NEVERTHELESS, WITHIN 48 HOURS OF HIS TESTIMONY, IT WAS ANNOUNCED THAT MR. KLOSKE WOULD BE PARTING WAYS WITH THE ADMINISTRATION. EITHER THAT CONSTITUTED A COINCIDENCE OF MIRACULOUS PROPORTIONS, OR MR. KLOSKE WAS FIRED AS A DIRECT RESULT OF HIS TESTIMONY. SIX WEEKS LATER, UNDER SECRETARY KIMMITT TESTIFIED BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE. MR. KIMMITT WAS UNABLE TO REMEMBER VERY MUCH ABOUT THE WHITE HOUSE MEETINGS AND WAS EVEN UNABLE TO REMEMBER WHETHER HE HAD TALKED WITH ANYONE REGARDING MR. KLOSKE'S DISMISSAL SIX WEEKS EARLIER. THE FACT THAT GEORGE BUSH CHOSE TO ROMANCE THE MAN HE LATER COMPARED TO ADOLPH HITLER WAS A HUGE MISCALCULATION. CLEARLY IT IS TIME FOR THE ADMINISTRATION TO END ITS CONCERTED ATTEMPTS TO WITHHOLD INFORMATION FROM CONGRESS AND FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. THIS IS A DEMOCRACY, AND THE PEOPLE AND THEIR DULY ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES HAVE A RIGHT TO KNOW WHAT LED UP TO OUR WAR WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN. UNCLASSIFIED COVER SHEET FOR NSD 26 ADDRESSEES TO: THE VICE PRESIDENT THE SECRETARY OF STATE THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE THE ATTORNEY GENERAL THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY THE DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF DISARMAMENT AGENCY THE DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY UNCLASSIFIED October 2, 1989 UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Policy Toward the Persian Gulf Access to Persian Gulf oil and the security of key friendly states in the area are vital to U.S. national security. The United States remains committed to defend its vital interests in the region, if necessary and appropriate through the use of U.S. military force, against the Soviet Union or any other regional power with interests inimical to our own. The United States also remains committed to support the individual and collective self-defense of friendly countries in the area to enable them to play a more active role in their own defense and thereby reduce the necessity for unilateral U.S. military intervention. The United States also will encourage the effective support and participation of our western allies and Japan to promote our mutual interests in the Persian Gulf region. Normal relations between the United States and Iraq would serve our longer-term interests and promote stability in both the Gulf and the Middle East. The United States Government should propose economic and political incentives for Iraq to moderate its behavior and to increase our influence with Iraq. At the same time, the Iraqi leadership must understand that any illegal use of chemical and/or biological weapons will lead to economic and political sanctions, for which we would seek the broadest possible support from our allies and friends. Any breach by Iraq of IAEA safeguards in its nuclear program will result in a similar response. Human rights considerations should continue to be an important element in our policy toward Iraq. In addition, Iraq should be urged to cease its meddling in external affairs, such as in Lebanon, and be encouraged to play a constructive role in negotiating a settlement with Iran and cooperating in the Middle East peace process. We should pursue, and seek to facilitate, opportunities for U.S. firms to participate in the reconstruction of the Iraqi economy, particularly in the energy area, where they do not conflict with our non-proliferation and other significant objectives. Also, as a means of developing access to and influence with the Iraqi defense establishment, the United States should consider sales of non-lethal forms of military assistance, e.g., training courses and medical exchanges, on a case by case basis. INCLASSIFIED |