DUTIES ON IMPORTS.
See PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, 2-6.
EJECTMENT.
See EQUITY, 1.
See MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 5.
EMBEZZLEMENT.
See BANKRUPTCY, 5.
1. What constitutes a taking; effect of deepening of channel in interests of
navigation as taking of oyster bed affected.
The deepening, in the interest of navigation, of a channel across a
navigable bay, the bed of which is used for oyster cultivation
under grants from the State, is not a taking of the property of the
lessee of the oyster beds within the meaning of the Fifth Amend-
ment. Lewis Blue Point Oyster Co. v. Briggs, 82.
2. Compensation to which owner of upland taken for improvement of
navigable river entitled.
An owner of upland bordering on a navigable river which is taken
under condemnation by the Government for the purpose of im-
proving navigation is entitled to compensation for the fair value of
the property, but not to any additional values based upon private
interest in the potential water power of the river. United States v.
Chandler-Dunbar Co., 53.
3. Compensation to satisfy Fifth Amendment.
The Fifth Amendment is satisfied by payment to the owner of what he
actually loses; it does not demand what the taker has gained.
(Chamber of Commerce v. Boston, 217 U. S. 189.) Ib.
4. Compensation to which owner of property taken for improvement of
navigation entitled.
One whose property is taken by the Government for improvement of
the navigation of the river on which it borders is not entitled to
the probably advanced value by reason of the contemplated im-
provement. The value is to be fixed as of the date of the proceed-
ings. Ib.
5. Compensation; considerations in appraisal of land taken.
One whose land is taken by the Government for a particular purpose is
entitled to have the fact that the land is peculiarly available for
such purpose considered in the appraisal. (Boom Co. v. Patterson,
98 U. S. 403.) Ib.
6. Compensation; where land taken includes streets title to which is in
Government.
Where a survey of a town site has not been carried out the title of the
streets does not pass out of the United States and the value of the
street cannot be added to that of the abutting property in condem-
nation proceedings at the instance of the United States. Ib.
7. Compensation; effect of additional value resulting from improvement for
which land is taken.
The owner of a separate parcel is not entitled to additional value re-
sulting as part of a comprehensive scheme of improvement, re-
quiring the taking of his and other property. (Chamber of Com-
merce v. Boston, 217 U. S. 189.) Ib.
8. Compensation; strategic value of property taken not considered.
"Strategic value" cannot be allowed in condemnation proceedings;
the value of the property to the Government for a particular use is
not the criterion. The owner is compensated when he is allowed
full market value. Ib.
9. Compensation; owner entitled to what.
The owner of property taken in eminent domain proceedings is entitled
to be paid only for what is taken as the title stands, Chamber of
Commerce v. Boston, 217 U. S. 189; hypothetical possibilities of
change cannot be considered. United States v. Chandler-Dunbar
Water Co., ante, p. 53, followed, and Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98
U. S. 403, distinguished. McGovern v. New York, 363.
10. Compensation; discretion of trial court as to admissibility of evidence
of values.
A wide discretion is allowed the trial court in regard to admission of
evidence as to the value of property taken by eminent domain, and
this court will not interfere on the ground of denial of due process of
law where there was no plain disregard of the owner's rights. Ib.
11. Compensation; speculative values.
Enhanced value of property as a part of a great public work depends
upon the whole land necessary being taken therefor. The chance
that all the property necessary can be acquired without the ex-
ercise of eminent domain is too remote and speculative to be al-
lowed. (C., B. & Q. Ry. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226.) Ib.
12. Compensation; wrong in; imputation to court and not to statute.
Where the state statute requires condemnation commissioners to de-
termine the just and equitable compensation, any wrong done, so
far as amount is concerned, is due not to the statute, but to errors of
the court as to evidence or measure of damages. Ib.
13. Effect of proceeding as concession of title in party proceeded against.
Where the state of the title and pending litigation affecting it is set
up in the pleadings, the fact that the Government seeks condemna-
tion of the property does not amount to conceding that the title
is in the party claiming it and against whom the proceeding is
directed. In this case all rights were reserved. United States v.
Chandler-Dunbar Co., 53.
L See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 7;
JURISDICTION, A 8;
NAVIGABLE WATERS, 7, 8, 15, 16.
See EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT;
INSTRUCTIONS TO JURY, 1;
MASTER AND SERVANT.
EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT.
