Mr. McGIFFERT. Well, it applied to every member of the Military Forces.

Mr. WHITENER. Well, I am told on reliable authority that the Military personnel on Capitol Hill had their guns loaded and had instructions not to tolerate any foolishness. Now, is that contrary to your understanding?

Mr. McGIFFERT. I don't know whether they did or not, Mr. Whitener. Mr. WHITENER. Well, you wouldn't deny that this was the situation? Mr. McGIFFERT. No, for all I know, they were given permission to do so by an officer.

Mr. WHITENER. Under these orders, I take it that a soldier, seeing someone throw a Molotov cocktail into an occupied apartment house, would have no authority to fire upon that individual unless some commissioned officer gave him a direct command?

Mr. McGIFFERT. That's correct.

Mr. WHITENER. Who protected the people in the apartments who were living over the stores?

Mr. McGIFFERT. I think the principal way in which you bring situations like this under control is the introduction of massive numbers of people-law enforcement people, whether they be soldiers or policemen or both.

Mr. WHITENER. Well, I was told by people in authority that the Military personnel were booed as they walked up and down the street. So apparently this massive force didn't deter those. Did you get any reports to that effect?

Mr. McGIFFERT. No, I didn't. I think that it is quite clear from the record of the disturbance that once large numbers of personnel were on the streets, the incidents fell off very rapidly.

Mr. WHITENER. Well, may I ask you one other question. Who, in authority, has the responsibility for the direction of the troops not to load their guns until authorized by a commissioned officer and not to fire in defense of their lives? What individual made that order?

Mr. McGIFFERT. Well, this is part of the Army policy, Mr. Whitener.

Mr. WHITENER. I know, but you said you gave each soldier a card. Mr. McGIFFERT. That's right.

Mr. WHITENER. This was an official order, so it had to have some authority.

Mr. McGIFFERT. That's right.

Mr. WHITENER. Who signed that order?

Mr. McGIFFERT. I don't know if there is a signature on the order

or not.

Mr. WHITENER. Do you have one of the cards?

Mr. McGIFFERT. No, I do not.

Mr. WHITENER. Could you get one?

Mr. McGIFFERT. I certainly can.

(The card referred to follows:)

(Copy of Card Carried by Army Troops in Washington during April 1968 Civil

Disorders)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

(SEAL)

WAR OFFICE

GTA 21-2-7, February 1968.

(Supersedes GTA 21-2-7, October 1967)

I AM A MEMBER OF THE ARMED FORCES. I WILL CARRY OUT THE ORDERS OF MY COMMANDER AND THE SPECIAL ORDERS CONTAINED HEREIN. I WILL CARRY THIS CARD WITH ME AT ALL TIMES WHILE ON THIS MISSION.

SPECIAL ORDERS FOR MEMBERS OF THE ARMY ENGAGED IN CIVIL DISTURBANCE OPERATIONS

1. I will always PRESENT a NEAT military APPEARANCE. I will CONDUCT MYSELF IN a SOLDIERLY MANNER at all times and I will do all I can to BRING CREDIT UPON MYSELF, my UNIT, and the MILITARY SERVICE. 2. I will BE COURTEOUS in all dealings WITH CIVILIANS to the maximum EXTENT POSSIBLE UNDER EXISTING CIRCUMSTANCES.

3. I will NOT LOAD OR FIRE my weapon EXCEPT WHEN AUTHORIZED by an OFFICER IN PERSON, when authorized IN ADVANCE BY AN OFFICER under certain specific conditions, or WHEN REQUIRED TO SAVE MY LIFE. 4. I will NOT INTENTIONALLY INJURE OR MISTREAT CIVILIANS, including those I am controlling, or those in my custody NOR will I WITHHOLD MEDICAL ATTENTION from anyone who requires it.

5. I will NOT DISCUSS OR PASS on RUMORS ABOUT this OPERATION. 6. I will IF POSSIBLE LET CIVILIAN POLICE MAKE ARRESTS, but I CAN IF NECESSARY TAKE into TEMPORARY CUSTODY rioters, looters, or others committing serious crimes. I will TAKE such PERSONS TO the POLICE OR designated MILITARY AUTHORITIES as SOON AS POSSIBLE. It is my duty to DELIVER EVIDENCE and to COMPLETE EVIDENCE TAGS and detainee FORMS IN ACCORDANCE WITH MY INSTRUCTIONS.

