234 C-141s, and 450

Guard to make up a total of 109 C-5s, C-130s, not including trainer aircraft. MAC has effectively melded this airlift force, along with available KC-10s, U.S. civilian airliners and foreign cargo aircraft, into an air fleet that has surpassed the effort of any air deployment in history. By the end of six weeks of operations, they had logged more than 700 million ton-miles, exceeding that of the 65-week-long Berlin Airlift in 1948. At the height of our current airlift operations, 127 planes landed daily in the desert of Southwest Asia, averaging one arrival every 11 minutes, around the clock. An effort of this magnitude can only be accomplished through an integrated airlift system, capable of comprehending overall transportation needs and applying the total airlift assets most efficiently and effectively. We have seen the proof of this in support of DESERT SHIELD/STORM requirements, where each portion of the airlift fleet has been used to its greatest advantage.

One critical portion of airlift in DESERT SHIELD/STORM is the contribution made by civilian air carriers. Immediately after the deployment began, civilian airlines offered their support and the first civilian mission flew on 8 August 1990. The extent of voluntary cooperation expanded rapidly, but airlift requirements quickly exceeded the combined capabilities of our government-owned and volunteer commercial assets. As a result, I activated (with the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs concurrence) the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) Stage I on 18 August 1990, marking the first time since the inception of CRAF in 1951 that any portion of the program had been activated. This action quickly expanded our civilian airlift fleet to 68: 17 long-range international (LRI) CRAF passenger aircraft, 21 LRI CRAF cargo aircraft, plus 15 passenger and 15 cargo volunteer aircraft, both U.S. and allied. Combined with our government-owned and operated, or "organic" assets, we were able to meet DESERT SHIELD airlift requirements until commencement of Operation DESERT STORM, and the start of our heavy sustainment effort.

Although sustainment supplies move primarily by sea, priority shipments go by air. To ensure the capacity to meet our air sustainment requirements, the Secretary of Defense activated CRAF Stage II on 17 January 1991. This made available a total of 77 Iong-range international (LRI) commercial passenger and 40 LRI cargo aircraft. Throughout this major mobilization effort, our ability to airlift priority cargo has been critical, and the U.S. airline industry has responded accordingly, voluntarily providing an additional 30 cargo aircraft above those required by activation of CRAF Stage II. We are pleased to have the continued cooperation of the airline industry.

While CRAF has augmented our strategic deployment, or intertheater airlift, C-130s have provided the tactical, or intratheater airlift, in DESERT SHIELD/STORM. The in-theater C-130s, while MAC assets, operate under the direct control of the U.S. Central Command Commander in Chief (USCINCCENT). This is normal practice for theater airlift. Since the beginning of the deployment, the C-130 performance in support of USCINCCENT requirements has been remarkable. Flying 9,124 missions as of 1 February 1991, they have amassed 50,815 flying hours. This force consists of 57% active duty and 43% Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve aircraft. They make an extremely effective airlift team, handling all intratheater air cargo movements.

The current mix of active to guard and reserve forces has served us well. Active duty forces provide a rapid response capability, while the guard and reserves have historically kept costs for the fleet down. Recent contingencies such as URGENT FURY, JUST CAUSE and now DESERT SHIELD/STORM clearly demonstrate the National Command Authorities' absolute requirement for immediate lift response capability. Limiting capabilities limits options.

Beside the obvious operational advantages, today, all C-130 units also benefit substantially from having centralized command of their logistical support and training. Our global responsibilities require that our entire airlift fleet be operated and managed from a global perspective, and not from the unique needs of the theater commanders. Our C-130s operating in Southwest Asia today may be deployed to support other theater commanders in the near future, but no matter where they are, they should always remain an integral player on the airlift team. Maintaining this integrity of the theater and strategic fleets is the best means of ensuring support to the unified commanders and individual services. It allows us to use our air mobility forces when and where they are most needed. This is the most efficient way of doing business, and we have demonstrated time and again that it works. By maintaining this fully integrated common user airlift fleet under USTRANSCOM, we will be there to provide the support America can always count on. All of our airframes are being pushed harder than at any time since Vietnam. From the onset of the deployment, our C-5 and C-141 fleets have been operating at near wartime use rates. . Keeping this tremendous flow going required us to defer routine preventative maintenance and cannibalize parts from aircraft undergoing depot level repairs. The operations tempo of our C-5s, currently the only aircraft capable of handling the very large pieces of military equipment we refer to as "outsized" has increased to nearly 3 1/2 times their usual rate. The C-141 has also been pushed to the maximum as its requirements peaked. Already the workhorse airlifter for MAC, our fleet of C-141s flew over 1,000 missions in August in support of DESERT SHIELD, about twice their normal mission rate. By December, they were flying almost 1400 missions per month a pace that continued on through January. Although the C-141s are maintaining a high mission capable rate, at the current tempo of operations it only takes seven months to equal one year of programmed service life.

