notably through the replacement of their FROGS with the more capable and increasingly accurate SS-21 missile. They have commissioned their fourth 40,000 ton Kiev class aircraft carrier, and this year will undertake sea trails with their new 65,000 ton Tblisi class carrier. Their recently fielded Blackjack bomber is a highly sophisticated aircraft. They are building Foxhound, Flanker, and Fulcrum fighters at an accelerated rate. New and increasingly silent submarines are being produced at the rate of nearly one a month. This equipment is a collective demonstration of first-class technological expertise. It is highly capable, highly lethal, and in numbers far exceeds the forces necessary for the defense of the Soviet Union or the Warsaw Pact.

"How do we face a situation as

My view is that we do so by

is by

The question before us is: potentially dangerous as this?" remaining absolutely stable and predictable. The best way we can help President Gorbachev meet his stated objectives ensuring that the Alliance remains strong and steady. If we do this, then instability and unpredictability in the East can be met with stability and predictability in the West.

Our European Allies face the same task. They contribute to the common security in two ways. First, they provide substantial forces to the Alliance.

on the

central

of the 22 divisions currently deployed front, for example, 18 come from our NATO

partners. In the event of hostilities these nations initially would provide 90% of the manpower, 75% of the tanks, 90% of the artillery, and 80% of the combat aircraft.

Equally important, but less well understood, is the nonmonetary contribution our Allies make. In the Federal Republic of Germany, a country the size of Oregon with the population density of the Eastern seaboard, there are nearly 900,000 men and women under arms. These Allied forces participate in over 5000 exercises per year and make over 110,000 low level training flights annually. This burden, borne by our Allies in Europe, is one which the American people have been spared. Nor can we forget that economically, historically and security.

culturally,

politically Europe is vital to American

American citizens have a greater financial investment in Europe than they do in any other area of the world; nearly one-half of America's foreign direct investment is in Europe. Foreign trade with the nations of the North Atlantic Alliance exceeds that with Asia, the Middle East or any other area. There are, moreover, strong cultural and historical ties between the United States and the European members of the Alliance. Nearly half of those Americans claiming single-nation ancestry list one of the European NATO nations as their cultural home. We share with the nations of Europe the democratic system of government that is so central to our way of life.

Preserving that system of government is our objective. If possible, we hope to protect it through the deterrence of war, but if necessary, we must be ready to defend it. Twenty years ago Pierre Harmel gave us a formula for accomplishing this task. He said we should do two things: stay strong and be prepared to

negotiate. Harmel's advice remains valid and appropriate in

today's world.

III. Staying Strong

The first step in staying strong is ensuring that we have the right strategy. Very often today you hear voices calling for a "new strategy." They state this as if NATO has unthinkingly locked itself into an invalid approach, or a strategy that no longer fits the times.

We have today the strategy of flexible response and forward defense. From a military viewpoint this is not the classical defensive posture. It does not trade space for time. It does not allow attacking forces to come in deep, revealing the objectives of their attack, so that we can then shift appropriate forces to deny them their objectives. It is not a defense that allows for economy of force along some sectors of the front so can channel an attacker and defeat him in time. It is

that we
just what it says it is:
reaches of our territory.

penetration.

a doctrine of defense at the forward

We do not allow any operational

But we have a flexible component to our defense, and that flexibility comes in our willingness to meet any attack with an appropriate level of defense. It is based on a triad that allows for direct defense, deliberate escalation and general nuclear responses. This concept is central to the primary objective of our strategy, to deter war in Europe. The best way to deal with

If

the specter of war is to prevent it from happening. deterrence fails, which it has not since the foundation of NATO, then the Alliance must be prepared to defend. The more we can show the ability to do just that, the less likely it is that deterrence will fail. In other words, in order to achieve our objective of deterrence, our defense must be credible.

we

The

But whatever strategy we adopt, it is useless unless support it. To provide this support, we must continue to upgrade and modernize our equipment in both the conventional and nuclear arenas. Small advantages can make a vast difference. fighter aircraft with slightly better electronics and greater maneuverability will sweep the skies. The tank that can fire one second faster that its opponent wins on the battlefield.

the

In 1983,

In the nuclear arena there is one clear priority continued modernization of our theater nuclear weapons. NATO Defense Ministers agreed to reduce unilaterally NATO's nuclear stockpile by 1400 weapons. This reduction combined with the previous unilateral reduction of 1000 weapons bring NATO's nuclear stockpile to its lowest level in twenty years. At the same time ministers identified a number of needed modernized weapons to ensure that the Alliance retained systems which are effective, reliable and survivable. These requirements remain valid today. We need to upgrade 155 mm artillery fired nuclear warheads, acquire the SRAM-T tactical air-to-surface-missile for dual capable aircraft, and develop the Follow on to Lance (FOTL). This modernization is an important part of our current Allied

Command Europe nuclear weapons requirements study which could result in a sizeable reduction in our nuclear stockpiles without any loss in the credibility of nuclear deterrence.

While our goal is to decrease reliance on nuclear artillery, the need for some of these weapons will remain. Modern nuclear projectiles contribute to deterrence by providing a capability to respond to threatening "breakthrough" concentrations of Warsaw Pact armored and mechanized forces, thereby denying the Pact the offensive capabilities to strike deep into NATO territory.

More of our

SRAM-T allows better aircraft penetrability. heavily burdened dual-capable aircraft would survive with the greater standoff potential and we could hold high-value, deep targets at risk with weapons systems based in Europe.

Our current Lance is aging rapidly. We have upgraded it as much as we can. If we do not take the research and development steps now, our missile-based nuclear forces will become obsolete in the mid-1990's. Unlike aircraft, which are readily targetable

at a small, fixed number of air bases, Follow on to Lance with an enhanced range (allowable under the INF treaty) could hide in hundreds of places, and would have the reach to make it an effective deterrent.

But no leg of our triad stands alone. Each is closely interrelated to the other. Our conventional forces must be

strong enough to allow rational decisionmaking by our leaders. It should be strong enough to prevent quick success by an attacker seeking to achieve operational and strategic objectives