fixed price or options.

"Designing to a cost: We have established the policy of setting a production-unit cost as a design goal at the initiation of any program that may involve a significant amount of production. Programs already under way are reviewed at key decision points, at which time we establish appropriate design-to-a-cost goals. Of the 46 major defense systems covered by DCPs, 24 either have production-unit-cost thresholds or are conducted under a fixed-price contract to deliver a specified number of production systems.

"Use of prototypes: We are using prototypes to improve the acquisition process from before a program is formally initiated (experimental prototypes) all the way through early production. Two of the most important benefits of these prototyping efforts are the reduction of risk and the establishment of realistic program costs.

"Required hardware competition: The most important kind of competition is one in which there are two or more viable system alternatives to fill a particular military requirement. In this

situation, there is pressure on each system proponent in the running to maintain the best balance between cost and capability. We are therefore emphasizing competitive fly-offs of experimental and developmental prototypes, major programs to improve existing systems, and the evaluation of foreign RDT&E programs.

"Radically smaller industry design teams: We are attacking this problem from both ends of the spectrum--that is, using experimental prototype programs to determine the size of a 'bare-bones' team and, at the other end, scrubbing the 'whole 9 yards' of requirements to the minimum that will still enable the system to fill the operational need.

"Minimal detailed weapon-system requirements: We are taking a hard look at 'nice-to'have' requirements to determine whether those last few percentage points of system performance are worth the cost. This scrubbing is now taking place both within the Services and in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). During the past year we have worked together on this problem on such programs as the A-X, UTTAS, and the new main battle tank.

"More independent operational test and evaluation (OT&E) before a procurement decision: This was probably the most signifi– cant single area of improvement in 1972. The office of the Deputy Director (Test and Evaluation) and the Military Departments, with their organizational OT&E changes, have given the OT&E function a major role in systems acquisition, especially regarding the production decision.

"Cost Controls

"Because of its importance, I mention several times in this report the actions we have taken in an attempt to reverse the constantly upward trend of weapon-system costs.

"In other years, we have reduced our forces to compensate for the greater expense of modern weapons, but, as our forces may be near the minimum required to maintain our worldwide strategic position, we cannot continue to do so in the future. Our studies of the possible impact of rising costs on force modernization show that past approaches could only lead to declining force levels, older systems on the average, or shortage of money.