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RESPONSE TO OIL SPILLS: THE EXXON VALDEZ

INTRODUCTION

On March 24, 1989, shortly after midnight, the oil tanker Exxon Valdez struck Bligh Reef in Prince William Sound, Alaska, spilling more than 11 million gallons of crude oil. (See Figure 1.) The spill was the largest in U.S. history and tested the abilities of local, national, and industrial organizations to prepare for, and respond to, disasters such as these. Many factors complicated the cleanup efforts following this spill. The size of the spill and its remote location, accessible only by helicopter or boat (see Figure 2), made government and industry efforts difficult and tested existing plans for dealing with such an event.

The spill posed threats to the delicate food chain that supports Prince William Sound's commercial fishing industry. Also in danger were ten million migratory shore birds and waterfowl, hundreds of sea otters, dozens of other species such as harbor porpoises and sea lions, and several varieties of whales.

THE INCIDENT

The two-year-old oil tanker Exxon Valdez, with a capacity of 1.46 million barrels (62 million gallons) of oil, was the newest and largest of Exxon's 19-ship fleet. On the evening of March 23, 1989, 1.26 million barrels (54 million gallons) were loaded onto the ship in Valdez, Alaska. The ship left the port at 9:10 p.m., bound for Long Beach, California.

Chunks of ice from the nearby Columbia Glacier were sitting low in the water, so the ship's captain tried to turn into an empty inbound shipping channel to avoid them. The ship was moving at approximately 12 miles per hour when it struck the rocks of Bligh Reef in Prince William Sound. The underwater rocks tore huge holes in eight of the vessel's eleven giant cargo holds, releasing a flood of oil into the Sound. More than 11

million gallons of oil spilled within five hours of the event. Seven hours after the spill was reported, the resulting oil slick was 1,000 feet wide and four miles long.

In addition to the spilled oil, there were other immediate dangers. About 80 percent of the ship's oil cargo remained on board; the ship was resting in an unstable position and in danger of capsizing. Removing the remaining oil from the ship and cleaning the spilled oil were top priorities.

THE RESPONSE

Since the incident occurred in open navigable waters, the U.S. Coast Guard's OnScene Coordinator had authority for all activities related to the cleanup effort. Once he was notified of the spill, he immediately closed the Port of Valdez to all traffic. A Coast Guard investigator, along with a representative from the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation, visited the scene of the incident to assess the damage caused by the spill. By noon on Friday, March 25th, the Alaska Regional Response Team was brought together by teleconference, and the National Response Team was activated soon thereafter. The National team is based in Washington, D.C. and is composed of representatives from fourteen different Federal agencies, with either the Environmental Protection Agency or the U.S. Coast Guard taking primary responsibility for coordinating oil-spill cleanup activities.

Alyeska, the association that represents seven oil companies who operate in Valdez, including Exxon, first assumed responsibility for the cleanup. Alyeska operates the pipeline and terminal at Valdez and is responsible for carrying out plans for oilspill emergencies. Alyeska opened an emergency communications center in Valdez shortly after the spill was reported and set up a second operations center in Anchorage, Alaska.

The On-Scene Coordinator, in cooperation with the Exxon Corporation, established several goals for the response. The most important goal was to prevent additional spilling of oil. Because the Exxon Valdez was unstable and in danger of capsizing, the 43 million gallons of oil still onboard the tanker threatened the environmentally-sensitive Sound. The first priority was to protect four fish hatcheries that were threatened by the spill. In addition, there were concerns about the safety of response personnel, since highly flammable and toxic fumes made response actions difficult.

Numerous equipment problems slowed down the response to the spill. Alyeska had mechanical containment equipment available such as booms, which are floating mechanical barriers that are designed to stop the spread of oil, but there were not enough of them to contain an 11 million gallon spill. Because of the remote location of the spill, equipment had to be moved over great distances to reach the accident scene. The barge used by Alyeska's response team had been stripped for repairs, and was therefore not immediately available for use. It took ten hours to prepare and load the barge, and another two hours to reach the Exxon Valdez.

In addition, the remote location of the incident presented many logistical problems. Because the spill site was located two hours by boat from the port of Valdez, every task was time-consuming. The response had to be staged from mobile platforms, and equipment had to be air-dropped or delivered by boat.

Other problems became apparent as the emergency teams began to arrive to help with the cleanup. Only limited lodging was available in Valdez, a small village of only 4,000 people. The small airstrip at Valdez could not handle large planes carrying the cleanup equipment. These planes were forced to land in Anchorage, a nine-hour drive from Valdez. The Federal Aviation Administration, the agency responsible for all air traffic control, had to set up a temporary tower to manage increased flights to the area.

