In Jordan, the steady decline in United States military assistance from a high of $115 Million in FY84 to $10 million for FY89 (the lowest figure since the mid-60's)--has significantly eroded the United States position, particularly with the Royal Jordanian Air Force. The Soviets have gained a virtual monopoly on Jordan's tactical air defense, the aging (and immobile) United States-provided Hawks notwithstanding. The King's decision last year to purchase British and French fighter aircraft--following a long and serious look at Soviet fighter aircraft--is probably part of a long-term trend toward increased military dependence on Europe.

Besides generally weakening our position in the area, some of the direct effects of funding reductions are:

Postponement of force modernization.

Cuts in logistics support for existing systems.

Cancellation of entire programs.

Degradation of the readiness of previously purchased weapons system..

For our friends and allies shown on the chart on page 39 (Sudan, Somalia, Djibouti and the Yemen Arab Republic), plus Jordan and Kenya, only $28.5 million in United States-funded military assistance was provided for FY89. For FY90, we believe $147.5 million is the required amount for these countries in order to meet United States security assistance objectives and support our coalition warfare strategy. Anything less will put the economy-of-force aspect of our strategy at risk. We simply cannot afford to ignore the uniquely cost-effective advantages gained by prudent security assistance investments.

In short, the lack of a long-range, adequately funded United States security assistance program is threatening regional stability, decreasing available regional support, and opening the

door for challenges to United States interests and influence. Should present downward trends and restrictive arms transfer policies continue, we may one day find our position so weakened that we cannot respond effectively to Soviet challenges.

Exercise Support

With few permanently assigned forces, exercises provide the primary means to evaluate the joint capabilities of forces that would be assigned to Central Command. Joint Task Force Middle East currently represents the only assigned force continuously operating in the Area of Responsibility. Day-to-day operations and contingencies have resulted in operational improvements which make Joint Task Force Middle East a ready and experienced asset. Exercises must be used to improve and train the remaining forces of both the United States and our friends and allies in the area. Central Command's recent successes in the Persian Gulf and its consistently improving reputation throughout the Area of Responsibility have contributed to an easing of access

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restrictions. As a result, efforts are underway to capitalize on this opportunity to broaden the exercise program and involve more countries. Exercises will, however, require increased resource support in service O&M as well as JCS transportation funding above the FY88/89 level to support new initiatives. exercises are the first step in expanding military-to-military relationships and are a necessary and effective starting point in countries allowing first-time access. As exercise levels increase, command relationships, technical complexity, size, and importance of these exercises grow. Ultimately, this growth can progress to participation in the major exercise, BRIGHT STAR. Conducted every two years, BRIGHT STAR was last held in 1987, costing over 75 million dollars. This massive exercise provides the only opportunity to train and test a large joint Service United States force in coordination with the armies of several countries in the Area of Responsibility. It is essentially our

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dress rehearsal for the complex goal of interoperability. required exercise level growth cannot be absorbed within the existing program. Therefore, an increased investment is needed now to provide the required practical battlefield simulation that will coalesce our forces with those of our friends.

In addition to providing improved training opportunities, the Central Command exercise program demonstrates Our resolve to support friendly Area of Responsibility nations, provides a means to maintain regular access to areas without United States permanent bases, and increases military-to-military cooperation. The vast differences in climate and culture make it important that servicemen and women understand the character as well as the capabilities of those they may be fighting alongside. Increased support for the exercise program, as outlined above, is requested.

The nations of the Central Command Area of Responsibility vary widely in their economic ability to support their armed forces. Title 10 funding is the only way some of these countries will be able to participate in combined exercises. Because of severe financial difficulties, some countries cannot support participation without harming other essential programs. Congressionally established ceilings on Title 10, Section 2010 (Participation of Developing Countries in Combined Exercises: Expenses)

Payment of

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and Chapter 20 limit flexibility in countries. These two nation in two areas.

(Humanitarian/Civic Assistance) severely developing viable programs across several programs fund interaction with the host First, Section 2010 enhances exercises by allowing us to support host nation participation in a combined exercise. Through this program, reimbursement for expended consumables, such as food, fuel, ammunition, etc., is possible, either by direct payment or by providing the consumables themselves. In countries with minimal reserve stockpiles this support is often critical.

Second, Humanitarian/Civic Assistance allows the forces participating in these exercises to interact with the civilian populace by covering the costs of construction projects, such as water wells, and medical treatment supplies. These efforts dramatically improve relationships with people outside the military while training our service personnel. By linking the two programs to exercises, we enhance the image of the United States and gain critical access in the Area of Responsibility. One of the most beneficial Title 10 programs, Section 1051 (Bilateral or Regional Cooperation Programs Payment of Personnel Expenses), provides the capability to bring foreign personnel here to plan exercises and observe United States tactics in large scale exercises. Congressional authority to fund this travel under Title 10, section 1051 expires on 30 September 1989. An extension of this authority is required to ensure the continuance of this successful and beneficial program.

Readiness.

The readiness and sustainability of Central Command are manifested in the status of units and our ability to keep them supplied in combat. Our combat units have no significant readiness problems which preclude them from accomplishing their assigned mission. The readiness level of the Army non-major support units, especially in the Reserve Component, continues to be a concern. Because of your support, Army personnel, training and equipping programs have made substantial progress in many aspects of force readiness. Your past assistance is greatly appreciated and with continued support steady improvement is projected in the future.

Lift

Today both airlift and sealift resources are inadequate to meet our deployment requirements. As the chart below shows, the

C-17 is the only current program that will provide a substantial increase in strategic airlift capability and take us close to the national goal of 66 million-ton-miles/day. Although Central Command would deploy only 17% of the national force, because of the huge distances involved, this deployment requires 50% of the national airlift goal. Since there exist other and competing high-priority requirements, we urgently need full support of the DOD airlift program.