sion. The principle was adopted by the States represented at the Brussels Conference in 1874 out of motives of humanity, and the Brussels Declaration sanctioned it. It is certain that, if the neutral State does not act impartially in applying this article, the State to whose detriment it has acted will protest. It is therefore necessary to leave to the neutral the privilege of performing this act of humanity on his own responsibility.

Owing to these considerations he asks General MOUNIER not to insist on the modification of the article.

Mr. Lammasch proposes a compromise formula: "If the interests of humanity require, the neutral shall authorize the passage, etc."

His Excellency Mr. Beernaert and Chevalier Descamps oppose any idea of obligation.

His Excellency Count Nigra proposes that note be taken of the declarations which have been made; the minutes will serve as evidence to show the spirit in which the Conference interprets this article.

His Excellency Mr. Beernaert acquiesces in this proposition.

The President proposes the following wording: "The nation may, on its own responsibility with regard to the two belligerents, au.horize the passage, etc."

General Mounier would prefer: "shall have a right to refuse."

It is decided to refer the final wording of the article to a future meeting. The discussion of Chapters I, II and IX of the draft Declaration of Brussels is now taken up.

His Excellency Mr. Beernaert delivers the following address:

Before beginning the examination of Chapters I, II, and IX of the Brussels Declaration, I ask leave to make a few remarks which seem to me applicable to all three in common.

The idea which inspired them is wholly humanitarian, as is the case for [89] that matter with the whole draft of 1874. It is a question of reducing

the evils of an invasion as far as possible, by regulating it or rather outlining a path for it; but in order to attain this end it is desired that the vanquished shall recognize the invader in advance as having certain rights on his territory, and that populations be in some sort forbidden to mingle with the war.

Hence, gentlemen, arose grave difficulties, which in 1874 long arrested the plenipotentiaries assembled at Brussels and which made it impossible for them to reach any result. As a matter of fact there was no convention at that time. The final protocol of the Conference offers its work, only "as a theoretical and preparatory study, as a conscientious investigation, calculated to serve as the basis for subsequent exchange of ideas."

The work therefore remains to be done; we are now engaged in it and we have it three-fourths finished, but however great our willingness may be, I am afraid that if we wish to regulate everything and to decide everything conventionally, we shall meet the same difficulties as before.

In my opinion there are certain points which cannot be the subject of a convention and which it would be better to leave, as at present, under the governance of that tacit and common law which arises from the principles of the law of nations.

I shall confine myself to indicating to you two considerations in support of my views:

I. Under the Brussels draft the conquered or invaded country recognizes the invader in advance as having rights on its territory.

The invader is to maintain the existing laws, or change them, and he is to enforce them (Article 3).

The officials of the invaded country are authorized to place themselves in the service of the conqueror, if they deem fit, and some guaranties are even stipulated in their behalf in this case. This is the object of Article 4.

The invader is authorized to collect existing taxes for his benefit (Article 5), and this right is singularly amplified by Articles 40, 41, and 42. Therein the enemy is conventionally authorized to levy new taxes, to make requisitions, and even to impose fines on the invaded country.

Such a conventional engagement does not really seem admissible to me.

Not that I wish to criticize the fact. Things have always happened thus, and they will doubtless continue to be the same, so long as humanity does not give up war. But, although it is natural for the conqueror to derive the power to act thus from victory, I cannot understand a convention giving him the right. Futhermore, I believe that such a notion would be ill received by parliaments, which will be called upon to approve our work.

What I have just said is true, even in the case of big States. Is it conceivable that the State that is beaten would grant rights to its conqueror in its own territory, in advance and in case of war, and that it would organize a régime of defeat? Could it be by the anticipated and written consent of the conquered party that the conqueror would levy taxes and impose fines or engage in his service officials whose first duty is to be faithful to their own country? I admit that there might in fact be some advantages in this, that civil order would be better preserved, and that the invaded populations would suffer less; but such a regulation would encounter objections of a moral and patriotic nature, which seem hardly surmountable. It does not seem to me that one can sanction in advance as a right that which necessarily belongs to the domain of fact and force. And this appears still more evident in the case of small countries which in the nature of things cannot be invaders but are subject to being invaded. Here there is not even that uncertainty, that reciprocity of risks, which I just pointed

out.

