bear available forces at key locations to strengthen regional defenses, deny the Soviets their strategic objectives, and ultimately confront and defeat them.

In sum, the Central Command's strategy is necessarily one of economy of force which capitalizes on the synergistic effect of United States and friendly forces to selectively deter or counter hostile Soviet military actions. Clearly, coalition warfare and active military support of our objectives by friends and allies are critical.

RESOURCES

Declining budgets will require tough decisions to ensure that this nation gets the most for its dollar. If Central Command is to accomplish its peacetime and wartime missions, there must be continued support in the following areas:

Security Assistance

In order for the United States to exercise effective leadership within a cooperative regional framework, a credible security assistance program for the Central Command region is necessary. Security assistance is an essential instrument in the implementation and integration of the twin pillars of Our national military strategy deterrence and forward defense.

Security assistance has been, and can continue to be, a productive and cost-effective investment which yields enormous returns at a relatively small price. The role of security assistance in Central Command's theater strategy calls for programs tailored to build a coalition of strong local forces, capable and confident in combined operations, when required, with the Central Command forces. With no permanently stationed Central Command troops on the ground, this coalition of local forces serves as a ready and effective force multiplier. This reliance on our regional friends and allies becomes even greater as our own defense budget declines.

As emphasized throughout this statement, program reductions since 1985 and restrictive arms transfer policies have damaged our credibility as a reliable security assistance partner and threatened our regional access and overall military-to-military relationships. This situation is further exacerbated by "earmarking" security assistance funds which has caused some of our country programs to bear a disproportionate share of the

reductions. In the past few years, earmarks have remained relatively constant while non-earmarked funds are down by 87.6%, as shown on the chart below. These reductions send an ominous signal to non-earmarked countries. Should this trend continue, the damage to United States' interests in the area may prove irreversible.

In order to ensure the most efficient use of funded security assistance, it is necessary to plan and fund long-range programs. Reductions since 1985 have eroded the effectiveness of many programs, and threatened self-sufficiency, regional defense arrangements and major capital security assistance investments. These reductions, combined with Congressionally restricted arms transfer policies for cash countries, have given our adversaries increasing confidence that they can challenge United States

interests with impunity.

Further, a void has been created for others to fill as they increase their influence and actively pursue the international arms export market. Over $43.1 billion in known arms sales have been lost by the United States in the last four years.

The recent $30-35 billion purchase by the Saudis of British aircraft, air bases, and other equipment is a prime example of our western allies filling the gap created by our restrictive arms transfer policies. On the other hand, the stringent restrictions and conditions imposed before approving the sale of 70 Stinger anti-aircraft missiles to Bahrain is an equally disturbing example. (One of the conditions of the Bahrain Stinger sale was a mandatory buy-back provision, requiring that Bahrain agree to sell the Stingers back to the United States no later than 18 months from the date of enactment of the legislation. The sale was approved only after the buy-back provision was included.) Such provisions embarrass both the United States and the purchasing country by insinuating that we cannot trust a proven friend and that Our Own commitment is vacillating. During our Persian Gulf operations in 1988, Bahrain's support, as well as that of other Gulf Cooperation Council countries, was significant as together they provided the United States almost $90M worth of fuel support and other services. This is the sort of cooperation we must have if we are to continue to achieve military objectives there. Without the good relationships fostered by security assistance, including arms sales, we cannot be sure of sustaining this level cooperation in the future.

of

While security assistance is the key to conducting coalition warfare, it can also promote a whole range of other security relationships influence, access, and mutual commitment. Unfortunately, the erosion of United States security assistance programs has actually escalated the probability of increased arms acquisitions from other sources.

demonstrated flexibility

So.

and

While the Soviet Union has responsiveness in providing military assistance to meet its foreign policy objectives in the region, the US has failed to do For example, when one considers those countries surrounding the strategic Bab el Mandeb choke point opposite the Yemens, the Soviets have delivered over 20 times as much military equipment during the period 1983-1987 as has the United States. As shown below, United States military assistance began to counter Soviet influence through 1986; however, as United States funding declined, the Soviets immediately filled the void.

Yemen Arab Republic to demonstrate the reliability of Our

A good example of the Soviets stepping into a position of prominence in the area is the case of the (YAR). Our programs had been designed superiority of American equipment and the sustaining support. Even before the drastic reductions of Our assistance to the YAR, the Soviets had aggressively been pursuing programs such as aircraft, tanks, personnel carriers, and air This trend shows every sign of continuing.

defense weapons.