Argument for Plaintiff in Error. 229 U. S. 429, 436; 12 Amer. & Eng. Encyc. of Law, 2d ed., 484, citing Spring Valley Water Works v. Drinkhouse, 92 California, 528; Chandler v. Jamaica Pond Aqueduct, 125 Massachusetts, 544; Lake Shore Ry. Co. v. Chicago R. R. Co., 100 Illinois, 21, 33; Read v. Barker, 30 N. J. L. 378; S. C., 32 N. J. L. 477; Lowell v. Middlesex County, 146 Massachusetts, 403; Warren v. Spencer Water Co., 143 Massachusetts, 155. Claimant is not seeking to measure the value of his land by the profits which the city will derive from its use. He contends, however, that the savings accruing to the condemning party by taking the particular land in question in preference to other land of a similar character, which saving would accrue to any person using the land for the same purposes, must be taken into consideration, as competent evidence of the market value of the property. Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U. S. 403; Great Falls Mfg. Co. v. United States, 16 Ct. Cl. 160, aff'd, 112 U. S. 645. In Great Britain in reservoir site cases, availability and adaptability must be taken into consideration. Manchester v. Countess Ossilinski (unreported, but cited in Re Brookfield, 176 N. Y. 138, Vol. 2043, N. Y. Law Institute Library); Currie v. Waverly &c. Ry. Co., 52 N. J. L. 381, 394; In re Gough, L. R. 1904, 1 K. B. 417. The executive department of this State has always taken adaptability of property into consideration in making purchases, as may be seen in the acquisition of the forest reserves. A prior demand for the particular property is entirely immaterial, but as a matter of fact there were a number of prior demands for this particular property for this very purpose, and offers were made to prove this. The reasoning by which the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York State reached its conclusion, which was affirmed without opinion by the Court of Appeals, so far as it is clear and to be understood, is un 229 U. S. Argument for Plaintiff in Error. sound in principle and necessarily leads to a false result and to the confiscation of the property of plaintiff in error. The market price considered by the Commissioners apparently was the value of the property in the local market, i. e., the adaptability to farm purposes. But the local market, and the necessities of the rural community, should not govern the value of this property, if it can be shown that it has a special value for millions of citizens in New York, and for hundreds of thousands of people in other municipalities. The claimant offered to prove that it is available for this special purpose and that it has an enormous value in such broader market, but he has been deprived of all opportunity to produce evidence upon these two points. Langdon v. Mayor, 133 N. Y. 628, 630. Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U. S. 403, and Matter of Gilroy, 85 Hun, 424, are controlling authorities. The cases relied upon by the Appellate Division do not overrule these authorities. The cases of Albany Northern R. R. Co., 16 Barb. 68; Matter of Daly, 72 App. Div. 394; Matter of East River Gas Co., 119 App. Div. 350; Moulton v. Newburyport Water Co., 137 Massachusetts, 163; Matter of N. Y. L. & W. R. R. Co. v. Arnot, 27 Hun, 151; Daly v. Smith, 18 App. Div. 197; Matter of New York, 118 App. Div. 272; St. Johnsville v. Smith, 184 N. Y. 34, can be distinguished. Market value is not always the true measure of just compensation as between an unwilling seller and a willing purchaser. Sloane v. Baird, 162 N. Y. 327, 330; Murray v. Stanton, 99 Massachusetts, 345; Matter of Furman Street, 17 Wend. 648, 671. The adaptability of land for use as a reservoir or for water purposes has been taken into consideration as an element of value of such land in a number of well decided and carefully considered cases, both in Great Britain and in the United States. See Cripps Law of Compensation; Gearhart v. Clear Spring Water Co., 202 Pa. St. 202. Argument for Plaintiff in Error. 229 U.S. The fact that the plaintiff in error did not or could not alone use his property as a reservoir site does not deprive that property of its value as a reservoir site or a portion of a reservoir site. Boom Co. v. Patterson, supra; C. N. W. R. R. Co. v. C. & E. R. R. Co., 112 Illinois, 609; Hooker v. N. & W. R. R. Co., 62 Vermont, 47; Railway Co. v. Woodruff, 49 Arkansas, 381; Mississippi Bridge Co. v. Ring, 58 Missouri, 491. The fact that plaintiff in error was the owner of only a part of the reservoir site does not prevent that element of value being considered. It only goes to the weight that should be given to the evidence and the amount that should be allowed for this element of value. See Gilroy Case, 85 Hun, 424; San Diego Land Co. v. Neale, 78 California, 63, 72. By refusing to take into consideration, in estimating the value of the claimant's property, the value of its use or availability for use as a reservoir site, the plaintiff in error has been deprived of his property, without due process of law, and has been denied the equal protection of the law in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States. Yesler v. Harbor Commissioners, 146 U. S. 646; People v. Supervisors, 70 N. Y. 228, 234. It is not due process of law, where the courts apply a rule of law in absolute disregard of the right to just compensation. Chi., B. & Q. Rd. