148 Opinion of the Court. the Court in Marcus. The Government's recovery here is comparable to the recovery under liquidated-damage provisions which fix compensation for anticipated loss. As this Court recognized in Priebe & Sons v. United States, 332 U. S. 407, 411-412, liquidated damages "serve a particularly useful function when damages are uncertain in nature or amount or are unmeasurable, as is the case in many government contracts.. And the fact that no damages are shown is not fatal. Section 26 (b)(1) merely accomplishes the intended result of Congress by authorizing a separate proceeding for the recovery of a lump sum in damages. It is obvious that injury to the Government resulted from the Rex Trailer Company's fraudulent purchase of trucks. It precluded bona fide sales to veterans, decreased the number of motor vehicles available to Government agencies, and tended to promote undesirable speculation. The damages resulting from this injury may be difficult or impossible to ascertain, but it is the 5 On several of the projects involved in the Marcus case, fraud was discovered by the Government in time for payments to be withheld. At trial in the District Court defendants urged that there could be no recovery of a penalty or forfeiture in these instances where no actual damage could be shown. The District Court held that failure to show actual damage in these instances would not preclude recovery under the statute. United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 41 F. Supp. 197, 218. The judgment of the District Court was affirmed here. See United States v. Rohleder, 157 F. 2d 126, 129. It seems quite probable that there is also an element of unjust enrichment to the Rex Trailer Company from its fraudulent purchases. The record is silent on this point and we have not considered it in arriving at our decision, but the fact that Rex was willing to resort to fraud to purchase the vehicles at the veteran's price strongly suggests an unfair gain from the purchases. The price for sales to priority purchasers was fixed by regulations published in 32 CFR (1946 Supp.) §§ 8302.8 (d), 8302.11, which provided: "Disposal agencies shall fix the fair value at which property shall be acquired by priority claimants. Such a fair value shall not be greater Opinion of the Court. 350 U.S. function of liquidated damages to provide a measure of recovery in such circumstances. On this record it cannot be said that the measure of recovery fixed by Congress in the Act is so unreasonable or excessive that it transformed what was clearly intended as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty. Affirmed. MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER concurs in the judgment substantially for the reasons given by him in his opinion in support of the Marcus decision. 317 U. S., at 553. than the lowest price which is offered to any trade level at the time of acquisition by the priority claimant, or where the fair value is fixed after examining competitive bids, it shall not be greater than the lowest acceptable bid." Syllabus. LOCAL UNION NO. 25 OF THE INTERNATIONAL CERTIORARI TO THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS. No. 33. Argued November 10, 1955.-Decided January 9, 1956. An interstate railroad which engaged in hauling loaded truck-trailers "piggy-back" brought an action in a state court to enjoin a labor union from conduct which interfered with such operation and which allegedly violated the Labor Management Relations Act. Employees of motor carriers with which the union had collective bargaining agreements had been persuaded by agents of the union to refrain from delivering loaded trailers to the railroad for "piggybacking." The union was not concerned in any way with the railroad's labor policy, nor was there any claim that the union interfered in any manner with the railroad's employees. Held: The case is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board, the railroad may seek any remedy it may have before said Board under the Labor Management Relations Act, and the state court had no authority to enjoin the union's conduct. Pp. 156-161. (a) A railroad subject to the Railway Labor Act is not precluded from seeking the aid of the National Labor Relations Board in circumstances unrelated to the railroad's relations with its own employees. Pp. 158-161. (b) The question whether there was a violation of the Labor Management Relations Act is for the National Labor Relations Board to determine. P. 161. (c) Even if the union's conduct is not prohibited by § 8 of the Labor Management Relations Act, it may come within the protection of § 7, in which case the State is not free to enjoin the conduct. P. 161. (d) Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U. S. 468, followed. P. 161. 331 Mass. 720, 122 N. E. 2d 759, reversed. Opinion of the Court. 350 U.S. Stephen J. D'Arcy, Jr. argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief were John D. O'Reilly, Jr. and Richard S. Sullivan. Herbert Burstein argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was William T. Griffin. MR. JUSTICE MINTON delivered the opinion of the Court. Respondent railroad has, since 1937, engaged in hauling, between Boston, Massachusetts, and other points in New England, loaded trailers of the type ordinarily hauled over the highways by motor carriers. This operation is popularly known as "piggy-backing." Trailers to be shipped from Boston are delivered to respondent's freight yard by employees of the motor carriers. There they are detached from the tractors and driven by special devices onto respondent's flatcars by employees of New England Transportation Co., a motor carrier, which is a subsidiary of respondent. The trailers are secured to the flatcars by respondent's employees. Petitioners are the local teamsters union, one of its officers and two of its business agents. The union, by virtue of collective-bargaining agreements, represents a large number of drivers and helpers of certain motor carriers which are engaged in over-the-road hauling of freight between Boston and other points in New England. Respondent's "piggy-backing" operations have steadily increased over the years, with a resulting loss of work for truck drivers. The union sought, without success, in 1946, and again in 1949, an agreement by the motor carriers to cease shipping trailers by "piggy-back." Having failed in these and subsequent negotiations to dissuade the trucking companies from participating in "piggybacking," petitioner union assigned petitioners Norton and McCarthy, business agents of the union, to patrol 155 Opinion of the Court. the entrance to respondent's Yard 5 where trailers are delivered for "piggy-back" operations. On July 11, 12 and 14, 1952, Norton and McCarthy stopped a number of truck-drawn trailers owned by carriers with whom petitioner union had collective-bargaining agreements and persuaded the drivers to refrain from delivering the trailers to respondent. Employees of New England Transportation Co. were persuaded by Norton and McCarthy not to load previously delivered trailers onto respondent's flatcars. Respondent filed suit in the Superior Court of Suffolk County, Massachusetts, seeking permanently to enjoin petitioners' conduct and, in addition, damages in the sum of $100,000. In its amended complaint respondent alleged, among other things: . . the individual respondents and the respondent union prevented the loading of trailers on flat cars and enforced a boycott against petitioner and a withholding of patronage and services by motor truck carriers and shippers. "The petitioner is informed and believes that the object of the acts committed by the respondents on July 11, 12 and 14, 1952, as set forth in paragraphs '8' and '9' of this complaint was to force or require the petitioner to cease handling and transporting the products of various shippers and motor carriers who employ petitioner's flat car service. "The said acts were and are intended to compel shippers and motor truck carriers to assign work to members of the respondent union and to thereby commit an unfair labor practice in violation of the National Labor Relations Act; and |