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The answer to our rapidly aging C-141 airframes is the C-17. Its modern design gives it the capability to move large quantities of equipment, munitions, fuel, and outsized cargo directly to forward areas. In fact, because of its superior fuel efficiency, the C-17 can carry its maximum payload over greater distance than either the C-5 or C-141. The C-17 can also airdrop outsize cargo. Its lower manpower requirements and reduced operation and support costs make it more efficient, while its exceptional ground maneuverability increases cargo throughput, adding to its effectiveness.

We estimate that if we would have had the C-17 in place of the C-141 during DESERT SHIELD, we could have met our airlift deployment requirements from 20% to 35% faster, depending on the capacity of the airfields made available in the area of operations. The C-17's impact in the first 12 days alone would have allowed us to carry enough cargo to deploy an additional three F-15, three F-16, three F-4, and three A-10 squadrons plus two light infantry brigades. In addition to its strategic

contribution, the C-17 could also have provided the equivalent in-theater airlift of a 16 aircraft C-130 squadron. To sum it up, the C-17 means fewer intertheater missions, fewer crew members, less maintenance, additional intratheater capability,

and a faster rate of cargo delivery.

The amount of heavy combat equipment required is too great to carry exclusively by air, so sealift was also put into motion immediately. Faced with a sealift effort of huge proportions, the Military Sealift Command (MSC) first turned to our 25 ships in the Afloat Prepositioning Force (APF). Making up this force are the 13 Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS) which are divided into three squadrons, each capable of equipping and supplying a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) of approximately 16,500 combat Marines. Another 12 ships constitute the Afloat Prepositioning Ships (APS) and carry Army and Air Force equipment and supplies. We also began to activate our eight Fast Sealift Ships (FSS) which are converted container ships modified in a roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) configuration. These ships are maintained in a reduced operating status which allows for activation in 96 hours or less. MSC also turned to the Maritime Administration (MARAD) to activate our ships in reserve. The Ready Reserve Force (RRF) currently numbers 96 vessels: 83 dry cargo, 11 tankers and 2 troop ships; laid up in various states of readiness which allow them to be ready for sea in 5, 10, or 20 days. Add to these organic assets the contribution of U.S., allied and friendly commercial shipping and, since mid-December, MSC has been managing a fleet of over 200 ships. As of the first of this month, we had sealifted over 28 million square feet of unit equipment enough tanks, trucks, ammunition, foodstuffs and other equipment to cover every square foot of 595 football fields. The volume of ship traffic across the seas between the U.S. and the Persian Gulf has become so great that we frequently refer to the sealift operation as "the steel bridge. At its peak on 30 December 1990, the number of ships en route to the Gulf was 132, with 44 more ships returning from the Gulf and an additional 28 ships being loaded or unloaded at ports.

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I am pleased to report that the military sealift programs which you have funded over the past ten years have now proven themselves. The first sealift to arrive in Saudi Arabia was of the MPS ships from Diego Garcia, delivering badly needed heavy unit equipment to back up our light infantry and marine forces defending the Saudi-Kuwaiti border. These MPS ships have maintained a 99% reliability rate with many additional sailings. Our FSSS have also performed very well, with seven of the eight delivering their cargo on or before schedule, usually in just 14 days of sailing time. Even though one of these ships suffered a major propulsion failure en route to the Persian Gulf, these ships have averaged more cargo per voyage than any two U.S. or foreign chartered vessels combined, delivering 14% of all dry sealift cargo while maintaining an 82% reliability rate. While their 33-knot speed is not a prerequisite for strategic sealift, their immense capacity and military utility make them an extremely valuable mobility asset.

DESERT SHIELD has also seen the first ever large scale activation of the RRF. We have given activation orders for 71 of these vessels in reserve, of which 63 have been made ready for sea. You no doubt saw press reports early in the deployment contending that some of our sealift ships had difficulty in meeting their activation commitments, particularly in the RRF.

These reports need to be placed in proper context. MARAD, in cooperation with industry and labor, undertook a level of effort in ship activations never before attempted. Even with this extraordinary effort, breakouts took longer than planned, and 30% of the vessels missed their activation targets by ten or more days. Once the ships were activated and operational control was transferred to MSC, however, the RRF fleet has performed exceptionally well. Even accounting for these breakout delays, the RRF has maintained an 81% overall reliability rate while delivering 29% of all dry cargo sealifted to the Gulf region. Anyone familiar with maritime operations and marine engineering would acknowledge that this is exceptional performance. Considering this fleet has an average age of 24 years, with many of those years spent at anchor unmanned, and that most of these aging ships were broken out of long-term lay up and hurriedly manned by merchant marine crews who responded to the call, their performance is a noteworthy accomplishment and proof that the RRF concept is sound.