7. I will ALLOW properly IDENTIFIED REPORTERS and RADIO and TELEVISION PERSONNEL FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT, unless they INTERFERE WITH the MISSION of my unit.

8. I will AVOID DAMAGE TO PROPERTY AS FAR AS POSSIBLE.

GPO 1968 0-291-687

(Executive communications dealing with the April civil disturbances, calling out 14,000 troops, etc., as submitted to the committee, are set forth in the Appendix, pp. 95-103 :)

(For costs of federalizing the National Guard and bringing in the Army troops, see Appendix, p. 92.)

Mr. MCMILLAN. Mr. O'Konski.

Mr. O'KONSKI. I will make my remarks very short.

Were you consulted about a permit for the building of Insurrection City in the heart of the Nation's Capital?

Mr. MURPHY. No, sir. I was not consulted about any permit.

Mr. O'KONSKI. I will not embarrass you by asking you what your answer would be if you were consulted.

I heard you say a little while ago that you are 160 policemen short? Mr. MURPHY. Yes, sir.

94-293-68- -3

Mr. O'KONSKI. Have you gone down to Insurrection City--they have some marshals there to see if they are really interested in jobs? That is what they are here for. They said, they can't get any jobs! Mr. MURPHY. I don't know, sir, if our recruitment units have gone down.

Mr. O'KONSKI. Well, there are 160 jobs open

Mr. MURPHY. Sir?

Mr. O'KONSKI. So they could have them. I notice that we took in something like $50,000 on fines and forfeitures during the last insurrection we had in our city, from 8,000 arrests that comes to about $6,000-$6 per arrest that we have taken in. From now on, when I can't find any parking space, I think I am going to go burn down a block and make myself a parking space. It will be cheaper than paying a fine for parking.

I just want to say this: I have been in Congress-this is my 26th year our Nation's Capital had, I think, the greatest and the finest police force of any city in the United States. I have nothing but admiration for them. I feel very strongly for your people. Very frankly, I don't see why anybody in the United States of America today would want to be a policeman with their hands tied the way they are.

We have the most excellent police force in the Nation's Capital of any city in the United States. In the Congress, I can truthfully say that. It was not until the politicians above started to give the orderswhen we got this that we call "measured response" theory.

I thought the purpose of a police force was to prevent crime, not measure it!

Mr. MURPHY. That is right.

Mr. O'KONSKI. Now, you have measured response, a genesis handed down by the Justice Department to all of the police forces all over the United States. Well, the Justice Department can't even catch the murderer of Martin Luther King. Yet they are trying to tell you people how to preserve law and order in the Nation's Capital.

I, for the life of me, can't understand why anybody wants to be a policeman today. In Milwaukee we had riots. Last year, after due warning, a 21-year-old looter was shot by a policeman. 2,500 people attended the funeral of the looter-made a martyr out of him; as to the policeman who was shot by a sniper-apparently, 150 came to his funeral.

When you have a mayor of a town, on Loyalty Day in one of our major cities, and they have two parades at that time-one to preserve law and order, commending the United States, protect your policeman, and the mayor had a hard time figuring out which parade he was going to go to; and you have another one the same day with draft card burners and looters and rioters, and the mayor of the town went over to the looters and the rioters and not to the Loyalty Parade. When you get that kind of support from mayors and politicians, for the life of me, I can't understand it.

The tragedy of it is that here we are, putting you people on the spot, who are risking your lives, when you really don't have the final say on how you should enforce the law. You get orders from politicians. In my judgement, we have got the wrong people here to interrogate. The people that we should have over here, and interrogate them, are the people who laid down these silly rules that tie your hands where

you risk your lives, where nobody in the United States of America wants to be a policeman any more.

That is all I have. God blesss you. You have a job to do, you are doing it the best you can. It is on top we should be concerned about, not with you people. That is all I have to say.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Sisk.

Mr. SISK. Just quickly-one of the things, Mr. Murphy, that I think has troubled a great many people here with reference to the recent problems had to do with the criticism that went to what seemed to be a long delay in recognizing a problem existed. I think it is probably rightly so. That is where my criticism lies.

I think that almost anyone should have known Thursday night pretty well what was going to happen, I would like, quickly, if someone caneither you or the gentleman here from the Department of the Armyto give me the sequence of events as to exactly when help was requested above and beyond the police.