1. Application dependent upon existence of interstate commerce.
Whether the Federal or state statute is applicable depends upon
whether the injuries of the employé were sustained while the com-
pany was engaged and the employé was employed in interstate
commerce. St. Louis, S. F. & T. Ry. Co. v. Seale, 156.
2. Contributory negligence; diminution of damages; sufficiency of instruc-
tion.
An instruction that contributory negligence of the employé goes by
way of diminution of damages, held not error because the statute
says that in such a case the jury must diminish the damages, it ap-
pearing that the words objected to followed an instruction that the
damages in such a case shall be diminished by the jury, and the
words objected to were meant to give effect to, and not to qualify,
the previous instruction. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. Earnest,
114.
3. Contributory negligence provision; effect to abrogate common-law rule
as to exoneration of master.
The purpose of the provision regarding contributory negligence in
Employers' Liability Act is to abrogate the common-law rule of
complete exoneration of the carrier from liability in case of any
negligence whatever on the part of the employé and to substitute
therefor a new rule confining the exoneration to a proportional part
of the damages corresponding to the amount of negligence attribu-
table to the employé. Ib.
4. Recovery under; existence of interstate commerce essential.
Under the Employers' Liability Act a right of recovery exists only
where the injury is suffered while the carrier is engaged in inter-
state commerce and while the employé is employed in such com-
merce; but it is not essential that the co-employé causing the in-
jury be also employed in such commerce. Pedersen v. Delaware, L.
& W. R. R. Co., 146.
5. Recovery under; who entitled; when engaged in interstate commerce.
One engaged in the work of maintaining tracks, bridges, engines or
cars in proper condition after they have become and during their
use as instrumentalities of interstate commerce, is engaged in in-
terstate commerce, and this even if those instrumentalities are
used in both interstate and intrastate commerce. Ib.
6. Recovery under; who entitled; when engaged in interstate commerce.
One carrying materials to be used in repairing an instrumentality of
interstate commerce is engaged in such commerce; and so held, that
a railroad employé carrying bolts to be used in repairing an inter-
state railroad and who was injured by an interstate train is en-
titled to sue under the Employers' Liability Act of 1908. Ib.
7. Recovery under; who entitled to maintain action.
Where the Federal Employers' Liability Act applies, no one but the
injured employé or, in case of his death, his personal representative,
can maintain the action. St. Louis, S. F. & T. Ry. Co. v. Seale, 156.
8. Recovery under; who entitled; when engaged in interstate commerce.
An employé whose duty is to take the numbers of, and seal up and
label, cars, some of which are engaged in interstate, and some in
intrastate, traffic, is directly and not indirectly engaged in inter-
state commerce. Ib.
9. Supremacy over state statutes.
Where the Federal Employers' Liability Act is applicable, the state
statute on the same subject is excluded by reason of the supremacy
of the former. Ib.
EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 5, 9-14.
EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL.
See ESTOPPEL.
1. Aid of, to enjoin maintenance of ejectment suits and adjudicate title.
Parties in possession of land under titles from various sources and hav-
ing the equitable, as well as the legal, title to a portion of it and the
equitable, but not the legal, title to the remainder, may, under the
circumstances of this case, properly invoke the aid of equity to re-
strain other parties from maintaining ejectment suits and to ad-
judicate the title to the entire tract in a single suit. Camp v. Boyd,
530.
2. Attitude and functions.
Equity regards that as done which ought to be done. It looks to the
true intent and meaning, rather than to the form. It relieves of
consequences of accident and mistake as well as fraud. Ib.
A court of equity ought to do justice completely and not by halves. Ib.
4. Intent of parties; meaning of term "ground rents" as used in convey-
ance; ascertainment and application.
While a term, such as "ground rents," used in a conveyance may not
be the recognized equivalent of any legal estate in lands, the court
may ascertain the recognized meaning given to it and resort to
that as evidence of the intent of the parties using it and thus deter-
mine what effect ought in equity to be given to it. Ib.
5. Multiplicity of suits; prevention of; determination of purely legal
rights.
As a court of equity should prevent multiplicity of suits, it may, to
this end, if obliged to take cognizance of a suit for any purpose re-
tain it for all purposes even though required to determine purely
legal rights otherwise beyond its authority. Ib.
6. Jurisdiction to enjoin collection of tax.
The fraud, accident or mistake necessary to justify an equitable action
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