As regards Belgium, you know that her situation is peculiar. She is neutral and this neutrality is guaranteed by the great Powers and notably by our powerful neighbors. We cannot therefore be invaded, and how could the Belgian Government submit to the approval of our legislature a convention providing for the failure of great States in their pledges toward us, sanctioning in advance acts which could but constitute an incontestable abuse of force?

I therefore think that from every standpoint there are situations here which it is better to leave to the domain of the law of nations, however vague it may be. We cannot here transform fact into law, and this would be the inevitable result, for we must regard the case at once from the standpoint of both invader and invaded. The country occupied is placed under the law of the conqueror; this is a fact; it is force and uncontrollable force at that; but we cannot in advance legitimate the use of this force and recognize it as law. It is certainly not possible for the conqueror to legislate, administer, punish, and levy taxes with the previous and written consent of the conquered.

This can only become regular upon the conclusion of peace, for only then, if a treaty confirms the conquest, will new bonds of law be established.

[90] Some have invoked the interest of the occupied country, and especially that of small countries.

Well, speaking in behalf of a small country, often trampled and cruelly so by invasion, I prefer the continuance of the present situation rather than the peril of uncertainties.

In my opinion we ought only to adopt provisions which, admitting the fact without recognizing the right of the conqueror, would involve a pledge on the part of the latter to exercise his right moderately. For instance there is nothing to prevent pledging oneself in advance to respect private property and buildings devoted to arts and charitable uses, and to levy taxes or make requisitions under certain given conditions. And such is the spirit which has animated all the votes given up to the present.

Thus Articles 3, 4, and 5 of Chapter I might be omitted, as well as Chapter IX, preserving the essential provisions of Chapter I, supplemented by some restrictive provisions in the matter of taxes and requisitions.

II. The second set of remarks which I wish to make to you apply rather to Articles 9, 10, and 11.

Who are the belligerents? What part may populations take in the war, either before or after occupation?

Here again I observe in the Brussels draft the same solicitude, which is very laudable in itself, namely, to reduce the evils of war and the sufferings which it involves; and when such a purpose is being pursued by one of the most powerful monarchs in the world, nothing is more worthy of praise.

But by undertaking to restrict war to States only, the citizens remaining to a certain extent only mere spectators, would not the risk be run of reducing the factors of resistance by weakening the powerful mainspring of patriotism? Is it not the first duty of a citizen to defend his country, and is it not to the fulfillment of this duty that we all owe the most beautiful pages of our national history?

On the other hand, would not telling the citizens not to mingle in the struggles in which the fate of their country is at stake be further encouraging that baneful indifference which is perhaps one of the gravest evils from which our times suffer?

Small countries especially need to fill out their factors of defense by availing themselves of all their resources, and you will permit me to say a few more words concerning my own country.

Our territory is extremely small, but its geographical situation is of great importance and this is the reason why we have so often been the battlefield of Europe.

Hence the creation of our neutrality, which has not only our own interest in view.

We scrupulously respect the conditions of this neutrality and we do all we can in order to be able to enforce its respect in case of necessity.

Hence the great expenditures which we have made at Antwerp and more recently on the shores of the Meuse. We have wished to remove even the temptation which belligerents might have to use our territory for strategic purposes.

I have already said that it could not be admitted that the guaranteeing nations could fail in their pledges toward us when we shall certainly not give them

the least pretext; but here is where we have to assume that we would be invaded.

Now let us suppose such a contingency to occur. Our country is so limited. in extent that it might be occupied by surprise in almost its entirety in two days, our army being driven back to Antwerp, the redoubt of resistance.

Could we, in view of this grave situation, liberate to any extent our citizens from their duty to their country, by at least seeming to advise them against contributing toward resistance?

Would this not truly be a grave matter? And here again, would it not be better, in the interest of all, not to attempt the regulation by convention of interests which lend themselves only with difficulty to regulation by convention, but rather to leave the matter to the law of nations and to that incessant progress of ideas which the present Conference and the high initiative from which it emanates will so powerfully encourage! (Applause.)

Consequently, his Excellency Mr. BEERNAERT proposes:

1. To omit Articles 3, 4, 5, 40, 41 and 42.

2. To omit in Article 2 the words "being suspended and."

3. In Article 6, paragraph 2, to indicate that it can only be a question of sequestration (inviolability already admitted for private property).

