February 24

Circular letter, Col. Crosby Field, Ordnance Department, Assistant Director of Safety, directed to all Government plants:

"(1) That ammonium nitrate is an explosive and that its fire and explosive hazards are aggravated when the material is contaminated with combustible or carbonaceous materials as is the case with all oxidizing agents' (R. vol. 33, p. 25196).

March 8

Letter, Wilbert J. Huff, consulting explosives chemist, Bureau of Mines, to Lt. Col. George Ensminger, Safety and Security Branch, Office of Chief of Ordnance, War Department. After stating that the small tests made by the Bureau of Mines would not be conclusive:

"Before these tests were made I repeatedly called attention of representatives of the Department of Agriculture, the Tennessee Valley Authority, and the War Production Board to the hazards of the mixture of ammonium nitrate with organic materials***. For that reason I was quite unwilling to endorse any ammonium nitrate mixture that contained organic materials on the basis of our small-scale study at Bruceton alone."

March 9

Ordnance Department letter to Hercules Powder Co., Du Pont Co., and Atlas Powder Co., concerning the adding of PRP to ammonium nitrate, which is the same FGAN exploding at Texas City, carried this statement in part:

"The technical literature states that a very definite explosion and fire hazard exists when organic materials are added to ammonium nitrate. ***

"Would the experience of the Du Pont Co. allow you to form an estimate of the hazard involved in the coating of ammonium nitrate with a mixture of organic materials at temperatures indicated in the above paragraph?" (R. vol. 33, pp. 25127-25130).

March 14

Answer, DuPont to Ordnance Department letter quoted above. After reciting explosions in DuPont plant attributed "to the presence of petrolatum which found its way to the evaporating pan," Du Pont stated:

"As a result of this occurrence and previous explosions in the ammonium nitrate plant, this company discontinued the coating of ammonium nitrate with any organic compound" (R. vol. 25, pp. 21221-21222).

April 6

At conferences occurring on this date between Dr. Harry Curtis, consultant of TVA, and dean of engineering of the University of Missouri, and other Government officials, Dr. Curtis stated:

"That the hazard involved in the production of ammonium nitrate has long been recognized, that it is probably no greater than that involved in some of our other operations, and that we are justified in continuing our present method of operation as long as the war continues. He believed, however, that for the peacetime production of fertilizer, a safer production method should be developed" (vol. 24, p. 20919). [Italics supplied.]

May

YEAR 1945

Ordnance Department brought out its 1945 edition of the Safety Manual (R. vol. 33, pp. 25139-1 to 25139-34). Subdivision (c) of paragraph 70, headed "Nitrates (Inorganic)," paragraph 3, reads:

"When compounded with combustible substances, nitrates are violent fire and explosive hazards, and may be subject to spontaneous ignition."

Paragraph 4, in part, reads:

"Ammonium nitrate may be exploded by relatively light initiation if it has been sensitized by impurities such as carbonaceous materials."

May 11

Conference notes of WPB conferences on dangers and explosibility of FGAN, which discusses the nonsafety of storage of ammonium nitrate in large quantities, saying further:

"With relation to potential hazards, Dr. P. Miller cited a preliminary report by Underwriters Laboratory on their tests of TVA conditioned ammonium nitrate fertilizer which indicated that the organic coating increased the sen

171

sitivity of ammonium nitrate to detonation. *** That the presence of such conditioner increased the sensitivity of the ammonium nitrate to detonation" (Bulletin 571, P. T. exhibit 246, R. vol. 24, p. 20929).

TVA Report No. 571, captioned "Conditioning of Nitrogenous Fertilizer, Literature Survey," in part says:

"It has been reported in an earlier literature survey (5) that the presence of organic combustible matter as impurity and ammonium nitrate increases the tendency of the ammonium nitrate to explode. According to that survey 1 percent of petrolatum in ammonium nitrate is a better sensitizer than 1 percent of TNT. It has been recognized (4) that the use of organic materials for conditioning ammonium nitrate possibly may be dangerous in that it may increase the explosibility" (R. vol. 24, p. 20928). [Italics supplied.]

July 22

YEAR 1946

Lt. Col. J. S. Jefferds, commandant, Iowa Ordnance Plant, undertook to get up a set of safety standards. Subdivision (c) read:

"Dry ammonium nitrate may be detonated if given the proper stimulus. Detonating qualities are enhanced by contamination of carbonaceous materials, confinement, and heat" (R. vol. 7, pp. 6222-6223).

