not in actual possession of the United States, until they were reduced to such possession. MacLeod v. United States, 416.

2. Military occupation; collection of duties on imports; application of executive orders.

Executive orders regarding the collection of duties on goods imported into the Philippine Islands during the military occupancy thereof by the United States did not apply to any ports, such as Cebu, during the time that they were not in the possession and under the control of the United States. Ib.

3. Military occupation of; collection of duties on imports; application of executive orders.

The principles of international law were recognized by the Executive in issuing orders concerning the government of the Philippine Islands during military occupancy thereof, and this court will not construe an order directing payment of duties on imports as relating to goods brought into ports in the possession of the de facto government of the insurgents. Ib.

4. Military occupation of; duties on imports; executive order of July 12, 1898; effect of place of residence of importer.

The fact that the importer of goods brought into a port of the Philippine Islands which had not been reduced to possession by the United States but was still under control of a de facto government of the insurgents resided in Manila which was under military occupancy did not make him subject to the executive order of July 12, 1898, to pay duties on such goods. Ib.

5. Military occupancy; duties on imports; application of ratification of executive acts.

The act of June 30, 1906, c. 3912, 34 Stat. 636, ratifying executive acts

imposing duties, does not apply to duties collected at points which the United States had not occupied and which were in possession of insurgent de facto governments. United States v. Heinszen, 206 U. S. 370, distinguished. Ib.

6. Military occupancy; duties on imports; legality of exaction. Duties collected by the United States on cargoes imported at ports in the Philippine Islands which had not been reduced to possession by the United States but were in possession of the de facto government of insurgents were an illegal and unwarranted exaction covered neither by the order of the President nor the ratifying acts of Congress. Ib.

PLEADING.

See CONVEYANCES, 2;

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 1.

POLICE POWER.

Businesses within; coal mining.

Coal mining is a dangerous business and subject to police regulation Barrett v. Indiana, 26.

by the State.

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE.

1. Amendment of pleading; interference with discretion of trial court. Even if the decision of a state court having jurisdiction of a case trans

ferred from a Federal court were subject to review here on a nonFederal question, this court would not, in the absence of manifest error, interfere with the discretion of the trial judge in permitting or refusing an amendment. First National Bank v. Keys, 179.

2. Application of local law as to form of local statute. Where there has been a constant legislative and executive construction

of a provision of the constitution of the State in regard to the title of a statute clearly expressing the object thereof, this court will not, in view of the consequences of striking down legislation, declare a statute invalid on account of defective title where, as in this case, there has been substantial compliance with the requirements of the constitution of the State in that regard. Citizens Telephone Co. v. Fuller, 322.

3. Certification of facts found by territorial supreme court.

The facts found are certified to this court by the territorial Supreme

Court either by adopting the findings of the trial court or by making separate findings of its own. Citizens National Bank v. Davisson, 212.

4. Deference to concurring judgments of lower courts.

Where the trial court and the Circuit Court of Appeals have, after considering the evidence, confirmed the verdict, this court will hesitate to say that their concurring judgments are not such as could be reasonably formed or are without foundation as matter of law. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Brown, 317.

5. Following state court's findings of fact.

It is only in exceptional cases that this court does not accept the facts as found by the state Supreme Court; and where, as in this case, those facts are supported by competent testimony it will not retry issues of fact already properly heard and determined by courts of competent jurisdiction. Portland Ry. Co. v. Oregon Railroad Commission, 397, 414.

6. Following state court's findings of fact. Where the record does not clearly disclose all facts necessary on which to base conclusions, this court will not overrule the state tribunal and declare rates fixed by it within its jurisdiction to be confiscatory and violative of rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendment. Ib.

7. Following state court's construction of state statute.

A construction by the state court that the equality provisions of a state statute regulating railway fares applies to localities as well as to individuals is binding upon this court, and the constitutionality of the statute will be determined as so construed. Ib.

8. Following state court's ruling as to rights acquired under contract with State.

This court follows the ruling of the state court on the question whether contracts between the purchaser and the State convey such an equitable title that the certificates of purchase are real estate. Robertson v. Howard, 254.

9. Following state court's construction of state grants.

The determination by the state court of the effect of grants of title to the bed of navigable waters within the State must be followed by this court. Lewis Blue Point Oyster Co. v. Briggs, 82.

10. Scope of review of judgment of Circuit Court of Appeals. Where the case is within the class which it was the purpose of the Judiciary Act of 1891 to submit to the final jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of Appeals, this court goes no further than to inquire whether plain error is made out. (Texas & Pacific Railway v. Howell, 224 U. S. 577.) Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Brown, 317.

11. Scope of review of order of Circuit Court of Appeals granting injunction in equity case.

On a review of an order of the Circuit Court of Appeals granting an injunction in an equity case, this court is not confined to considering the act of granting the injunction, but if it determines that there is any insuperable objection to maintaining the bill it may direct a final decree dismissing it. Denver v. New York Trust Co., 123.

See INSTRUCTIONS TO JURY, 2;
JURISDICTION, A 3; D 5.

PREEMPTION ENTRIES.

See INDIANS, 2, 7.

PREFERENCES.

See BANKRUPTCY, 8, 10-13, 14.

PRESS.

See MAILS, 2-5.

PRESUMPTIONS.

See BANKRUPTCY, 3, 5;

BANKS AND Banking, 2, 3, 4;

STATUTES, A 8.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.

See BANKS AND BANKING, 2, 3, 4;
ESCROW, 4.

PRINCIPAL AND SURETY.

1. Alteration to discharge surety; consideration in determining.

A court of equity looks to substance rather than to form. Whether the

contract of the principal has been so altered as to discharge the surety is to be decided according to the essentials. Wilkinson v. McKimmie, 590.

2. Alteration to discharge surety; what amounts to.

In this case held that an arrangement as to a reservation in a conveyance made simply to save expense of reconveyance and which did

not alter the position of the principal or his surety was not such a material change as would discharge the surety. Ib.

3. Liability of surety for acts of principal not specified in bond. Sureties on the official bond of a public officer are not, in the absence of statutory provisions, responsible for his failure to account for moneys received and held by him extra-officially and not specified in the bond. District of Columbia v. Petty, 593.

1. Spanish grants; proceedings on which grant issued.

The proceedings on which the grant involved in this case was issued

are substantially the same as those in United States v. Sandoval, 167 U. S. 278. Bond v. Barela, 488.