MILITARY DETERRENCE

Will the military balance shift during the remaining years of the 1970's? It's a fact now that the Soviet Union's inventory of modern, highly technical, strategic weapons is approaching, and in some cases surpassing ours, both in quality and in quantity. And, within a few years we can expect that the People's Republic of China will also have the capability of launching ICBM's, against targets in the United States.

This change in the balance of power is a major concern to all of us and the threat is continuing to grow. Improvements in Soviet strategic weaponry--surface, subsurface and air--continue as evidenced by the increasing expenditures of research and development appropriations.

The following excerpts from President Nixon and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff amplify the above remarks.

In his May 1973 report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's, President Nixon stated in part:

"Defense Policy

"Of all the changes in the international situation over the postwar period discussed in this Report, one of the most fundamental has been the shift in our strategic position.

"The Challenge We Faced

"When I entered office we faced a situation unique in American postwar experience. An era was behind us. In the immediate aftermath of World War II challenges to our security could be met with the assurance that our strategic nuclear position was overwhelmingly superior. By January 1969, the United States no longer enjoyed this strategic preponderance.

"The Soviet Union had embarked on a formidable expansion of its nuclear arsenal. We could chart with some certainty when the Soviet Union would surpass us in numbers of intercontinental

and submarine launched ballistic missiles; we could also project when they could close the technological gap in strategic weapons. Our own offensive building program had virtually ceased, as we had shifted our effort to qualitative improvements. We had developed a concept for ballistic missile defense of our territory, but had no active deployment. We faced a negotiation on strategic arms controls, but had only begun to analyze the relationship to strategic weapons decisions.

"At the same time, our spending for defense had grown substantially. Almost all the increases, however, had been absorbed by the war in Vietnam. The costs of new weapons were escalating, as were the expenses of maintaining the men of our armed forces. In addition, we were bearing burdens abroad for the common defense that seemed out of proportion to those borne by our allies. More than a million Americans were stationed overseas, and our reserves at home were minimal.

"Yet, I found that our strategic doctrine called for an American capability to fight in two major threaters simultaneously. The confrontation atmosphere of the Cold War persisted in both Europe and Asia. But the international environment after 25 years suggested new opportunities for diplomacy and, accordingly, for adjustments in military planning. The rigidity of the confrontation between East and West was erasing, and the conduct of nations could no longer be viewed in the simple bipolar context of military blocs.

"The need for an urgent reexamination of our national security policy and programs was obvious. There were four overriding questions:

What doctrine was appropriate for our strategic forces in an era when the threat of massive retaliation alone was no longer credible in all circumstances and decisive nuclear superiority was probably unattainable?

-- What should the interrelationship be between the programs required for maintaining our strength and our proposals for limiting strategic arms through negotiations?

-- How could we simultaneously satisfy pressing domestic needs, meet our responsibilities in Vietnam, and maintain the

capabilities of our other forces in a period when non-nuclear challenges were an important dimension of the security problem?

How could we, in coordination with our allies, strengthen our mutual defense in a manner that retained their confidence in our reliability but permitted them to play a more prominent role?

"Early in my first term, I made a series of decisions that resulted in a new concept of national security, reflected in the Nixon Doctrine.

"In strategic nuclear policy, we adopted the doctrine of sufficiency. We could no longer be complacent about the strategic status quo merely because we could cause a certain level of destruction in response to an attack. We therefore began to develop a sounder and more flexible doctrine for our forces that would provide other retaliatory options besides a direct attack on millions of people.

"Concurrently, in order to reduce our vulnerability and to compensate for the Soviet buildup, we launched a program to modernize our strategic forces. We continued to convert our land and sea-based missiles to multiple independently targetable warheads (MIRVs). Thus, our missiles which would survive an attack would be able in retaliation to strike their targets with greater assurance of eluding defenses. We laid plans for a new long-range missile and submarine that would reduce vulnerability by allowing operation in a larger ocean area while still in range of targets. In addition, to increase the survivability of our retaliatory forces, we began planning a new strategic bomber to replace the aging B-52 force. We also initiated the Safeguard anti-ballistic missile (ABM) program to protect our land-based retaliatory forces.

"Each of these decisions was taken, however, with the full understanding that, as an integral part of our national security policy, we also would seriously pursue negotiations for arms limitations. We would offer the Soviet Union the opportunity to reach agreement on measures that would enhance the security of both sides.

"Finally, we began to assess our security obligations to determine how our alliance defense posture might be strengthened

through mutual effort. We examined whether U. S. forces in some forward areas might be reduced; in those regions where security required a strong and continuing American presence, as in Europe, we and our allies initiated new programs for sharing the defense burden.

"In the past four years we have laid a solid foundation for safeguarding American security for the remainder of this decade. We are now entering a period of promising prospects for increasing international stability. But the outcome is by no means guaranteed. We are still in a challenging period of transition. We still face difficult decisions.

"There have been a number of positive developments since 1969. Unprecedented progress has been made in strategic arms controls. For the first time in two decades there is a genuine possibility of mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe. Our allies in Western Europe and Asia have become stronger, both economically and militarily, and are contributing more to mutual defense. Tensions in these two regions have been easing. A Vietnam Peace Agreement has been signed and our force of a half million men has returned home.

"On the other hand, we cannot ignore the negative trends that persist. Even though Vietnam is entering a new phase, conflict remains in Indochina and ferment persists in other key areas of the world such as the Middle East where the interests of major powers are involved. Modern weapons are still being delivered to areas of great instability. The Soviet Union is strengthening its armed forces in every major category, including those in which the United States traditionally has had a substantial margin of superiority. A Soviet military presence now has been established in many strategic areas of the world.

"As we determine the requirements for our defense in these circumstances and approach ongoing arms control negotiations, five factors of the current situation are of particular importance:

There is approximate parity between the strategic forces of the United States and the Soviet Union. Soviet numerical advantages are offset by superior American technology.

In such an era greater reliance must be placed on nonnuclear forces.

Technological change while creating new opportunities also poses a potential threat to existing strategic stability.

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Manpower costs have increased substantially. They now absorb more than 56 percent of our entire defense budget, compared with 42 percent a decade ago. Now that we have chosen to rely on all-volunteer forces, the proportion devoted to manpower is not likely to decrease.

-- The costs of increasingly complex modern weapons are also spiraling, further constraining our ability to maintain conventional force levels.

"At the same time, the political climate at home has changed. In spite of the adjustments we have already made to new conditions, we face intensified pressures for further withdrawals of our deployed forces and for greater reductions. In the post-Vietnam environment, some Americans seem eager to return to the prevalent philosophy of the 1930's, and resist U.S. involvement in world affairs. The consensus which sustained our national commitment to a strong American military posture over the postwar period is no longer unchallenged.

"The emerging global order, however, has neither exact historical parallels nor a predestined outcome. American actions will be a decisive determinant of its shape. In a period of developing detente, it is easy to be lulled into a false sense of security. Threats are less blatant; the temptation is greater to make unilateral reductions and neglect the realities of existing forces of potential adversaries.

"In such a fluid period we have no responsible choice but to remain alert to the possibility that the current trend toward detente with the Soviet Union and China may not prove durable. We have only begun an era of negotiations. We must not now ignore fundamental changes in the balance of forces or in the potential strength of our adversaries in an era of rapid change. To do so would only tempt challenges to our security interests