FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY UNTIL RELEASED BY THE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS STATEMENT OF GENERAL JOHN R. GALVIN COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES JANUARY 31, 1989 Mr. I Chairman and distinguished members of the House. welcome this opportunity to contribute to your study of the nation's defense requirements. Your deliberations this year will take place in the context of several particularly important events in Europe. This year will mark the beginning of the much heralded and long-awaited conventional stability talks; it will see the further implementation of the INF Treaty; but most important for us to remember, it will mark the fortieth anniversary of the North Atlantic Alliance Alliance in modern history. - the most successful As Commander-in-Chief of the United States European Command I am responsible for US military activities in Europ and most of Africa, an area that includes 77 countries. To carry out that mission I command 322,000 American soldiers, sailors, marines and airmen, and supervise 150,000 civilians who work for the military. In addition to commanding US forces in Europe, I serve as the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, responsible to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. My primary mission in both of these roles is to deter war and to maintain the peace with if that to defend by employing the military forces of freedom that the West has enjoyed for forty years, or peace is broken - Allied Command Europe. It is clear that we are entering a period of uncertainty. Whatever we think of the motives of President Gorbachev, there is little doubt that he is taking his nation through great change. And as this great power changes it will pass through unpredictable periods of potential instability. In regard to their posture towards the West, the Soviets now display a great willingness to negotiate. Having realized that are seeking to turn their readiness to They have the stagnation of their economy is in part attributable to their enormous defense expenditures, the Soviets necessity into a virtue by declaring participate in conventional arms control negotiations. learned that sounding bellicose and backing it up with a military force that exceeds any reasonable need for defense only tends to alarm others and motivate them to take prudent steps to ensure their own security. Now they are at least articulating a new approach. Within the Soviet Union, there is movement toward what the Russian leaders call "new thinking." Glasnost_and Perestroika are significant concepts that seem to be shaking a stifling ideology to its very foundations. Governmental institutions, the economic system, and the very social structure are all undergoing confusing, almost chaotic change. In regard to the balance of military forces we are hearing terms such as "reasonable sufficiency." We are hearing promises of unilateral conventional force reductions of 10,000 tanks, 5000 of which will come from the forward areas of the Warsaw Pact, 8500 artillery pieces, 800 combat aircraft, and 500,000 men. These are promises that we hope will come about. But even if they do, many questions remain unanswered. and equipment go? What will be done with them? What, exactly, is meant by manpower cut? What kinds of manpower are we talking about - railroad repair units, border guard units? And what of the massive production rates that we still see? President Gorbachev has announced a reduction of 14.2% in the Soviet defense budget. But 14.2% of what is not clear, since the Even if applied to Soviet Soviet defense budget remains highly classified. He has also announced a 19.5% cut in production capabilities. But 19.5% of what is equally unclear here. production of 3400 tanks per year, the Soviets would still be making 2700 --a level nearly three times that of NATO. Instead of manufacturing enough artillery for four artillery regiments every month, the Soviets will make enough for only three regiments. Intentions are one thing; capabilities are another. The Soviets are saying, "Trust us to fulfill our newly stated intentions." I would like to, but I must also look at the iron on the battlefield, the capabilities of the Soviets to do other than what they say then intend to do. In addition to tanks and artillery, the Soviets are fielding two new types of ICBMS the SS-24 and the SS-25. They also - continue to modernize their short-range nuclear missile forces, |