MH-60, the MH-47, and the MH-53 have run the spectrum of not being included in the DoD budget; being underfunded when they were included in the budget; having cost overruns; being late in delivery; having major systems software problems; and, sometimes, not even being able to meet the basic SOF mission requirements. Do you believe we will experience the same procurement management problems in FY 1990, or do you expect oversight of SOF programs to improve?

Answer. The Command expects steady improvement in the management of SOF acquisition projects. It should be noted that some improvements have already materialized simply as a result of focusing Command attention upon current SOF programs. As the Command moves forward with program and budget experience, more effective acquisition management will follow by providing better material requirements generation and improved research, development, and procurement procedures.

Question. Do you, or will you, have any authority over procurement of SOF equipment?

Answer. The Command has the statutory mission to develop and acquire SO-peculiar equipment, material, supplies and services. To accomplish this mission, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, section 1211, gave USCINCSOC Head of Agency for Acquisition authority under Chapter 137 of Title 10, United States Code. On May 4, 1988, the Secretary of Defense signed the DoD implementing directive. With this authority, and the January 24, 1989 POM/Budget decision by the Acting Secretary of Defense, the Command will now be able to prioritize requirements, determine acquisition procedures, and ultimately fund SOF programs. We will manage the acquisition of SO-peculiar materiel through agreements with other agency heads to delegate procurement functions and responsibilities and by establishing/designating a contracting activity for quick-reaction, SO-peculiar pro

curement.

SPECIAL TECHNOLOGY REQUIREMENT

Question. Because SOF units are the most likely U.S. forces to be deployed in the foreseeable future, it is important that they keep up with the increasingly sophisticated technology being used by terrorists and Third World countries. How quickly can you make the necessary changes if you learn that, say, Libya and Iran have fielded new communications or electronic equipment that your troops aren't trained to deal with?

Answer. This question has several aspects. The first focuses on the intelligence community's ability to identify and classify new emitters according to function, use, control, and direction. In the past, "new" Third World capabilities were primarily old "red" Soviet/Warsaw Pact systems. However, the recent acceleration in the migration of high tech systems and the development of alternative blue (U.S./allied) and gray (Brazil, Sweden, India, etc) arms suppliers are combining to complicate the Third World threat environment. In the future we will increasingly be confronted with unusual mixes of red/blue/gray systems within a single country's armed forces. Third World nations frequently find it easier to ac

quire and integrate off-the-shelf state of the art capabilities more rapidly than larger, more bureaucratic military establishments. The intelligence community needs to devote additional analytic resources to tracking these changes. In some instances the use of blue equipment and recent advances in communications technology pose unusual challenges to existing collection capabilities. Once a new communications or electronic threat is identified and categorized by the intelligence community, immediate action is taken to counter the threat. Four methods are used to address the new enemy capability. The first three-tactics, techniques, and procedures can be implemented immediately, and as early as the next mission, since they normally only require administrative changes to directives and operational plans. Institutionalizing the change may take longer depending on the extent of the required changes. The fourth-equipment changes-may take longer as it may require technological changes to equipment. In some instances existing defensive avionics systems can be rapidly reprogrammed to counter the new threat. These changes could be as minor as variations to frequency hopping sequences in radio systems to as major as structural modifications to aircraft or underwater delivery vehicles to avoid new electronic sensors. Significant changes in technology could necessitate a complete research, development and acquisition program with its concomitant approval, budgeting, development and acquisition process.

Question. A total of $338.4 million was appropriated in FY 1989 to OSD and the Services for SOF R&D. How much of this money do you personally control to meet emerging requirements when the threat against your troops changes?

Answer. At the present time USCINCSOC does not personally control these funds. However, USCINCSOC does exercise considerable influence over their use. As directed by the 24 January 1989 Acting Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandum titled "CINCSOC Program/Budget", USCINCSOC will assume budget execution responsibilities for selected MFP-11 programs effective 1 October 1990 and for all MFP-11 programs on 1 October 1991. The Command is currently formulating its implementation plan.

Question. In FY 1992 you will be allowed to prepare and submit the SOF budget request. Do you believe there is any need to change the proportion of funds allocated between operations, procurement, and R&D?

Answer. As part of the FY 1992-97 POM preparation process, United States Special Operations Command will carefuly analyze the balance between operations and maintenance, procurement and research and development. USSOCOM will then program the proper mix of these appropriations to fully support SOF.

Question. The Navy and the Air Force have not budgeted any R&D funds for advanced R&D, but both the Army and OSD have. Why do the Army and OSD need such funds if the Navy and Air Force can live without them?

Answer. USSOCOM is formalizing SOF advanced R&D efforts with DARPA and the ASD (SO/LIC). In the SOF community the Army, Navy and Air Force components are all using the Special Operations Special Technology (SOST) program for advanced technology equipment demonstration. These funds, while limited, are

essential to keep us on the leading edge of technology as we pursue refinement of our equipment requirements and acceleration of Service acquisition processes. Also, the Air Force in particular has a great many programs and projects in its advanced R&D budget that will directly or indirectly benefit SOF. For example many of the Air Force's electronic combat, advanced communications, chemical/biological defensive equipment, combat identification, signature reduction, and weapon and senior advanced development efforts will produce systems that will be available for application to our Army and Air Force aircraft fleets and their crews. Similarly some Navy advanced development efforts stand to provide future benefits to our special operations assets and forces. The Navy and Air Force SOF components cannot "live without" these funds.

Question. Why do both the Army and the Air Force R&D requests drop significantly between FY 1989 and FY 1990?