When queried about this information, on deposition this testimony occurred: "Q. Now, then, in July 1946, you had already discovered what to be fearful of in handling this unpredictable material, ammonium nitrate fertilizer grade?-A. We were aware of the hazards" (R. vol. 7, p. 6224).

Colonel Jefferds also copied from 1941 Ordnance Manual this language: "Ammonium nitrate is not very inflammable at atmospheric temperatures, but fires involving ammonium nitrate in large quantities become an explosive hazard” (R. vol. 25, pp. 21029-21030).

July 24

Maj. Edwin J. Grayson, commanding officer, Nebraska Ordnance Plant, writing for request of waiver of section X, paragraph 80, Ordnance Safety Manual, dealing with manufacture of FGAN and method of shipment, states:

"Consideration must be given to the fact that the nitrate, before leaving the ammonium nitrate line, will be coated with a mixture of clay, petrolatum, rosin, and paraffin, and will be in pellets of about 35 mesh. It is shipped as a fertilizer rather than as explosive" (R. vol. 25, p. 21449). [Italics supplied.]

December 30

The contract between Emergency Export Corporation and the United States Government covering the production of FGAN at the ordnance plants of the Government, under subdivision (b) of article 6-a, provided in part:

"The Government recognizes that the work herein provided for is of a highly dangerous nature, and that its accomplishment under existing conditions will be attendant with even greater risk of damage to property, injuries to persons, and failures or delays in performance due to uncertain and unexpected causes that would normally exist. The Contractor is unwilling to assume said risk for the consideration herein provided. It is therefore agreed that the Contractor shall not be liable to the Government in any amount whatever for failure or delay in performance by it hereunder or for any damage to or destruction of property or for any injury to or death of persons arising out of or in connection with the work hereunder, no matter what the cause thereof may be or may seem to be" (R. vol. 29, p. 23364). [Italics supplied.]

December

Report of B. T. Christiansen, chief chemist for Emergency Export Corporation, the supervising agent of the Government in the manufacture of FGAN. Mr. Christiansen says, in this volume, which was circulated to Army Ordnance: "Ammonium nitrate supports the combustion of oxidizable materials" and "If mixed with carbonaceous materials it is exploded more readily" (R. vol. 38, p. 27703).

(NOTE.-Major Starr, commanding officer, Nebraska Ordnance Plant, admits that the information in Christiansen's bulletin and article was in the Ordnance files when he, Starr, arrived as the commander at the ordnance plant, Starr stating (R. vol. 8, p. 6476): "Well, the information reported on there has been known for some time.")

REPORT OF EMERGENCY EXPORT CORPORATION, DATED AUGUST 27, 1946 "It was brought out at the time of discussion that experience Emergency Export Corporation had in making export shipments of grained ammonium nitrate in paper bags had brought out the fact that approximately 20 percent of the bags had been broken open upon arrival at overseas destinations. It was suggested that certain containers which were surplus to the needs of the War Department might be utilized in shipping ammonium nitrate" (R. vol. 29, p. 23261). YEAR 1947

January 16

H. A. Campbell, chief inspector, Bureau of Explosives, writes Chief of Ordnance in alarm over boxcar fires of FGAN, stating:

"Inquiry developed that loading temperatures have been ranging from 180° to 210° F. It was also developed that it has not been uncommon to find that paper bags in which the nitrates were shipped badly charred and disintegrated when unloaded at destination. I am of the opinion that loading temperatures in this material are excessively high and continued spontaneous heating in material loaded at these temperatures is liable to result in fires in transportation. Your assistance is solicited in handling the matter so that future shipments will be cooled to a temperature not to exceed 120° F. at time of loading" (R. vol. 29, pp. 2298922990). (Italics supplied.]

March 7

Advice of Campbell handled this manner:

"Duncan Smith took letters from plant to D. C. and discussed with Mr. H. D. Reynolds, who answered Mr. Campbell's letter to the effect that it is not feasible to accept his recommendation" (R. vol. 29, pp. 22989-22990).

January 27

Letter from Chief of Ammunition Supply Division, Office of the Commanding General of Ordnance Department, stating in part, in reference to Campbell letter: "This matter has been discussed with Colonel Tibbitts, of the Safety and Security Division, and they have no objection to the ammonium nitrate being loaded at a maximum temperature of 190° F. It is realized that the request to not exceed 120° F. at time of loading is not practical" (R. vol. 13, p. 9444). May 28

Col. Joel E. Holmes, field director, Ordnance Department, reports to Chief Field Director of Ammunition Plants on paper bag tests, same paper bags used at Texas City:

"The Union Bag Co. has reported that ammonium nitrate dust on paper bags, upon absorbing sufficient moisture from the air to become damp will cause serious damage to the paper. ***Special tests conducted at Iowa Ordnance Plant show that the inner ply of multiwall bags suffers degradation after 24 hours heating in an oven maintained at 100° C. (212° F.) under conditions wherein the paper is embedded in a dish of ammonium nitrate fertilizer."

