"TODAY THE C-17 REPRESENTS THE ONLY WAY TO ACHIEVE THE STRATEGIC AND
TACTICAL MOBILITY THE ARMED FORCES REQUIRE...

THE COMMANDERS OF THE UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED COMMANDS HAVE CLEARLY
STATED THEIR NEED FOR THE C-17 DURING RECENT CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS..."

INTRATHEATER CAPABILITY OF C-17

Mr. DICKS. The other thing is you have intratheater capability, you say you have with the C-5 but not realistically. The C-17 gives you that intratheater capability.

General CASSIDY. That is the hardest thing to quantify because that is so scenario dependent. In this case it is very true. We are going to be fighting, out gunned and out manned and that is fine, we can do that. We are good. But we have got to be able to move and react to the fighting situation. The C-17 gives you that in the capability for the theater movement and you can't predict where that is going to be. That is what is called the friction of war. You will never be able to predict what the enemy is going to do. You have to consider him to be a smart and aggressive enemy. Therefore, we can give that fighting commander the flexibility and he can win.

Mr. DICKS. I yield.

Mr. LIVINGSTON. Thank you. General, I have been a supporter of the C-17 but I have heard the argument that when you had the C5's working in tandem with the C-130's, and C-130's are much cheaper a shot versus the C-17, that we would have a lot cheaper access to the front with C-130's then you will have with the C-17's. Do you want to respond to that?

General CASSIDY. That has been a question brought up by lots of people and even young aviators-this is the way they pose the question. I would like to make sure we are answering the same question. They say are you really going to put $125 million airplanes up close to the front and I look them square in the eye and I say, you bet your boots I am going to do that, when our nation is at risk I will use whatever we need to do that. Plus there is another issue beyond risks. The issue is if I have to use a C-130, I will use four C-130's. There are five crew members on every C-130. That is 20 crew members I will put at risk. On the C-17, I put three crew members at risk. Crew members are what make airplanes go.

Mr. DICKS. Isn't the C-17 much more capable of landing and taking off?

General CASSIDY. Its performance is much better. The point of this is risk and the point is I'll risk three crew members and a $125 million airplane before I'll risk five crew members. That is the way we military people should plan. It is a great question and we have had a lot of debate on it. And I have always won, because I think it is right. And you are right, the point that you make, sir, Mr. Dicks, on going other places, you have the ability, and we will know where the Stingers or concentrations of things are, and the C-17 gives us the ability to go to more places, all we do is adjust where it is going. It gives us the flexibility inherent to being able to go more places. All of those things working together I think solve the problem.

Mr. DICKS. What should be our long term objective for enhancing airlift after C-17, are you considering a next generation Air Force transport or are you looking at commercial aircraft, or a commercial aircraft derivative?

General CASSIDY. Our long-term objective in enhancing airlift is to provide a credible mix of strategic and tactical airlift platforms

that will enable us to meet the identified strategic mobility and theater airlift needs. With the C-17, we will meet our strategic mobility programming goal of 66 million-ton miles. However, to address the theaters tactical airlift needs, we will need to find a replacement for our aging C-130 tactical airlift fleet. We have been studying this problem under the auspices of the Advanced Transport Technology Mission Analysis (ATTMA) program and are about to further articulate this requirement with a formal statement of need.

Because of the nature of tactical airlift, and its need to operate out of small, rough and mostly austere landing fields, a strictly commercial aircraft would not meet our needs. However, a commercial aircraft derivative, especially one that specifically addressed these tactical airlift requirements, could be a viable player in any acquisition action to replace our tactical airlift fleet.

Mr. MURTHA. Thank you very much. Mr. Dicks and Mr. Young have some questions for the record. The committee will stand adjourned until 2:00 o'clock.

[CLERK'S NOTE.-Questions submitted by Mr. Dicks and the answers thereto follow:]

SEALIFT SHORTFALL

Question. Some have argued that we can simply rely on our allies to supply needed sealift. Do they have sufficient capability to offer and what limitations would there be on its availability in a timely manner?

Answer. The U.S. has agreements with NATO allies to provide some 400 dry cargo vessels in time of mobilization. A procedure exists under the aegis of the Maritime Administration to exercise those agreements. In addition, NATO allies have also identified tanker and passenger assets for possible use. Arrangements exist to use some South Korean vessels in certain situations. The U.S. has no arrangements beyond these to rely on sealift from our allies. Potentially, a number of our allies have modern, militarily useful ships in their merchant fleets that could augment our sealift capability. If the allied nations found themselves threatened, it could be safely assumed that their flag fleets would be made available. On the other hand, there is no guarantee on the timeliness of receiving those assets, nor any guarantee that the ships would be placed at our disposal at all, if our allies were not directly threatened or affected by the contingency. As history has shown, it is both prudent and necessary to maintain a strong U.S.-flag merchant marine to ensure the ability to carry out our national objectives.