Question. The GAO reports that the Air Force now plans to spend $1.85 billion to make these systems operational. The original estimate was about $600 million. What caused such large cost growth?

Answer. The original $600 million estimate was determined by adding the basic Data System Modernization (DSM) contract value of $195 million and an estimated cost for the development of an austere satellite control center in Colorado of $402 million. This latter estimate was from an Air Force study conducted in 1980 and did not include costs for a full-up communications system, a dualnode network control and scheduling capability, and an engineering and administration facility. It included only minimal costs for training programs.

The final estimated cost of $1.85 billion is comprised of $457.7 million, which was the final DSM contract cost, and $1.4 billion for total Consolidated Space Operations Center (CSOC) program costs. As mentioned above, the approved CSOC program included a substantially broader scope than that which was assumed for the original study. In addition, the GAO figure of $1.85 billion included approximately $300 million in Operation and Maintenance costs which should not be attributed to the CSOC acquisition costs.

In 1982, an independent cost study, approved by Secretary Aldridge, estimated the baseline cost of CSOC (as currently designed) to be $900 million. In addition, the baseline requirements for DSM amounted to $400 million. Increases beyond this total $1.3 billion estimate were due to: increases in satellite support requirements, including greater numbers and greater complexity of projected satellite contacts, schedule extensions caused by funding profile limitations, and the complexity of integrating a new satellite command and control system while simultaneously supporting space operations.

Question. After significant problems under the original contract, the Air Force closed that contract in December 1987. It then issued a follow-on contract-sole source to the same bidder—on a cost plus basis.

Why wasn't this work competed?

In retrospect, do you feel that normal market incentives, such as competition, would have resulted in better contractor performance? Answer. The DSM effort was concluded in December 1987 following delivery of the systems by IBM, and acceptance by the responsible program office against contract requirements, with appropriate credit to the government for requirements which remained unverified. The Command and Control Sustaining Engineering (CCSE) contract is an ongoing maintenance and operational engineering support contract awarded in May 1986 to support the new CCS transition to full operational status. A contract of this type is a standard practice to provide sustaining engineering support for new systems. Given the government investment and knowledgebase with IBM at the time, the fact that several vitally important space programs were relying on that in-place experience to meet critical program schedules, and the cost and schedule impacts of "initializing" a new contractor, the decision to proceed with IBM as the CCSE contractor was, and is, considered prudent. At the government's direction, this contract included a subcontractor support

level of at least 50 percent to cultivate expertise in the CCS system and provide a competitive field from which to select the follow-on sustaining engineering contractor for the system.

Question. A recent Air Force study concluded that "the capacity at the Consolidated Space Operations Center (CSOC) for satellite operations, training, and support functions is expected to be inadequate when projected future satellite programs are added to existing programs." Does this mean that even after spending $1.8 billion (three times the original cost estimate), the CSOC facility will be inadequate? Please explain.

Answer. The CSOC facility was sized to handle all existing and projected programs at the time of its original design. There are currently no definitized operational requirements for AFSPACECOM programs which exceed the capacity of the CSOC facility. Training functions were not programmed to be included in the CSOC facility; however, the current baseline plan includes satellite operations training in a separate, dedicated training facility. Training facility requirements for other future programs are yet to be definitized. There are no known shortfalls in support functions for current or future AFSPACECOM satellite programs.

DEFENSE SUPPORT PROGRAM (DSP) FOLLOW-ON

Question. Current plans call for the current Defense Support Program (DSP) satellite, which provides early warning of ICBM and SLBM launches, to be replaced in the 1990s by SDI's Boost Surveillance and Tracking System (BSTS) satellite. Are you convinced that the existing DSP cannot be upgraded to a satisfactory performance level to accomplish tactical warning and attack assessment during the 1990s, and, if so, what are its limitations?

Answer.

Question. The current five-year plan includes $1.4 billion for BSTS development through FY 1994. This will apparently not result in a full SDI-capable satellite, nor will it result in a full-scale flight experiment for an advanced early warning system. The flight experiment will only include subscale optics and a partial focal plane sensor, with the objective of data collection, not validation of full-scale engineering performance. And even this schedule presumes SDI funding profiles which may be reduced. Are you comfortable with the current BSTS program plan, and, if not, why not? Answer.

Question. In your view, at what point in the BSTS schedule should we abandon further improvements to the existing system? Answer. At Milestone II Decision for BSTS (FY91). We must still ensure that DSP remains a viable operational asset through the transition to BSTS. We should hold the line on DSP improvements to those deemed critical.

Question. Given the critical nature of the early warning mission, and the fact that the first BSTS satellites may only include the capability for early warning (and not SDI or other requirements), would you be more comfortable if budgetary control for BSTS fullscale development resided with the Air Force now, to ensure that these schedules will be met?

Answer. It is imperative that there be no break in the early warning mission during transition from DSP to BSTS. To that end we are working on a Transition Plan that will ensure that capability is maintained. As CINCNORAD my primary responsibility is to provide for mission readiness in Tactical Warning and Attack, Assessment for North America. At US Space Command, we provide worldwide support from space to the other U&S Commands. Therefore, our concern is not so much who funds BSTS but rather that it is funded to the levels necessary to provide the best possible system and that there be no schedule slippage that impacts mission readiness. However, we are satisfied with the present arrangement for the funding of BSTS and see no reason to alter course because SDIO has done an excellent job in providing the necessary funding.

ADVANCED SATELLITE TECHNOLOGY (LIGHTSAT) PROGRAM

Question. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) requests funds in FY 1990 to continue the Advanced Satellite Technology (or "Lightsat") program. This effort is exploring the feasibility of low-cost satellite/booster combinations for direct use by regional or theater commanders. What is your view of the Lightsat program, and why?

Answer. USSPACECOM supports DARPA's LIGHTSAT program. As a supporting CINC to US theater CINCs, this program holds promise for much needed direct "force enhancement" from space systems.

On Boosters: USSPACECOM is interested in future launch systems than can provide responsive, reliable, flexible, survivable/endurable and affordable "assured access to space" for its space force enhancement, space control, and space force applications mission. Such systems should satisfy the requirements of two broad classes of space support: (1) support for U&S forces and national agencies during periods of peacetime, crisis or limited hostilities and (2) assured space access for critical payloads throughout the full spectrum of conflict including post-conflict reconstitution. The survivability requirement for this latter combat-capable class of launch vehicles will necessarily be geared for medium to light weight satellites. Such systems should be located at geographically distributed and/or mobile launch platforms/sites, and be capable of any azimuth and adverse weather capability. DARPA's investigation of small boosters could provide valuable information on the feasibility, capability, and utility of launch systems in this class.

Small Satellites: Obviously, smaller more combat-capable boosters will require smaller payloads. -. But, we must address much more than the satellites and boosters, we must address the: threat; user; satellites; telemetry, tracking and control; launch; command and control; and the supporting infrastructures. Such a "tactical space system architecture" should be:

Tailored to needs of combat forces.

Adaptive to changes in threat, technology and world conditions.

Cost effective-in terms of total systems and life cycle.
System enduring-through requisite levels of conflict.

Achievable in near term-with available (not necessarily low capability) technology.

Timely-to meet needs of tactical commanders.

Total systems-take system approach.

DARPA's Lightsat Program, as well as other DoD small satellite efforts such as the Navy's SPINSAT, could provide valuable information on some of these issues.

Question. Would this program, if successful, help solve some of our problems in the areas of launch system survivability, launch responsiveness, and tactical support?

Answer. DARPA's LIGHTSAT effort, if properly focused, could help answer some important feasibility and combat utility questions concerning launch system survivability, launch responsiveness and tactical support.

Question. Is it your understanding that the air-launched "Pegasus" vehicle could also serve as an ASAT weapon?

Answer. I know of no stated requirements to use the "Pegasus" for an air launched ASAT weapons platform. As you know, "Pegasus" is an Orbital Science Corporation (OSC) and Hercules contractor funded initiative. Technically, the "Pegasus" could put as much as 50 lbs into a geosynchronous intercept trajectory and would, therefore, theoretically be well suited for potential ASAT missions. However, using "Pegasus" as an ASAT launch platform would present several problems. Firstly, OSC is developing "Pegasus" as a military and commercial space launcher. Using it in an ASAT role could jeopardize its use as a commercial launcher by appearing as a "threat" launch to the Soviet Union. Secondly, "Pegasus" is not designed as a militarized vehicle-it does not contain fully-redundant systems or MIL-STD class S parts and was not designed for storability. In short, I don't believe OSC is considering "Pegasus" for an ASAT mission, nor do I know of any DoD stated requirements for it to perform in an ASAT role. Ås you are aware, US Space Command states requirements for a warfighting capability, but cannot dictate a solution, such as "Pegasus.'

DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD STUDY: "ASSURED MILITARY USE OF SPACE" Question. A 1988 summer study of the Defense Science Board reached some significant conclusions about deficiencies in today's military space capability. I'd like to read some quotes from that study, and have you address each in its turn. "Ground control installations are at a limited number of fixed locations and, in some cases, overseas. The architecture, as designed, contains limited redundancy and is fragile from a connectivity standpoint. The current architecture does not adequately support operational commanders." Answer.

Question. "Our launch facility complexes have become filled with unique, one-of-a-kind facilities. This lands to very long launch sequences, limited throughput and vulnerability to accidents, natural disasters, and terrorism in peacetime and to sabotage and cheap shot attacks during conflict. A comprehensive program is needed as the cost and politics are substantial."

Answer. I agree. We need to create military space launch systems that are much more responsive, flexible, robust, cost effective

and survivable. This should include design of launch vehicle systems and payloads that provide rapid mix-and-match flexibility and interface standardization that allow any booster to launch all critical payloads at and below its lift capabilities.

Question. "Satellites cost as much as $100,000 per pound. This is more than experienced in either national programs or commercial programs. Some changes could yield up to 30% savings in satellite costs."

Answer. I don't know of any military satellites that cost $100,000 per pound. Most range in costs from one-quarter to one-half that

amount.

However, in my view, "cost per pound" is not necessarily a valid measure of effectiveness (MOE) for systems that support our combat forces. . We must reduce the cost of doing space business to the greatest extent possible commensurate with fulfilling the operational requirements of our forces. We must make our space systems more available to our forces, but not at the expense of combat effectiveness and survivability.

Question. "Very likely MILSTAR capacity will not be adequate to provide intratheater beyond-line-of-sight communications with sufficient capacity. It is, therefore, proposed that EHF MILSTAR-compatible packages be put on high altitude satellites to provide enduring anti-jam communications to theater forces."

Answer. MILSTAR was designed to provide survivable and enduring communications for the most critical strategic and tactical command and control requirements only. It was not intended to satisfy all requirements for jam-resistant beyond-line-of-sight communications. Current MILSTAR satellite loading assessments, based on JCS validated requirements, support the highest priority tactical and theater forces requirements.

Adding MILSTAR-compatible EHF packages to other high altitude satellites would provide supplemental anti-jam capacity to users. However, without significant investments to improve the survivability and endurability of the host satellites, control systems, and user terminals, these EHF packages may not adequately support user requirements. MILSTAR costs are largely driven by survivability and endurability requisites. When fielded, MILSTAR will be the National Command Authorities' most survivable, endurable, and jam-resistant communications system. No other existing or planned system will be able to operate throughout the projected threat in the pre-, trans-, and post-attack environment.