In the early days of Operation DESERT SHIELD, MSC also began to charter commercial sealift assets through the release of a worldwide contracting Request For Proposal (RFP). Analyzing the response to this RFP, MSC first negotiated contracts with all U.S. flag vessels that were offered for charter and met USCINCCENT transportation requirements. The tremendous international support was also apparent in the number of allied and friendly ships offered for charter. As the deployment grew, MSC continued to charter U.S. commercial flag vessels, when available, to meet sealift requirements. Commercial shipping has moved 44% of all dry cargo sealifted to Saudi Arabia as of 1 February 1991, with 25% being moved by allied and friendly shipping. Of the total number of ships used so far 45% have been allied ships, 43%, were government-owned or operated U.S. ships, and 12% of the ships came from the US merchant marine. Although consideration was given to activating the Sealift Readiness Program (SRP), the small number of additional militarily useful U.S. merchant marine ships the SRP would have provided could not offset the severe economic disruption that activation would have had on that declining industry.

Our ability to sealift more than 6.7 million tons of materiel in the first six months of operations to the Persian Gulf region has depended heavily on the contributions of organic, allied, and friendly shipping. Looking to the future, MARAD has predicted our merchant marine fleet will continue to decline, from 168 militarily useful dry cargo ships today to 34 by the year 2005. This decline, if unchecked, will force us to reevaluate the role the U.S. merchant marine can play in our national strategy. Unlike Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM, we will not always have worldwide support for our national security objectives nor the lift assets associated with that support. The solution includes both the U.S. merchant marine and our organic assets, as it has in the past. We, as a nation, should make a concerted effort to revitalize the U.S. merchant marine while continuing to develop our organic programs to ensure an adequate sealift response capability.

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Ships are not the only concern, as the pool of U.S. merchant mariners for manning these vessels is also in serious decline. From the beginning of DESERT SHIELD, leadership in the mariners unions took immediate action to successfully crew every reserve ship as it was activated. Manning ships for a deployment of this scale is a noteworthy effort, but we must remember that the

entire reserve fleet was not called up at once. While we anticipate the labor unions will continue to be highly supportive of our needs, the fact is their membership continues to decline in numbers and increase in age. Maritime industry manpower has dwindled almost 60% since 1970 to a current level of 27,000 and is projected to be less than half that amount by the turn of the century. One possible solution is a national resolve to revitalize the merchant marine; an alternative is the establishment of a merchant marine reserve.

DoD is now conducting a Mobility Requirements Study (MRS) which will quantify our strategic lift needs for the next decade. Many of the sealift issues raised in DESERT SHIELD/STORM will be addressed. Among the recommendations that will come from this study are the proper number of RO/RO strategic sealift ships, an optimum mix of ships in the RRF, and the size and composition of the afloat prepositioning force. The predicted demands for airlift will also be added to form a blueprint from which we can build the mobility structure of the future, a structure conceived and designed to meet the evolving threats of the 21st century.

Another integral part of the total transportation effort is the marshaling of combat forces with their heavy unit equipment. The Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) coordinated the movement of Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps units to seaports, prepared those ports for ships and cargo, and supervised the loading operations at 28 ports worldwide. In some cases, ship modifications were necessary to accommodate loads and MTMC's terminal operators successfully used flatracks to enable container ships to carry unit equipment, even helicopters, and expedite the movement of combat forces. 1,237 out of 2,010, or approximately 60% of our total number of flatracks are being used in the transportation effort. MTMC carries out a lot of behind-the-scenes coordination with industry and government agencies to keep the combat units moving. On 8 August 1990, they initiated a contingency response (CORE) program that provided a pre-trained team of specialists to liaison with transportation management agencies and streamline the coordination of exemptions and waivers, and handle safety, security, facility, and transportation resource issues.

MTMC is also responsible for trucks, trains, and transloading. For example, the 101st Airborne was transported via 1,174 truckloads by 27 commercial trucking companies from their post at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, to the port of Jacksonville, Florida, over a 5-day period without a single late shipment. Since the beginning of DESERT SHIELD, MTMC has been responsible for the transportation of more than one million tons of cargo by more than 23,000 trucks and over 14,000 rail cars. Their Defense Freight Railway Interchange Fleet (DFRIF) program of heavy duty flatcars has supported DESERT SHIELD/STORM by moving heavy fighting vehicles, such as M1 and M60 tanks, and bulk fuels. When one of our fast sealift ships needed extensive repairs, MTMC coordinated the simultaneous transloading of its cargo to another fast sealift ship to get that equipment to its unit in the theater. Although the deployment effort has now diminished, MTMC still faces a continuous task, as the bulk of sustainment cargo will go by sea. During one recent week, over 3,300 forty-foot containers were booked for subsequent transport by commercial container ships.