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226; Backus v. Fort St. Depot Co., 169 U. S. 557, 565. The term "just compensation" as used in this statute should be liberally construed in favor of the property owner and in case of any doubt the property owner should receive the benefit of the doubt. Eminent domain statutes are construed most strictly against the condemning party. Cooley on Const. Lim. See also: Appleby v. Buffalo, 221 U. S. 524, 529; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 91; Raymond v. Chicago Trac tion Co., 207 U. S. 20, 35, 36; Londoner v. Denver, 210 U. S. 373, 386. The capabilities of the property of the plaintiff in error, its adaptability and availability for use as part of a reservoir site, constitute commercial value and property. The term "property" means the right to use, exercise dominion over, and dispose of some particular thing or object. Property means ownership, the exclusive right of a person to freely use, enjoy and dispose of any object, whether real or personal. Hamilton v. Rathbone, 175 U. S. 421; Buffalo v. Babcock, 56 N. Y. 268; Matter of Jacobs, 98 N. Y. 98, aff'g, 33 Hun, 374. Mr. Louis C. White, with whom Mr. Archibald R. Watson and Mr. Wm. McM. Speer were on the brief, for defendant in error. MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the court. This is a proceeding for the taking of land to be used for a reservoir to secure an additional supply of water for the City of New York. Commissioners were appointed, as provided by the constitution of the State, to ascertain the compensation to be paid. Land belonging to the plaintiff in error, McGovern, was among the many parcels taken and the question brought here arises on the refusal of the Commissioners to admit certain evidence as to the exceptional value of the land for a reservoir site, the exclusion of which, it was alleged, had the effect of depriving McGovern of his property without due process of law, contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. The offer of proof as first made embraced many facts and covers six octavo pages of the record. This was rejected, the Commissioners, as we understand their ruling, considering it only as a unit, and as containing inadmissible elements, which probably it VOL, CCXXIX- -24 did. The offer then was made "to prove the fair and reasonable market value of this piece of property taking into consideration that element of value which gives it an enhanced value because it is part of a natural reservoir site;" also "to prove the fair and reasonable value of the Ashokan reservoir site which the City of New York is now condemning," and that the Ashokan reservoir site (as a whole) was the best and most available site for the purpose of obtaining an additional water supply. These offers were enough to raise the question discussed, although the last one was only a reiteration of what was alleged in the original petition for the taking of the land and stood admitted on the record. The action of the Commissioners was affirmed by the courts of New York. 130 App. Div. 350, 356; 195 N. Y. 573. The statute requires the Commissioners to determine 'the just and equitable compensation which ought to be made.' If there has been any wrong done it is due not to the statute but to the courts having made a mistake as to evidence, or at most as to the measure of damages. But of course not every judgment by which a man gets less than he ought and in that sense is deprived of his property can come to this court. The result of a judgment in trover, at least if satisfied (Lovejoy v. Murray, 3 Wall. 1; Miller v. Hyde, 161 Massachusetts, 472), is to pass property as effectually as condemnation proceedings-yet no one would contend that a plaintiff could come here under the Constitution simply because of an honest mistake to his disadvantage in laying down the rule of damages for conversion. If the plaintiff could bring such a case to this court, one might ask why not the defendant for a mistake in the opposite direction that will deprive him of money that he is entitled to keep. When property is taken by eminent domain it equally is recognized that there must be something more than an ordinary honest mistake of law in the proceedings for |