SOVIET MILITARY CHANGES

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Gorbachev of course has been talking about what he is going to do. They have made official announcements. They are pulling out of Afghanistan. I think there is a perception in the United States that they are at least saying the right things. When we were over in Europe, they talked about how they still weren't convinced that Gorbachev was going to be able to carry out the announcements he made.

What do you see from a military standpoint? Do you see any change in the threat in Europe?

General GALVIN. I think that there are indications of intentions to change the military; that is to be willing to make reductions in the military forces. I think there are indications of intentions to change from an offensively oriented force to a defensively oriented force.

I found it interesting when Akhromeyev was in New York over here and talked to the Council on Foreign Relations

Mr. MURTHA. When was that?

General GALVIN. That was in the fall. When was that? Late August 1988.

He said they were offensively oriented but they are going to change. That is the first admission I have seen where the military said they were offensively oriented.

In the speech in the U.N. when Gorbachev said, "we will take out tanks, we will take out such things as assault crossing units," he was obviously responding to the pressure from the West that had been on for a long time to change from an offensive orientation to a defensive one.

However, we still have to look at that old equation of intentions versus capabilities because intentions can rechange back in another direction over night, but if you have let your capabilities drop down, it would take a long time to bring them back up.

As you know very well, weapons systems programs are usually many years long. Ten years is not unusual for the creation of a weapons system. I think we need to keep our powder dry as we watch what happens here and hope for the best. But also I think there is a question of beyond the military part of it, this entrance into an unknown time ahead by the Soviets in which we don't know what will happen in the Eastern satellites. We don't know what will happen inside the Soviet Union. There could be more instability in the future than we have seen in the past.

So there are really two parts to the threat that I see. One is that military is still there, although they are talking about coming down and changing

Mr. MURTHA. So there has been no actual change in the military disposition. For instance, they are talking about moving actual combat units back into Russia. That hasn't happened yet?

General GALVIN. Nothing has happened yet. My estimate is that the Soviets will have to work very hard to make the changes they have already indicated they might make over the next two years. That is, take the 5,000 tanks out of the forward locations and the rest of those changes. As you look at in detail what will

be involved in that, it will take some time. Nothing has really happened yet.

REDUCTION IN FORCE

Mr. MURTHA. You said your capability doesn't really meet the various missions you have. Even in all-out war, you obviously would have to be reinforced.

If you were to dismantle the Pershing, and GLCM missiles, would it hurt your capability at all if you brought those 10,000 people home?

General GALVIN. When we put the Pershing II in, we were then operating under the ceiling which the Congress had mandated for Europe, and so in order to get the 6,000 positions for the Pershing II people, we had to take 6,000 other positions out. What we took out were such things as other types of artillery men, but across the board we took out positions in order to stay under the ceiling.

If we now take out the Pershing II, what I would like to do is replace those 6,000, because in the meantime other things have changed. We have the MLRS units coming in, the attack helicopter battalions arriving, and we are going to need the manning of those forces.

So I would like to try to stay to the same ceiling, at least to the same ceiling as we have had before. As you know, the Department of Defense has asked for relief from that ceiling, but I would like to at least stay with the ceiling that we have.

Mr. MURTHA. But you were able to get along without those 10,000 people by shifting them into the Pershing missile sites; you were able to get along without them?

General GALVIN. Yes. Because to some extent, what we picked up in risk of doing without them, we satisfied with having additional missiles. So there was some kind of rough balance, you could say that.

BUDGET PRIORITIES

Mr. MURTHA. This is a key year and we have got some big systems for funding. We have got the C-17 aircraft, which is a big program and so important to the Army.

We have the LHX helicopter, which is a top priority of the Army; we have the V-22 tilt rotor aircraft, which is one of the Marine Corps' top priorities. We have got the argument between the MX and the small missile. We got the B-2 aircraft and we have a limited amount of money.

I am afraid we are going to get into a position where it is going to be necessary to cut back on the support of the troops and the other things that we need in order to keep high morale. We are starting to feel a shortage in recruitment. For instance, for the first time we have had to take a much higher percentage of category 4's than desired.

I am just worried if the President is not willing to raise taxes we won't have the money available to support the troops the way they should be supported.

I'm thinking there may be a way to pull troops out of Europe and reduce end strength-it does two things. One, politically, it

sends a signal that we are pulling troops out since you are able to get along without them. And also we are able to reduce our forces by 10,000 troops and 10,000 dependents.

I am not asking you to make a recommendation because I know your missions are so extensive that you can't handle them the way it is. But what I am asking you to do is to consider the problem we face in this committee, and this is the committee that has forced spare parts, sealift and everything else onto the Defense Department. So we are looking now at how we can balance this thing with the responsibilities that you have.

General GALVIN. I think there are some ways to look at what we should give up, if we have to give up something, and I think it is a pretty legitimate question to ask me what my priorities would be. Actually, of course, I could answer the question by saying I don't want to give up anything. And that would be very true. But if you said, all right, if you are going to need MLRS and LHX and some other things in the future and immediately, now, and if you have got some zero base here to things, I would say that the first thing we need to look at is the amount of large field training exercises that we do and in fact I am looking at those.

I think, for example, I have spent 10 out of the last 15 years in Europe and I have been on nine or ten Reforgers and a lot of other things. I think we need to build big exercises where we need to, but look harder at precisely what it is we want to train. Sometimes we need to train generals and admirals in operational art more than we need to train privates and corporals, where we can train them in smaller exercises.

