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WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 1, 1989.

COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED STATES SPECIAL
OPERATIONS COMMAND

WITNESS

GENERAL JAMES J. LINDSAY, UNITED STATES ARMY, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

[CLERK'S NOTE.-Due to the classification of the material discussed with General Lindsay, the hearing will not be printed. However, the questions for the record will be printed at this point. Questions submitted by Mr. Dicks and the answers thereto follow:]

ARMY DEVELOPMENT AND EMPLOYMENT AGENCY (ADEA)

Question. A major goal of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act was to provide the Commanders of the Unified and Specified Commands with adequate authority and responsibility to carry out their wartime missions and to provide them with budgetary resources to meet unique requirements including combat and materiel development. General Lindsay, I understand that in the past your command utilized the Army Development and Employment Agency to identify and analyze your (unique) requirements for military application of off-the-shelf technologies. Could you describe your work with ADEA and the contribution it made?

Answer. ADEA was established in 1983 by the Department of the Army to design the High Technology Light Division. Its mission was broadened in 1985 to expedite non-developmental item (NDI) solutions for the total Army. As part of that total effort, ADEA supported Army SOF extensively with USAJFKSWCS as the combat developer. ADEA provided field evaluations of such items as desert mobility equipment, snowmobiles and SATCOM radios. ADEA evaluates these as possible non-developmental items, but does no formal testing.

Question. As you know, the Army has decided to disestablish ADEA. As a result, how are you meeting the requirement for nondevelopmental items (NDI)? Is it as responsive as ADEA was, especially in cases when requirements dictate very limited purchases? Answer. NDI is an approach to acquisition that is not limited to any single agency. USSOCOM has the flexibility to effect a Memorandum of Agreement or Memorandum of Understanding appropriate to the system under consideration and the expertise of the agency or lab involved. If an NDI response is pursued, there are several agencies or labs available that have a record of responsiveness. For example, we can and are evaluating potential NDI items through the US Army JFK Special Warfare Center's Concept Eval

(517)

uation Program. This program capitalizes on the proximity of Special Operations units to perform user testing and the Airborne and Special Operations Test Board for test and evaluation expertise. ADEA was very helpful and responsive to SOF needs. The challenge in responsiveness is not in obtaining NDI items, but in getting the Services to accept informal evaluations (rather than Service lab formal evaluations) to speed up the acquisition process.

Question. The committee has directed the Secretary of Defense, in conjunction with the JCS, to submit a report on a proposal to reorganize ADEA to be an agency of the Department of Defense specifically to provide direct support to the Unified and Specified Commands. What advantages could such an organization provide in your operations?

Answer. If ADEA is resourced and funded without cost to the unified and specified commands, it would provide an additional resource for funding of analyses, evaluations and acquisition projects. Question. In particular, would you find it useful to have at the JCS level an analytical agency that would provide prompt response to problem areas you have identified in areas such as combat and materiel development, operational concepts, organizational and operational plans, special operations missions, low intensity conflict and use of emerging technologies and test beds?

Answer. Joint Warfare Center should assume both the analytical and simulation support requirements for USSOCOM.

Question. Related to this proposal is the need, expressed by the Defense Science Board, to create a joint simulation/gaming center. The Defense Science Board recommended that the agency to execute this center should be either ADEA or DARPA. What are your views concerning the creation of this capability by including it as one of the missions of an ADEA type agency reporting to the JCS? Answer. An ADEA type agency (or one that can easily be reconfigured to be closer to the ADEA format) reporting to the JCS already exists-the Joint Warfare Center at Hurlburt Field, Florida. Operationally, the JWC is under FORSCOM, but final authority over JWC policy rests with the Operations Deputies and JCS.

Question. I understand that a message has gone to all the CINCS asking for their comments on this proposal by February 20. I would appreciate being provided with a synopsis of your recommendations to assist us in evaluating whether this proposal has merit, and if so, how it should be implemented?

Answer. This command views the Joint Warfare Center (JWC) as the focal point for its joint simulation/gaming center, and views the creation of another agency to be unnecessary. USSOCOM is working with the JWC to identify SOF-unique simulation and gaming techniques.

[CLERK'S NOTE.-End of questions submitted by Mr. Dicks. Questions submitted for the record and the answers thereto follow:]

FY 1989 CONGRESSIONAL ADD-ON

Question. In FY 1989, the Congress added $286 million above the budget request in a special appropriations for SOF programs. FY 1989 is now a third of the way completed. Could you briefly run

down each of the major categories for which funds were added and tell us the status of obligating these funds:

$108 million for Army communications equipment.

$100 million for Navy small boats.

$25 million for miscellaneous Navy equipment. $53 million for Army and Navy O&M.

Answer. We have a plan to obligate the $286 million plus-up. On February 2, 1989, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict notified Congress of DOD's plans to utilize the $286 million. On February 8, 1989, the funds were authorized for release. We have begun to implement our spending plan.

FY 1990 BUDGET REQUEST

Question. The FY 1990 SOF budget request totals $3.2 billion. This is an increase of $970 million or 43 percent over the FY 1988 SOF actual expenditure. Why should the SOF budget be permitted to increase so rapidly when many other DOD programs are being stretched out or cancelled in the FY90 budget request?

Answer. Special Operating Forces have been underfunded since the end of the Vietnam War. While other military programs were undergoing modernization, SOF modernization was deferred by other DOD priorities. To counter a deteriorating special operations capability, Congress mandated a revitalization of special operations forces resulting in the creation of the US Special Operations Command and acceptance of a plan to rejuvenate SOF infiltration/exfiltration capabilities.

