Key to the effective use of the air, land, and sea strategic lift assets is our ability to direct and control them. DESERT SHIELD/STORM is the first major military operation in U.S. history where transportation was directed by one central headquarters. As you are aware, USTRANSCOM was established in 1987 to provide the unified CINCS with the global air, land, and sea transportation they require to meet national security objectives. Thus, all of our transportation efforts have been carried out in support of the requirements of USCINCCENT for Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM. We executed the deployment as it was planned: major combat units first, followed by their support forces and sustainment. Air lift took the first combat forces, the first sustainment cargo and expedient cargo, and 99% of the passengers in a total of 12,473 missions as of 1 February 1991. Sealift, while carrying less than 1% of the passengers, carried 86% of the dry cargo in 387 voyages and 99% of the fuel shipped to the Gulf as of that same date. USTRANSCOM Successfully integrated the efforts of our three components and adjusted to other influences, such as U.S. Commander in Chief Europe (USCINCEUR) priorities for supporting USCINCCENT. Our USTRANSCOM headquarters team has come up with some innovative solutions to the challenges raised in DESERT SHIELD/STORM.

While USCINCCENT operational requirements allowed for the vast majority of cargo to arrive in weeks by sea, some priority cargo had to arrive in the theater in days. To expedite these essential items, we established a "Desert Express" air service. Comparable to commercial express services, Desert Express provides "overnight" delivery for extremely high-priority items such as spare parts for aircraft, tanks, and other high-tech combat equipment. Desert Express proved to be so valuable that it was expanded to two flights a day as of 13 February 1991. A "European Express" was also created for moving equipment out of Europe, where large amounts of spare parts and equipment are stockpiled. Flown daily by C-14ls, Desert Express moved over 1,200 tons and European Express carried 376 tons into the Persian Gulf theater as of the first of this month.

Our innovative response to challenges in DESERT SHIELD has not been limited to airlift. We also established a Special Middle East Sealift Agreement (SMESA) with seven liner services. Operating out of ports on both U.S. coasts, we have contracted a capacity under SMESA to ship up to 2,700 forty-foot equivalent unit containers per week to the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, enough to meet the projected peak sustainment requirement. To expedite air-eligible cargo diverted to sealift and other high-priority sealift cargo, we implemented a "Sealift Express" service. Using the existing terms of SMESA, Sealift Express expeditiously handles chartered cargo moving to the Gulf region with a goal of cutting shipment time to 23 days, 30% faster than regular SMESA service.

Orchestrating a global transportation network requires the proper automated support. USTRANSCOM has made significant strides in developing Command, Control, Communication, and Computer (C4) systems necessary to provide that support. New interfaces to the airlift and sealift scheduling systems were developed to speed requirements information into the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES). JOPES can now be used more readily in the deployment of forces and, in future versions, not only aid us in controlling follow-on sustainment, but assist theater CINCS like USCINCCENT in the employment of forces. The productivity gained through improved information

flow, like those never before attempted interfaces, underscores the potential gains achievable in the defense transportation community by networking current systems. USTRANSCOM is leading the effort to establish a Global Transportation Network (GTN) which will allow any user to access transportation information from any other user's data base. A consistent level of funding for command and control systems procurement and operations must be maintained if we are to achieve this important capability.

A transportation effort of DESERT SHIELD's magnitude also requires the right mix of properly trained people at every level. Our active duty forces were joined at the start by reservists and national guardsmen from all services, 40 percent of whom were volunteers. Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard forces make up half of MAC's total airlift capability and over 17,000 reservists and guardsmen are presently on extended active duty with MAC. Even prior to activating the more than 3,000 Army and Navy reservists needed for continuous operations, MTMC was able to form provisional port units at key locations. Volunteer reserve personnel aided the effort to outload some of the first combat units sent in the deployment. MSC reservists greatly assisted in the activation of the hospital ship USNS Comfort and reserve units at ports within the Persian Gulf are handling a great deal of the military shipments arriving in theater. Our DOD civilians. working at headquarters and component levels have also been invaluable to USTRANSCOM's performance in DESERT SHIELD. As Secretary Cheney wrote me recently, "it is a great feeling to know that our active and recalled reserve soldiers, sailors, marines, airmen, coast guardsmen and civilian personnel can come through when called upon." I agree with him wholeheartedly, confident that the people in this command can be counted on to get the job done. I have not been disappointed.

While remembering that there were many factors in our favor in DESERT SHIELD, our ability to deploy a force to combat the fourth largest army in the world has shown the utility of our airlift and sealift assets. Never before in history has any nation transported so much, so far, so fast. The deployment has also, however, pointed to needs in our strategic lift system, needs that can be addressed by your committee, Mr. Chairman. The C-17 is vital to our future airlift capability. The Secretary of Defense's decision to build to an 18 aircraft per year production rate recognizes the need for this critical airlift asset. Your continued support of this program, and the six aircraft requested in FY92, will ensure we reach that goal. We will also need your support on where we should go with strategic sealift. The decline of the merchant marine is real, and the options to counteract it vary. Do we revitalize the merchant marine industry itself? Should we build or procure even more strategic sealift ships to augment our fast sealift fleet? Are additional prepositioning ships the best way to go? When the MRS is completed, our requirements will be known and specific programs can be designed to ensure our future sealift capacity.

When I appeared before your subcommittee last year, I stated that the USTRANSCOM objective is to support the strategic lift requirements of the unified CINCS, and that their ability to fight and win is dependent upon our ability to project U.S. forces to any theater of conflict. DESERT SHIELD has provided a graphic illustration of that point. The time and resources required to complete this deployment of truly historic

proportions underscores the critical role our strategic lift assets play in projecting our forces rapidly and in sufficient quantity to provide a credible conventional deterrent. If rapid deployment prevented Saddam Hussein from moving his troops into Saudi Arabia, then mobility itself can be seen as a deterrent to military aggression. General Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, emphasized this in his statement to the House Armed Services Committee on 7 February 1991: "Deterrence is only credible if we possess a robust means of power projection and the mobility to deploy and sustain our forces. With your continued support of mobility programs, USTRANSCOM can help promote this nation's credible deterrent posture, both now in the Persian Gulf, and wherever we find ourselves in the future.