At the start of the spill, necessary communications between response personnel were difficult because there was limited phone service in Valdez. The Coast Guard On-Scene Coordinator was the only person with a direct telephone line out of the community. The lack of phone lines delayed cleanup teams from being able to request the resources they needed, and it took time for the phone company to increase the number of phone lines. Radio communication was also troublesome. The large numbers of boats working the area resulted in multiple simultaneous radio transmissions, and the mountainous terrain made radio communication difficult. The Coast Guard established a news office and requested more communications staff, because numerous national media representatives were arriving in Valdez every day.

On the second day of the spill, Exxon assumed responsibility for the cleanup and its costs. Exxon activated its emergency center in Houston, Texas, which sent equipment to stabilize the ship. The company directed another ship, the Exxon Baton Rouge, to remove the remaining oil from the stricken Valdez.

In taking responsibility for the cleanup operations, Exxon set out to address the problems mentioned earlier. The company opened a communications network that allowed information about the spill and the cleanup efforts to be shared with state and federal government officials, private company representatives, and others who were interested in the events surrounding the spill. The company, in cooperation with the U.S. Coast Guard, installed four weather stations around Prince William Sound to provide the weather forecasts that were critical to planning cleanup efforts. A refueling station for helicopters was set up in Seward, Alaska. More than 274 tons of additional equipment, including skimmers, booms, and dispersants arrived at the site by the fourth day.

Hundreds of people were brought to the area to help conduct the cleanup effort within two days of the spill. More than 1,000

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Figure 1. Maps showing site of Exxon Valdez accident, March 24, 1989.

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Figure 2. Location of oil (dark areas) spilled from Exxon Valdez as of April 20, 1989.

Coast Guard personnel, along with employees of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the Fish and Wildlife Service, and the Environmental Protection Agency helped with the response. Nine additional Coast Guard cutters and eight aircraft were brought to the scene. Specialists from the Hubbs Marine Institute of San Diego, California, set up a facility to clean oil from otters, and the International Bird Research Center of Berkeley, California established a center to clean and rehabilitate oiled waterfowl.

THE CLEANUP

Three methods were tried in the effort

to clean up the spill:

burning

chemical dispersants mechanical cleanup

A trial burn was conducted during the early stages of the Exxon Valdez spill. A fireresistant boom was placed on tow lines, and the two ends of the boom were each attached to a ship. The two ships, with the boom between them, moved slowly through the main portion of the slick until the boom was full of oil. The ships then towed the boom away from the slick and the oil was ignited. The fire did not endanger the main slick or the Exxon Valdez because of the distance separating them. Because of unfavorable weather conditions, however, no additional burning was attempted in this cleanup effort.

Soon after the spill, dispersants were sprayed from helicopters. Mechanical cleanup was started using booms and skimmers.

The use of dispersants proved to be controversial. Alyeska had less than 4,000 gallons of dispersant available at its terminal in Valdez, and no application equipment or aircraft. A private company applied dispersants on March 24 with a helicopter and dispersant bucket. Because there was not enough wave action to mix the dispersant with

the oil in the water, the Coast Guard representative at the site concluded that the dispersants were not working.

Skimmers, devices that remove oil from the water's surface, were not readily available during the first 24 hours following the spill. Thick oil and heavy kelp tended to clog the equipment. Repairs to damaged skimmers were time-consuming. Transferring oil from temporary oil storage vessels into more permanent containers was also difficult because of the oil's weight and thickness. Continued bad weather slowed down the recovery efforts.

Efforts to save delicate areas were begun early in the cleanup. Sensitive environments were identified, defined according to degree of damage, and then ranked for their priority for cleanup. Seal pupping locations and fish hatcheries were given highest importance, and for these areas special cleaning techniques were approved. Despite the identification of sensitive areas and the rapid start-up of shoreline cleaning, however, wildlife rescue was slow. Adequate resources for this task did not reach the accident scene quickly enough. Through direct contact with oil or because of a loss of the their food resources, many birds and mammals died.

THREE YEARS AFTER THE SPILL

During the three years after the Exxon Valdez oil spill, cleanup and environmental restoration of the affected shorelines and islands continues. The cost of the cleanup has amounted to billions of dollars, and the cost of legal settlements has resulted in millions more.

On June 12, 1992 the U.S. Coast Guard announced that the cleanup activities should end. Although the cleanup activities have ceased, there are still pools of oil left in some areas where it is assumed that the harm caused to the ecosystem by the oil is not greater than the benefits to be gained from further cleanup.

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