Answer. You will notice the procurement requests for both the Army and the Air Force show a similar increase between FY 1989 and FY 1990. The corresponding RDT&E and procurement fluctuations reflect the maturing of programs which are now being passed from R&D to production and procurement. Future R&D requirement will be generated through the Joint Mission Analysis and other ongoing internal requirements studies.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

Question. Despite the fact that you have no geographic responsibilities, you are intimately involved in the Security Assistance program. Historically, some of the most cost effective Security Assistance that the US has provided to any other country has been in the form of sending Green Berets or other SOF units to train friendly Third World military forces. Do you currently have any such training exercises currently underway or planned during this year?

Answer. The answer will depict only Security Assistance funded programs (i.e., Foreign Military Sales and Military Assistance Programs). This includes mobile training teams (MTTs) and technical assistance field teams (TAFTs), but does not include deployments for training, humanitarian assistance, personnel exchanges, or drug enforcement agency activities, all of which are funded from non-Security Assistance sources. First, the following Security Assistance funded MTTs are planned for this year:

Also, there are several 1-man TAFTS and 1 to 5-man MTTs that deploy to El Salvador on a recurring basis, for various periods of time, up to one year in length. Their missions are to train and assist the ESAF at various levels of command (i.e., Brigade, National Training Center, and Military Academy).

In addition to the MTTs' above, USSOCOM units participate in various other programs that support the warfighting CINCs. These programs are known by many different names e.g, Deployments For Training (DFT), Expanded Relations Program (ERP), Joint/ Combined Exercise Training (JCET) and while not considered Security Assistance, these programs provide training opportunities that benefit both host nation forces and USSOCOM forces.

Question. Is it good training for your units to be involved in such security assistance efforts, or is it a waste of their time?

Answer. From the training perspective of SOF units, security assistance is actually an excellent means to improve those necessary skills of language proficiency, cultural awareness, area orientation, and interpersonal communications that can only be achieved by dealing directly with foreign nationals and that are absolutely essential in maintaining mission readiness. Many of USSOCOM's assigned missions, specifically, Foreign Internal Defense, to include nation building, Humanitarian Assistance, Psychological Operations, Civil Affairs, and Unconventional Warfare hinge on the ability of SOF soldiers, sailors, and airmen to operate in foreign countries, using their skills to train and influence foreign personnel under various environmental conditions. In essence, security assistance opportunities provide USSOCOM the best training vehicle possible by conducting real-world missions under real circumstances. The security assistance funded missions that SOF participate in through mobile training teams, staff assistance visits, and subject matter expert exchanges are more than good training; they are the way that the SOF community can help influence the attainment of U.S. foreign policy objectives in the low-intensity conflict environment. Security assistance allows USSOCOM to fulfill its strategic role as a force multiplier and critical military instrument in the U.S. foreign policy arena.

Question. Occasionally, you conduct joint SOF training exercises with other countries. Are these exercises of benefit to your troops, or do they spend most of their time training their foreign counterparts and not really learning anything new?

Answer. Any exposure to a foreign country/personnel is beneficial in preparing SOF personnel for deployment to that country. SOF personnel, when deployed as "trainers," are students themselves when working with personnel in a foreign country. Specifically, joint SOF training exercises are beneficial because they provide a training forum in which interoperability procedures can be developed and practiced.

SOVIET TROOP REDUCTION PROPOSALS

Question. President Gorbachev has proposed unilateral Soviet troop and equipment reductions in central Europe. Since you have no specific geographic warfighting responsibilities, do his proposals have any impact on how you plan SOF contingencies and train your units?

Answer. Specific contingency war plans and target priorities of the theater ĈINC will determine SOF operational focus and any required modification to our training emphasis. We do not expect the basic mission of providing combat ready SOF to meet theater CINC warfighting requirements for direct action and special reconnaissance to change significantly. However, we may see more emphasis on refining highly mobile SOF capabilities to respond in a timely manner to fast breaking crises and contingencies at the lower end of the conflict spectrum, and not necessarily directly linked to potential East-West conflict.

NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVE FORCES

Question. The inception of the "Total Force" concept in 1974 increased our reliance on the reserve components. Today, with all of the discussions on active troop reductions and withdrawals, additional requirements will be added to the missions of the reserve components. To what extent do you currently depend on Reserve and Guard forces?

Answer. USCINCSOC relies heavily on its Reserve and Guard SOF for nearly 50 percent of required wartime manning to support theater commanders.

Question. In your opinion, is there a requirement for additional support from the reserve components?

Answer. Additional support from the reserve components (RC) is not required. However, funds for increased RC participation in deployments for training (DFT), military training teams (MTT) and exercises at all levels will help improve RC preparedness through improved training opportunities.

Question. How well do the assigned units perform their missions? Answer. RC SOF have performed superbly in selected assigned missions.

Question. Are you aware of any problem areas? If so, what are they and what recommendations do you have to correct any deficiencies?

Answer. Yes, there are several problem areas in RC SOF. However, while some progress has been made, there are no short cuts or short-term solutions. The following examples illustrate the types of problems USSOCOM staff is working to correct.

a. Personnel. NAVRES and RC SF units are experiencing low MOS Qualification and insufficient senior grade personnel. Recruiting efforts for RC must focus on AC personnel who have recently separated from active service, in order to minimize the number of initial entry personnel who require extensive, time-consuming training to qualify in required SOF skills.

b. Training. The major problem area facing Reserve Component Special Forces (RC SF) is the amount of time available to train to mission requirements. Training requirements for the SF missions