compensation before a party can make out that the State has deprived him of his property unconstitutionally. Backus v. Fort Street Union Depot Co., 169 U. S. 557, 575, 576. As it is put in the case most frequently cited in favor of the right to a writ of error, "we are permitted only to inquire whether the trial court prescribed any rule for the guidance of the jury that was in absolute disregard of the company's right to just compensation." And again the final judgment of a state court "ought not to be held in violation of the due process of law enjoined by the Fourteenth Amendment unless by the rulings upon questions of law the company was prevented from obtaining substantially any compensation." Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226, 246, 247; Appleby v. Buffalo, 221 U. S. 524, 531, 532.

The present case of course does not show disregard of McGovern's rights or that he was prevented from obtaining substantially any compensation. Even if the plaintiff in error is right, it shows only that the Commissioners and courts of New York adopted too narrow a view upon a doubtful point in the measure of damages. It hardly even is so strong as that; for the ruling of the Commissioners is not to be taken as an abstract universal proposition, but the judgment concerning this particular case found by men presumably, as the plaintiff in error says, men of experience who had or were free to acquire outside information concerning the general conditions of the taking and the selected site. The plaintiff in error quotes authority that, probably for this reason, the New York courts will not set aside an award of such Commissioners unless so palpably wrong as to shock the sense of justice. It is conceded 'that the owner is not permitted to take advantage of the necessities of the condemning party,' and it would seem that it well might be that the Commissioners regarded it as too plain to be shaken by evidence, on the public facts, that the value of the land for a reservoir

site could not come into consideration except upon the hypothesis that the City of New York could not get along without it and that its only means of acquisition was voluntary sale by owners aware of the necessity and intending to make from it the most they could. It is just this advantage that a taking by eminent domain excludes. But if the rulings complained of be taken as universal propositions they present no element of the arbitrary even if they should be thought to be wrong. The enhanced value of the land as part of the Ashokan reservoir depends on the whole land necessary being devoted to that use. There are said to have been hundreds of titles to different parcels of that land. If the parcels were not brought together by a taking under eminent domain, the chance of their being united by agreement or purchase in such a way as to be available well might be regarded as too remote and speculative to have any legitimate effect upon the valuation. See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226, 249. The plaintiff in error was entitled to be paid only for what was taken from him as the titles stood, and could not add to the value by the hypothetical possibility of a change unless that possibility was considerable enough to be a practical consideration and actually to influence prices. Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Boston, 217 U. S. 189, 195. In estimating that probability the power of effecting the change by eminent domain must be left out. The principle is illustrated in an extreme form by the disallowance of the strategic value for improvements of the island in St. Mary's River in United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., ante, p. 53.

The plaintiff in error relies upon cases like Mississippi &c. Boom Company v. Patterson, 98 U. S. 403, to sustain his position that while the valuation cannot be increased by the fact that his land has been taken for a water supply still it can be by the fact that the land is valuable for that purpose. The difficulties in the way of such evidence and

the wide discretion allowed to the trial court are well brought out in Sargent v. Merrimac, 196 Massachusetts, 171. Much depends on the circumstances of the particular case. We are satisfied on all the authorities that whether we should have agreed or disagreed with the Commissioners, if we had been valuing the land, there was no such disregard of plain rights by the courts of New York as to warrant our treating their decision, made without prejudice, in due form and after full hearing, as a denial by the State of due process of law.

Judgment affirmed.

MR. JUSTICE DAY dissents.

NASH v. UNITED STATES.

CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT.

No. 197. Argued March 18, 19, 1913.-Decided June 9, 1913.

In many instances a man's fate depends upon his rightly estimating, that is as the jury subsequently estimates it, some matter of degree, and there is no constitutional difficulty in the way of enforcing the criminal provisions of the Sherman Anti Trust Act on the ground of uncertainty as to the prohibitions.

The Sherman Act punishes the conspiracies at which it is aimed on the common law footing and does not make the doing of any act other than the act of conspiring a condition of liability. In this respect it differs from § 5440 and the indictment need not aver overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy. Brown v. Elliott, 225 U. S. 392, distinguished.

This court can see no reason for reading into the Sherman Act more than it finds there.

It is not necessary for an indictment under the Sherman Act to allege

or prove that all the conspirators proceeded against are traders. Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U. S. 274.

Where the indictment under the Sherman Act alleges numerous methods employed by the defendants to accomplish the purpose to restrain trade, it is not necessary, in order to convict, to prove every means alleged but it is error to charge that a verdict may be permitted on any one of them when some of them would not warrant a finding of conspiracy.

186 Fed. Rep. 489, reversed.

THE facts, which involve the validity of a verdict and sentence for alleged violations of the Sherman AntiTrust Act, are stated in the opinion.

Mr. Samuel B. Adams and Mr. John C. Spooner, with whom Mr. George Rublee was on the brief, for petitioners.

Mr. Assistant to The Attorney General Fowler, with whom Mr. Alexander Akerman, United States Attorney, was on the brief, for the United States.

MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the court.

This is an indictment in two counts-the first for a conspiracy in restraint of trade, the second for a conspiracy to monopolize trade, contrary to the act of July 2, 1890, c. 647, 26 Stat. 209, commonly known as the Sherman Act. Originally there was a third count for monopolizing, but it was held bad on demurrer and was struck out.

The allegations of fact in the two counts are alike. Summed up in narrative form they are as follows: The American Naval Stores Company, a West Virginia corporation having its principal office in Savannah and branch offices in New York, Philadelphia, Chicago, etc., was engaged in buying, selling, shipping and exporting spirits of turpentine in and from Southern States to other States and abroad. Nash was the president; Shotter, chairman

of the board of directors; Myers, vice-president; Boardman, treasurer; DeLoach, secretary, and Moller, manager of the Jacksonville, Florida, branch. The National Transportation and Terminal Company, a New Jersey corporation, had warehouses and terminals for handling spirits of turpentine and naval stores at Fernandina, and other places named, in Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, etc., and was engaged in storing such turpentine and rosin and issuing warehouse receipts for the same. Myers was the president; DeLoach the secretary and Moller manager of the Jacksonville branch. On May 1, 1907, it is alleged, these corporations and individuals conspired to restrain commerce in the articles named, among the States and with foreign nations-the restraint to be effected in the following ways among others: (1) by bidding down turpentine and rosin so that competitors could sell them only at ruinous prices; (2) by causing naval stores receipts that naturally would go to one port to go to another; (3) by purchasing thereafter a large part of 'its' supplies at ports known as closed ports and, with intent to depress the market, refraining from purchasing any appreciable part at Savannah, the primary market in the United States for naval stores, where purchases would tend to strengthen prices, the defendants taking the receipts at the closed ports named on a basis of the market at Savannah; (4) by coercing factors and brokers into contracts with the defendants for the storage and purchase of their receipts and refusing to purchase from such factors and brokers unless such contracts were entered into; (5) by circulating false statements as to naval stores production and stocks on hand; (6) by issuing fraudulent warehouse receipts; (7) by fraudulently grading, regrading and raising grades of rosins and falsely gauging spirits of turpentine; (8) by attempting to bribe employés of competitors so as to obtain information concerning their business and stocks; (9) by inducing consumers, by payments and