and Western Indies, and we appreciate their faithful coöperation in all works of education and industry." It is also difficult to discover the issue that is raised in a campaign in which the Republicans declare "the Civil Service Law was placed on the statute books by the Republican party which has always sustained it, and we renew our former declaration that it shall be thoroughly and honestly enforced," to which the Democrats reply, "the Democratic party stands committed to the principles of Civil Service Reform, and we demand their honest, just and impartial enforcement."

These are but a few examples chosen from among many, but they suffice to show that very often for the sake of votes political parties will set up straw issues and attempt by irrelevant appeals to the emotions to catch the fancy of groups and classes of voters.

A far more serious perversion is the deliberate confusion of issues that often occurs. Of this the 1920 campaign furnished an all too striking illustration. Neither from the platform of the Republican party nor from the campaign speeches of its candidate could any definite impression be obtained concerning our entrance into the League of Nations. That we would not join the League without reservations was made quite evident, but whether the Republican party would lead the United States into the League if the Lodge reservations were secured, or whether the party was definitely committed against entrance into the League, it was impossible to determine. The party straddled

the issue so that on election day votes were cast for the Republican party in the belief that that party would lead us into the League with reservations, while other votes were cast for the same party because of exactly the opposite conviction. The practice of using "weazel words," i. e., words which suck all definiteness from a statement, is by no means confined to the Republicans, however. A survey of the platform of both parties would reveal similar situations very frequently in each.

Even more conclusive evidence that the major political parties are not functioning effectively is the fact that out of the six outstanding domestic issues of the last three-quarters of a century only three have been presented for popular decision by them. The tariff, free silver, and the income tax were party issues between the major parties. Slavery, woman suffrage (except after it was practically here) and prohibition were not. Yet this is the function of political parties -the presentation of issues.

What is the explanation of their failure to function? The answer is simple. The forces which make for the institutionalization of parties, that is, make parties ends in themselves, have perverted them from their real purposes. What are these forces? They are three in character-psychological, structural, and economic. The most important, perhaps, are the psychological. Inertia and habit on the part of the voters are responsible for the casting of as many votes as is reflection, a fact which enables party managers to discount the wishes of large numbers of their ad

herents. The impulses of pugnacity and competition likewise come into play in the course of a campaign— very intensely in the party managers but more or less intensely in all of the party adherents-and this also contributes to intellectually dishonest practices. Victory often seems more important to the party adherents than the principles for which the campaign is fought. If necessary, principles are subordinated to victory. Almost if not quite as important as these factors is the complexity of American politics. The number of offices to be filled by popular vote produces, as we have seen before, a situation beyond the grasp of the average citizen. The result is that in great measure he turns over his duties to professional politicians. He does not select the candidates; he does not select the issues. His chief function is rarely more than the formal ratification of the work of others. Very often these "others" have a vested interest; that is, victory means economic gain to them. To the average professional politician victory, offices, and spoils are the sine qua non. Party expediency, not principle, is the guide of action. So the proper function of the party is perverted, with the result that American politics is in a great many particulars a muddle. And distrust of political action continues to grow.

What can be done about it? Again there is no panacea. Considerable improvement, however, can be made. Independence on the part of the voter both inside and outside the parties will accomplish a great

deal. The larger the number of independent voters, i. e., those who have no personal axes to grind, no vested interest in the success of their party-who participate in party councils, the greater is the probability that the party will stand for principles rather than expedients. This means, so far as the average reader of this book is concerned, that the more active he becomes in party councils, in all likelihood by so much will the situation be improved.

The second way in which the voter can contribute his share toward making the parties function properly is by independent voting. Constant punishment of parties which attempt to gain votes in illegitimate ways will alone put an end to the practice. Emphasis should be placed on the fact that a vote for a third or minor party is not a vote thrown away, for very often the major parties sin so equally in subordinating their proper functions to party interest, that if the choice lay only between them it would be between tweedledum and tweedledee. A vote for a minor party, it is true, is not likely to elect a candidate, but it is no more thrown away than are all the votes which are cast for the losing candidates. Indeed, it is probably more effective than a vote cast for these candidates. Of the twenty-eight major demands concerning matters of domestic policy which were made by the minor parties in the half century preceding 1916, only four (fiat money, direct election of the president, government ownership of railways, and the socialization of all means of production) have failed to be

enacted into law or championed by one of the major parties in a presidential campaign. Furthermore, these twenty-four demands constitute more than two-thirds of all the constructive domestic legislation advocated in the platforms of the two great parties during that

era.

Civil service reform; woman suffrage; the direct election of senators; a department of labor; the initiative and referendum; the recall; proportional representation; the restriction of Chinese immigration; the regulation of corporations; a postal savings bank; the parcels post; the reform of the inelastic currency; regulation of railways and telegraphs; social insurance (workmen's compensation); the right of combination; amelioratory legislation; the prohibition of child labor; a graduated inheritance tax; the revision of the Homestead Act; the prohibition of intoxicating liquors; the suppression of polygamy; the arbitration of labor disputes; the free and unlimited coinage of silver-these were the demands which were made. And at least to the extent of seeing them written into the platform of a major party, these were the results which were accomplished. In view of these facts one can hardly say that a vote for a minor party is a vote thrown away.

Another and probably more effective method of compelling the parties to respond to the wishes of public opinion has been developed in the organization of "pressure groups." These organizations vary widely in character and effectiveness. Most spectacular among them has been the Anti-Saloon League. The