The funding for many of these programs peaks in FY 1989 and 1990. This contrasts with other DOD programs which reached peak funding during modernization in earlier years. The FY 1990 SOF budget request keeps the Congressionally mandated revitalization on track and significantly enhances the nation's special operations capability.

Question. Frequently we can project your future budget requests in the Defense bill by looking at your military construction requests. Between FY 1988 and FY 1991, you will spend over a third of a billion dollars on new military construction. Will there be large operation and maintenance (O&M) and procurement requests in the out years to operate and equip these facilities you are currently proposing to build?

Answer. SOF military construction is in support of programmed force structure growth. While often there is a direct relationship between this military construction and procurement programs, some additional construction will be in support of our existing forces and our proposed force growth. Hence, we are seeking construction programs such as hangars for the Combat Talon II aircraft, headquarters, training, and maintenance facilities for activation of the 3rd Special Forces Group; and SEAL Team EIGHT. Typically these operations and maintenance costs are budgeted in host base accounts which are not in MFP-11. No large procurement requests will be needed in the out years to equip these facilities.

Question. Why do we need to do so much new military construction for SOF units?

Answer. Funding levels for SOF military construction reflect costs associated with standing up new commands, increases in force structuring and phasing out substandard billets and support facilities.

For the Army, funds were programmed to construct a full complex of supporting facilities for our Special Forces Groups (SFG). These complexes consist of barracks, dining, administrative, operational, and maintenance facilities needed to adequately support the groups. The remaining Army projects include an Army component command headquarters, and additional operations, maintenance, and training facilities.

For the Navy, MILCON projects cover the entire spectrum: a headquarters building, billeting facilities, operations, training and maintenance facilities, and ranges. For example, current projects include a facilities complex and boat maintenance and operations facility for SEAL Team FOUR. In Panama, a full support facility has been programmed for Naval Special Warfare Unit-8. Command and Control/Headquarters facilities for NAVSPECWARCOM, currently operating from rented trailers, are also programmed.

For the Air Force, MILCON projects are generally associated with fielding new SOF aircraft and weapons systems at Hurlburt Field, FL and new training facilities at Kirtland AFB, New Mexico. Clark Air Base, RP, was authorized funds for an aircraft nose dock, fuel hydrant system and MH53 hangar. Hurlburt Field received approval to build an aircraft simulator facility, dormitory, aircraft parking apron, aircraft maintenance shop, and consolidated support center.

In sum, except for fielding the CV-22, future SOF MILCON requirements will be significantly reduced. Current funding projections are adequate to support SOF build-up and improve readiness of our forces.

SOF COMMAND STRUCTURE

Question. When the CINC SOF position was established, you were assigned a component command from each of the primary Services: the 1st Army Special Operations Command; the Naval Special Warfare Command; and the 23rd Air Force. It is our understanding that both the Army and Navy component commanders are flag officers with substantial special operations experience. Is that correct?

Answer. That is correct; combined both commanders have over 50 years of special operations background and personal qualifications.

Question. It is also our understanding that your Air Force component commander is an outstanding officer, but he does not have a SOF background. Is that correct?

Answer. Major General Bob Patterson is an outstanding officer with over 33 years experience. His special operations background includes operations experience as an AC-130 gunship pilot in South East Asia from June 1970 to January 1971. He has served at all comand levels and is currently the commander of all Air Force

Special Operations Forces, a position he has held for the past 32 years. Also, he was deeply involved with the Grenada operation. He has over 9,000 flying hours, 293 of which are combat.

Question. In fiscal year 1988, this committee directed that "key positions critically affecting Special Operations... should typically be filled with individuals who have a Special Operations background." Do you feel that you are complying with this Committee directive?

Answer. Commanders, directors, and other key operators and planners, with the most significant impact on special operations, have been selected for both their professional and special operations qualifications. The Services have provided USSOCOM and its components their best special operations personnel for these positions.

Question. The Committee has been told that you write the fitness reports for your Army and Navy component commanders, but that the Air Force Military Airlift Commander writes the fitness report for your Air Force component commander. How well can you command SOF air units when you don't truly command your own air commander?

Answer. Your information is incorrect. CINCSOC writes fitness reports on all component commanders including the AFSOC commander. The Air Force fitness reporting system provides for parallel fitness reports as appropriate. COMAC prepares a separate report on Major General Patterson which addresses the administration and logistics aspects of his command. This is not unique to the Air Force-in fact the TRADOC commander provides input for the fitness report on the CG, JFK Special Warfare Center, and the Deputy CG of Forces Command provides input for the fitness report on the Commander, 1st SOCOM.

Question. Two years ago the Congress directed that all SOF resources be centralized into what is now called Program 11 in the DoD accounting system. Is that centralization complete?

Answer. On 24 January 1989, the Acting Secretary of Defense directed the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) prepare a Program Objective Memorandum (POM) and budget for SOF resources in Major Force Program Eleven (MFP-11) for the FY 1992-97 cycle. We are currently revalidating MFP-11 and the results will be used to update MFP-11 and will serve as the baseline for the preparation of the FY 1992-97 USSOCOM POM and budget.

Question. As part of the legislation which created the CINC SOF Command, you were to be given control of these centralized resources. Would you walk the committee through the time table for each year beginning with FY 1988 and tell us exactly what involvement you have with resource planning, budgeting, and execution? Answer: USSOCOM involvement in resource planning, budgeting, and execution was directed by the DEPSECDEF in September 1987. Secretary Taft directed that the Services crosswalk funds supporting Special Operations Forces into Major Force Program 11; that the ASD (SO/LIC) represent SOF on the DRB; that USCINCSOC submit an Integrated Priority List to the Services and CJCS; and that reprogramming rules be changed to shield MFP 11 re

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