So I think if we cut some of the exercises, the larger ones, especially those that have a lot of deployment of forces by air and sea, which is very costly, that we could put our noses to the grindstone and get the same level of readiness or close to it at a lower cost. A second priority for me would be OPTEMPO. We are going to have to look at how many thousand kilometers a year we drive our tanks and sail our ships and fly airplanes, how many hours. I think we could look at modernization. I would tend to look at modernization before I would look at force structure in Europe.

LHX HELICOPTER

Mr. MURTHA. That is a good point. The LHX helicopter, how important is that to you in Europe and at any point in time?

General GALVIN. I think it is very, very important to me in the long run. But if I had to put that up against force structure, especially in the current levels of force structure, where, for example, we have four divisions forward, the Soviets have 19 divisions in East Germany alone. I would say, I would very seriously consider stretching some programs in modernization before I would give up the force structure.

C-17 AIRCRAFT

Mr. MURTHA. How about the C-17?

General GALVIN. I really need the C-17. I have been pushing hard to get the C-17. As you know, already the C-17 is stretched out compared to the way it was going to come on after the initial approvals. It is getting a longer and longer stretch over the years.

Mr. MURTHA. So what you are doing, is relating the problem to the missions you have, which is something the commander in chief with the Joint Chiefs of Staff decides. But as a whole, the problem you have with the troops you have now, is you don't have the capability of fulfilling all those missions. That is what you are saying? General GALVIN. I think so. Probably you could say I am looking shorter range basically because I am out there trying to get the mission done.

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. McDade.

FISCAL YEAR 1990 BUDGET

Mr. McDADE. Thank you.

Welcome. We are always delighted to have you appear in front of the committee. We want to thank you for what is always a cogent and very honest statement.

Let me just talk to you about some of these issues that, as we see this budget beginning to shake out and change form, give us all some pause. None of us want to get back to the days of the hollow Army, and sustainability of course, those items you were talking about, and how we deal with them, are a major issue for all of us. And what concerns me is whether or not we are heading that way again.

Let me just illustrate a few things and give me your comments. Even though we have a two percent growth in the submitted budget, maybe not the final budget, but the budget that has been submitted, there are cuts in spares and maintenance backlogs continue to grow.

If you look at a sustainability item, just one of them, what caught my eye was Army ammunition. From 1986 to 1989 the appropriation declined by 16 percent and in the budget just submitted, in fiscal year 1990, there is a additional 15 percent cut. In fiscal year 1991, there is another 12 percent cut slated. Now this is in a budget that proposes to have two percent growth in it, and if you believe what you are hearing on Capitol Hill, it isn't even going to hit zero growth. That takes us back to the level of the 1970s in terms of dollars put in to sustain you with respect to that account for ammunition, and it looks like we are going to see a lot of other cuts in these so-called non-glamorous items.

I wanted to get your impression if those figures, as you see them, are accurate, and what do you believe the impact is upon the general level of sustainability and the question of whether or not we are heading back down that slope again.

General GALVIN. You are right that, when there is a crunch with the budget, the tendency is to cut the less glamorous things, and they tend to be repair parts, ammunition, forward stockages, and strategic lift. And as I go and look at the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines forward deployed in Europe and planned for Europe in the event of a war, that is exactly where the weaknesses are. For example, the Army's forward stockages of POMCUS. In other words, the division stockages of equipment put out ahead and sets of equipment for the six divisions that should get over there in ten days is something we promised we would do as our contribution to the defense over there. And that is only

complete.

Now, in the POM, the current POM is up to another five years just to get to

Mr. MURTHA. Is that
General GALVIN.

of the ten?

of the extra six.

Mr. MURTHA. So you have a full complement?

but that is

General GALVIN. The four divisions over there are pretty much full complement. The combat and combat support are in good shape.

But ammunition, for example, and preferred ammunitions, only of their requirement is forward located for the Army. It is the same thing if you go to the Air Force.

PREFERRED AMMUNITION SUPPLIES

Mr. MURTHA. What is preferred ammunition?

General GALVIN. Preferred ammunition is a whole series of things, AIM-9, TOW, various-that is improved TOW and so forth. It is the modern ammunition.

Mr. MURTHA.

in other words, is what you are talking

about not being available,
General GALVIN. That is right

of what we say, that is what the U.S. Department of Defense says, is necessary for the United States to stock forward is stocked forward. Mr. McDADE. The budget has a further cut in ammunition and in the year beyond that additional in fiscal year 1991. It looks like we are going right back down into that difficult condition that we tried to get out of. To me, it looks that way. Does it look that way to you?

General GALVIN. I have, ever since I started looking at this with the Chiefs of the Services and the Defense Department, I have tried to look across the board, and I have ten different categories that I look at, including the availability of the reserve forces, the readiness of those forces, the balance of combat, combat service support, the warehousing available in Europe, the strategic lift and a whole set of those. I am satisfied that my requests get a hard look and right now, as you know, when Duane Cassidy was in here this morning, he talked about the series of meetings, boards, and studies that are being made, and there has been over the past couple years some improvement in the situation.

But if you look at POMCUS, for example, at the current rate it would be about or more before we would have the rest of that stockage in Europe. So every year we get some fill. If you count the amount of ammunition we put in it in a year in terms of five-ton truckloads, it is a lot of truckloads, but the fact is that one day of supply for the forces that would fight over there is probably somewhere near, just the supplies that force would use up in a high intensity war.

So it is a tough question all the time of, will I take

out

and buy some ships for strategic lift? However, you are right in your judgment of it that what tends to not come up in the high priorities is the less-glamorous stuff, tanks that are not going to be used by troops but go into warehouses, ammunition to be put in stockages overseas, this kind of thing.

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