January 22

Union Bag & Paper Corp. report, after a series of tests, on the same bags used to sack the ammonium nitrate exploding at Texas City:

"At 90° relative humidity we found that paper in a bag will pick up moisture to a point where it has a moisture content of 15 percent or over. This amount of moisture in the bag walls, when filled with hot ammonium nitrate, will cause the disintegration which occurred. This disintegration will occur even at temperatures as low as 200° and probably lower, although we did not experiment at temperatures under 200°." [Italics supplied.]

Because of its findings, the bag company recommends:

"If this is not possible from a warehousing point of view, it would be our suggestion to reduce the packing temperature to a range of 160° F.-175° F. *** From our understanding of your operations it is questionable if you have the facilities to warehouse these bags under the relative humidity conditions suggested. *** It has been our observation in other plants where ammonium nitrate is packed with little or no deterioration of the bags, that their packing is done within the range of approximately 160° F. to 170° F. and that they experienced none of the difficulties which currently face you. It would be our strong recommendation that if possible your packing temperature range be reduced to that noted above" (R. vol. 29, p. 23411). [Italics supplied.]

January 1947 to April 15, 1947

Testimony of Colonel Jefferds, commanding officer, Iowa Ordnance Plant: "Q. Let's move on. We are at a temperature of 250 to 258. What happened to the material at that point?-A. At that point the material is dropped down through the shaker screen.

"Q. That is the Ro-Ball screen?—A. Yes, I believe that is the name. They were shaker screens.

"Q. Through the screen passed whatever the size of the screen was in the way of grains of material, is that right?-A. Yes.

"Q. Into what?-A. Into bags.

"Q. Bags immediately under your kettles, is that right?-A. That is right.

"Q. How much time elapsed occurring between the bagging under the kettles and the delivery to the sewing machines at Central Bagging? —A. Oh, 15 or 20 minutes, perhaps" (R. vol. 7, pp. 6096–6097). [Italics supplied.]

January to April 15

Colonel Jefferds, commanding officer, Iowa Ordnance Plant, testified as follows: "Q. So far as FDAP was concerned, notwithstanding what Lieutenant Colonel Meldrum sent you, and notwithstanding what you were telling them, that they could either take production or lower temperature, but that you could not give them both, you told them that, didn't you?-A. In effect, yes."

Jefferds further testifying:

"Q. FDAP never ordered you to reduce temperatures and sacrifice production, did they?-A. They never ordered us to go to 120°.

"Q. Or never less than 200°, did they, before Texas City?-A. That is correct. "Q. In fact, never less than 210° F. at Texas City, did they?-A. I believe that is also correct."

October 30, 1946

Letter, International Paper Co., on bag damage, stating, in part:

"It is my understanding that the temperature of your material at the time it is filled into the bags is well above 212° F., and in addition, that your filled bags are normally loaded quite rapidly into cars which are closed and transshipped in the main to gulf ports, so that upon arrival at these ports the paper in the bags has not only been thoroughly dried out, but has had little if any opportunity to regain its normal moisture content" (R. vol. 29, p. 23414).

March 4, 1947

Col. Carroll H. Deitrick, now Brigadier General Deitrick, then head of Safety and Security Division of Ordnance, and executive officer to Maj. Gen. Everett S. Hughes, Chief of Ordnance, wrote Picatinny Arsenal asking for certain tests and stating:

"Because of the similarity of the accidents, and owing to the fact that the fertilizer is bagged at temperatures of approximately 190° F. to 240° F. in duplex paper bags placed immediately into boxcars under relatively restricted conditions of free air circulation, this office suspects that the fires may have resulted from the normal high temperatures fertilizer in combination with easy ignitability of the duplex paper sack" (R. vol. 30, p. 23829).