Now, I recognize that the police-apparently, at a certain time, you called in all your reserve. At what point did that occur, Chief Layton? Chief LAYTON. We called in-put the order out to call in all reserves after sometime between 11:00 and 12:00 o'clock Thursday night. Earlier, Mr. Sisk, we had made a decision that we needed the first call for the tour of duty coming on at midnight to report earlier, and I don't have the time.

Mr. SISK. Do you have the time on that?

Chief LAYTON. That order to bring the midnight tour of duty in early was at 10:10 p.m., on the fourth.

Mr. SISK. That was at 10:10?

Chief LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. SISK. On Thursday night?

Chief LAYTON. Yes, sir. We decided about that same time to hold until further notice all of the men working 4:00 o'clock p.m. to 12:00 midnight. Then it was a little after midnight that the order actually went out to call in all of the off-duty men, the day section included.

Mr. SISK. All right. Let's say, then, by 1:00 o'clock a.m., on Friday morning, or one hour after midnight Thursday night, the police had called up all the forces it had.

Whose authority, Mr. Murphy, was it to make a request for additional help, for the National Guard and the Military? Who had the authority under the program you had set up before to make that decision, as to what point at which to request additional aid?

Mr. MURPHY. Well, the arrangement was that our Commissioner Washington would make the request, but Commissioner Washington and Chief Layton and I conferred shortly after midnight and we had been in telephonic communication with some people at the Pentagon, and it was decided that I should go to the Pentagon at 3:00 a.m.

I arrived there about 3:00 o'clock, after the meeting had been set up, and explained the situation we had had, the present condition in the city, our concern about the next evening, and we began at that time

to

Mr. SISK. At what hour, and minute, was a specific request made for Military aid in the situation?

Mr. MURPHY. At that conference, sir, we requested that the National Guard be on the street before dark Friday evening.

Mr. SISK. Why the delay there? Was it going to take from 3:00 o'clock in the morning until that night to get the Guard on the street? Mr. MURPHY. By 3:00 a.m., Friday morning, sir, the situation was under relatively good control.

Mr. SISK. Did you have anything, though, to lead you to believe it would stay under control?

Mr. MURPHY. We had no good evidence to indicate either way, sir. Mr. SISK. You see, I happen to agree, Mr. Murphy, with you to some extent with reference to hesitancy in using the ultimate forceof going out and mowing people down with machine guns. Frankly, I know a lot of other people who were very upset because that had not been done. I agree with you that is not the way. But it seems to me that the only way, then, you can offset that is through a show of force with what the Secretary called a massive force.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, sir.

Mr. SISK. So I think to someone there is justifiable criticism, why a decision wasn't immediately made to have on the streets those troops Friday morning. This, to me, is a real criticism. I am trying to get the exact time the request was made for the first troops, Guard or otherwise?

Mr. MURPHY. Well, sir, that request for the Guard, a preliminary request for the Guard, was made at that time to be confirmed Friday a.m. The situation in the city at that particular time had been pretty much limited to one street, a section of 14th Street, and both the looting and the window-breaking and the larceny and the fires were under good control by 3:00 a.m.

As a matter of fact, by between 4:00 a.m. and 11:00 a.m., activities in the city were close to normal and that schools opened, people came to work. We had many additional police officers on duty. We did not assume-far from it-we did not assume that we were back to a totally normal situation. But we were hopeful that perhaps this outbreak on Thursday night would subside, and as soon as we had sufficient officers in that it might not flare up again.

Mr. SISK. Actually, then, as I understand what you are saying, really, there was no request made for troops on the street to be available before late Friday afternoon or Friday night? Well, we all agree, then, a substantial error in judgment was made here?

Mr. MURPHY. From the present position, knowing what did happen-of course, if we had know that that there would have been another outbreak

Mr. SISK. This is hindsight, and it is always better than foresight. But, as I say, there was an error in judgment. Of course, this goes to the matter of intelligence. I would assume certainly you do have in so-called trouble spots in Washington some type of intelligence, that is in the way of information.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, sir.

Mr. SISK. What I am trying to say is, people who feed information in, and apparently, there was a failure or breakdown, if you did have such a force.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, I might point out, Congressman, that when I went to the Pentagon-I am not familiar with everything that happened, but I know that alert systems were escalating within the Military. I know the difficult situation that existed in the Pentagon dur