Page images
PDF
EPUB
[graphic]
[graphic]
[merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][ocr errors][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][ocr errors][merged small][merged small][ocr errors][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small]
[merged small][ocr errors][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small]

Outside the United States, Problems of Communism may be obtained from the nearest office of the United States Information Service. For sale within the United States by the Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government Printing Office, Wash. ington 25, D. C. Price 35 cents (single copy). Subscription price $1.50 a year. Back issues of Vol. I (1952) and Vol. II (1953) and some issues of Vol. III (1954) are not available.

DEPOSITED BY THE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

The USSR Since Stalin: Trends and Portents

At first glance, the situation in the USSR since Stalin's death seems to consist of a host of conflicting elements: economic concessions coupled with increased political controls; an amnesty followed by the reestablishment of the death penalty; bilateral agreements entered into with individual countries to the accompaniment of shrill attacks upon sundry unnamed "enemies of peace"—to mention only a few.

To explain this puzzling picture, we should perhaps bear in mind first, the legacy which Stalin left to his successors—a fear-ridden populace, a deteriorating agriculture, a world united in its determination to resist any further Soviet expansion-and second, the unprecedented degree of nervousness that existed in the Soviet leadership immediately after Stalin's death (evidenced, inter alia, by its appeals against "panic" and "confusion"). When the dust settled, however, it became clear that the regime was still firmly in the saddle, even though its problems were as acute as before. Relative political stability was maintained despite the subsequent purges; and it became possible to tackle Stalin's legacy in a more systematic and organized fashion. There could be no full-scale return to Stalinism-that much was certain. The regime was neither powerful enough nor, indeed, desirous of resorting to brute force, coercion and terror. Consequently, it embarked upon a policy designed to alleviate the internal and external situation without endangering its power vis-à-vis its own subjects and the world at large.

The events of the past three years, then, may best be understood by keeping in mind the regime's wish to pursue a rational policy, best calculated to improve its position at home and abroad. The peasants were granted some material incentives in the hope of increasing their productivity; at the same time, political controls in the countryside were tightened, albeit not as harshly as before. The secret police was "put in moth balls" for the time being, yet no one would seriously suggest that the citizen has been granted rights approaching those enjoyed by citizens of democratic states. Soviet writers have been permitted to give freer vent to their artistic proclivities; the principle of party supervision over the arts, however, has yet to be questioned.

The "conflicting elements" thus become less conflicting. For there exists no essential contradiction between proclaiming one's desire for "peace" and attacking “certain countries" for nefarious opposition to it. And it only appears confusing to see the Soviets speak of Marxist-Leninist principles in statistics while adopting, in practice, mathematical principles which have nothing whatsoever to do with dialectical materialism. The Russian "bear," after all, has turned out to be a rather astute animal. He has adopted more adroit tactics in an attempt to have his cake and eat it too. This, perhaps, is the most important lesson to be drawn from the articles below.

-The Editors

The Time Factor in Soviet Foreign Policy

By ANDREW HAVEN

POST-STALIN Soviet foreign policy shows both

similarities to and marked departures from its Stalinist forerunner. Certainly the overt hostility which characterized Soviet attitudes and actions toward the non-Communist world under Stalin has given place to a foreign policy which is more flexible

Andrew Haven is the joint pseudonym of two British journalists who have contributed a number of studies on international communism to various reviews, including The World Today, Contemporary Review, and British Survey.

and superficially less intransigent, propounded-at
least until recently—with an air of polite reasonable-
ness. Right up to the Foreign Ministers' Conference
at Geneva in October-November there were many
who thought that Moscow's outwardly more amena-
ble approach to international problems was not just
a shift in the party line, but the result of a genuine
desire of the new Soviet rulers to bury some of the
past. Even the abortive conference, which clearly
showed that the USSR was not prepared to abandon
the fundamentals of its policy, was less acrimonious

HX

P96
V.5

« PreviousContinue »