May 21

J. C. Holtz and R. L. Grant made an official investigation for the Bureau of Mines of the ammonium nitrate fertilizer exploding at Texas City entitled "Manufacture of Ammonium Nitrate Fertilizer of the Type That Exploded at Texas City." On the matter of heating and bag conditions, this was stated:

"According to plant experience (56) fertilizer packed in the multiwall paper bags at 93° C. (199° F.) does not heat further. If packed at 104° C. (219° F.) and loaded promptly into railroad cars, the asphalt in the bags begins to bleed. If packed at 110° C. (230° F.) the insides of the bags show charring, particularly if heat losses are minimized. At 118° C. (244° F.) the three inner sheets are considerably weakened by charring and embrittlement. At 150° C. (302° F.) simulated bags ignited spontaneously in 5 or 6 hours."

May 7

Col. Gordon C. Tibbitts, assistant to Col. Carroll H. Deitrick, executive officer to Maj. Gen. Everett S. Hughes, Chief of Ordnance, was ordered to Texas City to make an official investigation and report of the catastrophe there occurring. A part of that report states:

78228-56-12

"The ammonium nitrate fertilizer on both ships, at least the greater portion, obviously detonated with high order as a result of fire. It is known that ammonium nitrate will detonate under certain conditions of elevated temperature when in the presence of carbonaceous materials. **There is ample carbonaceous material available in the bags in which the fertilizer is packed in addition to a wide variety of contaminants in the hold of a ship with which material from broken bags would come in contact. *** Despite the fact that the bags are raised off the floor by the dunnage a broken bag will permit the nitrate to sift down through the dunnage onto the floor. This condition will always be present when the fertilizer is packed in paper bags” (R. vol. 25, pp. 21171–21172).

January to April 15

Capt. George E. McCabe, United States Coast Guard, Chief of Staff, Eighth Coast Guard District, including Texas City, testified as follows:

"Q. Now, prior to April 16-17, 1947, the dates of the great Texas City disaster, did you ever know before that time that ammonium nitrate could or might explode? A. No.

"Q. Up to that time, from the standpoint of cargo, you viewed it as a harmless material, such as cottonseed meal, or flour, or sugar, or things of that sort?A. Yes, or coal, or anything else” (R. vol. 9, p. 7311).

April 29 to May 6

Official United States Coast Guard Board of Inquiry into explosion and fire on steamship Grandcamp, Texas City, in its finding No. 2, condemned the United States Government as follows:

"The shipping officers of the United States Army, Iowa Ordnance Plant, West Burlington, Iowa, the Cornhusk Ordnance Plant, Coplant, Nebr., and the Nebraska Ordnance Plant, Firestone, Nebr., violated section 417 of the Interstate Commerce Commission Regulations governing the transportation of explosives and other dangerous articles, dated January 7, 1941, and in effect at time of shipment by describing the substance offered for transportation by rail under a shipping name not authorized by subject regulations" (R. vol. 24, p. 20675). [Italics supplied.]

March 17, 1947

Certificate by Capt. Albert F. Hine, Transportation Corps, at Gulfport, Miss., October 19 through November 4, 1946, November 6 through 26, 1946, and November 8 through December 1, 1946. First report shows 4,600 bags out of 188,832 bags, listed as damaged with first cause "deterioration and partial charring of bags due to ammonium nitrate being bagged hot, contents of some bags remained at a relatively high temperature as long as 48 hours after cars were unloaded and ammonium nitrate placed on wharf" (Jefferds exhibits 19-C, 19-D. and 19-E). (Not printed.)

May 13, 1946

Letter B. T. Christiansen, chief chemist of Emergency Export Corporation, to Dr. John C. Holtz, of the Bureau of Mines, in part stated:

"The tests were made in an effort to determine the factors relevant to the charring of bags. The tests were precipitated because of reports of ammonium nitrate bags arriving at their destination in a charred condition. The reports of charred bags were not investigated and the fact as to whether or not they were actually charred has never been established” (R. vol. 27, p. 22066). [Italics supplied.]

May 19, 1947

Report, Colonel Stribling, commanding officer, Ravenna Arsenal, to Field Director of Ammunition Plants, on trip to port of Baltimore, stated in part:

"Throughout the visit it was apparent that personnel handling fertilizer at the port had not been given complete instructions as to the type of material which can be stored with fertilizer, nor are they fully familiar with the problems incidental to proper handling" (R., p. 23092).

June 12, 1947

Confidential circular to branches of the Ordnance Department from Colonel Deitrick, Chief of Safety Division, and executive officer to Commanding Officer of Ordnance. In part it said:

"The Ordnance Department has recognized the explosive properties and capabilities of ammonium nitrate under certain conditions as cited in paragraph 70(a) 1, 70(c) 2, 3, and 4, of the Ordnance Safety Manual, O. O. Form 7224, extracts of which are as follows: