cably involved in that change, and that change has dangers of instability. At the same time, the military strength of the Soviet Union really has not changed appreciably, although there are indications that it may. So then the next question after that is, what to do ourselves? And I think that we need to take a hard look at that this year. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY First of all, our security, national security, lies within a system of collective securities of other nations, especially in the West, and the major alliance is NATO. In that Alliance, we asked a very wise man, Mr. Pierre Harmel, to tell us way back 20 years ago how we should conduct ourselves and what should be the overall strategy guidance. He said we should stay strong, but be prepared to dialogue and negotiate with the other side if and when that was possible. I think that still will apply to us. I don't think we have to do a lot of soul-searching to see where we have to go next. I think we should follow the guidance we already have, and that is to stay strong but be ready to talk at the tables. In order to stay strong we have to look at our strategy itself first, and that is the strategy of forward defense and flexible response, which has been a very good strategy for 20 years. We, before that, had the strategy of massive retaliation, and we decided that was not credible. What we have now is the technological explosion we have seen in the past 20 years. Not only have we changed, but our potential adversary has also changed a great deal. I think, therefore, the strategy is good. There are many, many other strategies by the way, and I don't believe the strategy we have is the one we should keep simply because we can't think of any other one. There are many others, but it is the best. In order to support it, first of all, we have to make sure we have the proper conventional capability. And that is basically the capability for close battle and the possibility for follow-on forces attack. And in the close battle and the follow-on forces attack, my toughest questions that I have to face are whether or not I can get the right amount of sustainment, that is days of supply, especially ammunition, and the right amount of reinforcement to Europe in time to conduct a defense, if God forbid we had an all-out attack and we had to defend ourselves. We all hope, by the way, that our capabilities and our readiness to carry out our strategy will provide for the deterrence which prevents war and keeps us in peace as we have found ever since NATO began four decades ago. It is reinforcement and sustainment that are the most difficult problems. They break down into airlift, sealift, POMCUS, war reserves, and especially ammunition. In the ammunition, the problem involves especially what is called preferred ammunition, which is usually the most modern ammunition. STUDY ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS REQUIREMENTS I would be more than happy to discuss follow-on forces attack and close battle, but I would do so if you would like to hear about it. I will wait for questions on that, and simply say the other part of our sustainment of strategy is nuclear. I have just finished as the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, besides being CINCEUR, a study on nuclear weapons requirements, which is one that I turn over to the U.S. as a custodian and the United Kingdom as a nuclear custodian every two years and then also to the Secretary General of NATO. That study has been turned over. What it says is that we can make significant reductions in our nuclear weapons, especially the shorter-range weapons, if we can get modernization, and that modernization falls into three categories: improved artillery, tactical air-to-surface missile, and followon to Lance. BURDENSHARING I mention in my paper the issue of burdensharing, and I would be happy to talk about that. I basically feel the nations in Europe need to do more to share the burden, but I also have two other thoughts about that. One of them is that the United States also needs to do more in terms of fulfilling its force goals and getting the other six divisions to Europe within the ten day time frame and following through with the rest of the reinforcement that would be necessary in time of war. The other point I would make is the countries of Europe are different countries, obviously. Great Britain over the years has had a good record in burdensharing. The Germans have had a pretty good record in burdensharing in terms of percentage of gross national product, but also the additional part which is beyond GNP, and there especially the Germans have done a great deal. So the bigger countries, as it turns out, do a lot. Some of the other countries such as Denmark, Luxembourg, others, do not do as much. And I think it is not a good idea to average those countries across the board, but look at them one by one. I do think the report which has been turned in to all of the countries and which, of course, is here in the U.S. Congress, is an indication that the European countries have taken us seriously. It does go down country by country, and is pretty frank about what the countries ought to do, and now it is the question of what will be accomplished as a result of that report. On the other side, the Harmel advice to us was two-fold, and the other part of it, besides staying strong, was to negotiate. The Soviets yesterday published some figures finally after a long, long time waiting on our part, and I think the main point about those figures is that it shows they probably are serious about going into the CFE talks, the conventional talks in Vienna. I think that is vitally important to us because the overwhelming power of the Soviet Union is in their conventional power, which it has been for these decades since World War II. They have tried to build a force which can move rapidly with large units over long distances in the attack without pause and with good command and control and sustainment. We need to bring that force down to parity with ours, and I hope that is what will happen as a result of these talks and that they will proceed with some rapidity and dispatch. SHORT- AND LONG-RANGE INITIATIVES The last point that I would make is this: We have talked a lot about initiative and we almost wear initiative as a hair shirt. When we say we don't have any initiative, the Soviets have all the initiative, we ought to take a look at that. We can divide it into long-range and short-range initiative. In the long range, we have had a good strategy in NATO, and it looks like it might be paying off. We may be winning with that strategy after all if we can get the Soviets to the table and bring down the forces on the military side. More than that, outside the military side, we are seeing the Soviets are talking about glasnost and when you begin to define glasnost, it sounds strangely Western. It has to do with freedoms and democracy and self-determination and human rights and even free enterprise. So what we are seeing here, I think, are long-range initiatives on our part that paid off. Now, the short-range ones, we find that Gorbachev and the Soviet Union are able to come up almost every three or four weeks with a new initiative which sends us scurrying to answer. But I think we need to look at that. When you are the larger side, you can afford to be willing to offer something up. When you are the side that has been threatening a long time, you can afford to be conciliatory. When you are the side that has been strongly centralized all along, you can afford to make quick decisions, and you don't have to check with too many people. On the other hand, we have 16 nations in the Alliance, 16 independent, sovereign nations who want to consult before they do anything, and we don't have one single national leader who can get up and speak for all the nations. I think those are not weaknesses, they are strengths on our part. What we ought to look at is how we have succeeded long range with our initiatives. The fact that we do not succeed short range with them is probably more a blessing than it is a curse. And with that, Mr. Chairman, I would be ready to answer any questions. [The biographical sketch and statement of General Galvin follow:] PRESENT ASSIGNMENT Supreme Allied Commander, Europe/Commander-in-Chief, United States European Command, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, APO New York 09055, since June 1987 MILITARY SCHOOLS ATTENDED The Infantry School, Basic Course The Armor School, Advanced Course United States Army Command and General Staff College United States Army War College Student, Infantry Officer Basic Course, United States Army Platoon Leader and later Executive Officer, Company I, Assistant Post S-2 (Intelligence) and S-3 (Operations) and Advisor to the Colombian Army Ranger School, United States Platoon Leader, later Commander, later Executive Officer, Commander, Company B, 1st Airborne Battle Group, 501st Student, Columbia University, New York, New York Student, United States Army Command and General Staff ASSIGNMENT Operations Officer, S-3 (Operations), 1st Brigade, 1st Assistant G-3 (Plans), Office of the Assistant Chief of Researcher and Writer, Office of the Secretary of Defense Military Assistant and Aide to the Secretary of the Army, Student, United States Army War College, Carlisle Deputy Secretary of the Joint Staff, United States Military Assistant to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Chief of Staff, 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized), United Assistant Division Commander, 8th Infantry Division Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Training, United Commanding General, 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) Commanding General, VII Corps, United States Army Europe |