4. To add in Article 6 this new paragraph: "The plant of railways com[91] ing from neutral States, whether the property of these States or of companies, shall be sent back to them as soon as possible, and shall not be utilized for military operations."

5. To insert two new articles:

A. The army of occupation shall not be allowed to levy any taxes on the occupied territory until after a decision by and on the responsibility of the commander in chief or of the superior civilian authority established by him.

These taxes shall as far as possible be levied in accordance with the rules of assessment and incidence in force in the occupied territories.

B. The occupying army shall not be allowed to make any requisitions in kind except by written order of the commander in the locality occupied.

For every requisition compensation shall be given or a receipt delivered. On motion by Mr. Beldiman, it is decided to have printed and distributed as soon as possible the interesting speech of his Excellency Mr. Beernaert. Mr. Martens, having taken the floor, says:

GENTLEMEN: Before beginning the discussion of the most important articles of the Brussels Declaration of 1874, I will ask permission to submit some considerations to you regarding the history of these provisions.

His Majesty the Emperor ALEXANDER II, being imbued with an idea of the importance of forming rules relating to the laws and customs of war in time. of peace, when the minds and passions of people are not inflamed, took the initiative in convoking the Brussels Conference of 1874.

The Emperor had in mind the well-known historical facts, which demonstrate how in war time mutual recriminations and mutual hatred aggravate the inevitable atrocities of warfare. Moreover, the uncertainty of the belligerents regarding the laws and customs of war provokes not only hatred but also useless cruelties committed on the field of battle.

The initiative of my august sovereign was not all due to a new idea. Already during the War of Secession, had President LINCOLN directed Professor

LIEBER to prepare instructions for the armies of General GRANT. These regulations not only resulted in great benefit to the United States troops, but also to those of the Southern Confederacy. Those are circumstances in which the very force of events called forth the idea of regulating the laws of war. The example had been set. The Brussels Declaration brought about by ALEXANDER II was the logical and natural development thereof.

The importance of that declaration consists in the following: For the first time an agreement was to be established between Powers regarding the laws of war really binding on the armies of the belligerent States, in order to shield the innocent, peaceful, and unarmed populations against useless cruelties of war and the evils of invasion where not required by the imperious necessities of the

war.

It was said in 1874, and it has been said to-day, that it is preferable to leave these questions in "a vague state and in the exclusive domain of the law of nations." But is this opinion quite just? Is this uncertainty advantageous to the weak? Do the weak become stronger because the duties of the strong are not determined? Do the strong become weaker because their rights are specifically defined and consequently limited? I do not think so. I am fully convinced that it is particularly in the interest of the weak that these rights and duties be defined. It is impossible to compel the stronger to respect the rights of the weaker if the duties of the latter are not recognized.

Those who have caused the idea of humanity to progress in the practice of war are not so much the philanthropists and publicists as the great captains, such as Gustavus Adolphus, who have seen war with their own eyes. Being obliged to place a curb on the inflamed passions of their soldiers, they inaugurated a discipline in their armies, which was the source of the regulation of the usages of war, which discipline was all the more necessary in case of invasion of a hostile territory.

If there are laws of war- and no one denies this fact - it is absolutely necessary to come to an agreement in determining them.

Being animated by the desire to bring our intelligence into play in examining these laws and customs of war, we have thus far worked in concert along this line, and we have been able to solve most of the questions submitted

to us.

Now that we have reached the most important articles of the Brussels Declaration, it would be a pity to leave in a vague condition the questions which relate to the first articles on occupation and combatants.

I know it is said that we ought to leave the solution of these questions [92] to the practice of war, to the generally recognized principles of the law of nations, and, finally, to the hearts of the captains, commanders in chief, and military authorities. But, gentlemen, the heart has purposes which the mind does not understand and in time of war only one purpose is recognized, and that is the purpose of the war. I bow with respect before the great deeds which the human heart has performed during war and on the field of battle. The Red Cross is the best proof of this. But, gentlemen, the noble sentiments of the human heart unfortunately very often remain a closed book in the midst of combats.

Our present task is to remind peoples of their duties, not only in time of peace but also in time of war. Our mission has been well defined from the very beginning of our common labors: we wish to elaborate, in a spirit of concord,