ceedingly widespread method. It is still in use in thirty-eight of the states, in all but 300 of the cities, and in practically all of the counties. The chief argument in its favor is the argument of executive responsibility. Complete harmony is necessary between the chief executive and his subordinates if efficient administration is to be secured. And it is maintained that this can be secured only when all offices, from top to bottom, are filled by members of the same party.

Superficially the contention seems to be sound. A moment's reflection, however, reveals the fact that the chief tasks of administration are not partisan. There is, after all, no Democratic way of mixing concrete; nor is there a Republican way of causing chemical reactions.

But, it is declared, subordinates of opposite political creeds may sabotage in order to destroy the public's faith in the administrative ability of the party in power. Should such a situation arise, only one course is possible and that is the removal of the undesirables. It would then be removal for inefficiency, however, and not for political convictions. That such a condition would ever arise is very doubtful, for under the administration of an enemy the natural inclination of those of the opposite political faith would be to perform their functions in such a way that the charge of inefficiency could not be made nor removal follow.

Beneath these rationalizations lies the real driving force that has made for the maintenance of the system-partisan appetites. For a frank statement of

the parties' point of view we must again turn to the philosophizings of George Washington Plunkitt, the old-time Tammany leader who was quoted in an earlier chapter.

"This civil service law," he says, "is the biggest fraud of the age. It is the curse of the nation. There can't be no real patriotism while it lasts. How are you going to interest our young men in their country if you have no offices to give them when they work for their party?

"This is an awful serious proposition. Free silver and the tariff and imperialism and the Panama Canal are trifling issues when compared to it. We could worry along without any of these things, but civil service is sapping the foundation of the whole shooting match. Let me argue it out for you. I ain't up on sillygisms, but I can give you some arguments that nobody can answer.

"First, this great and glorious country was built up by political parties; second, parties can't hold together if their workers don't get the offices when they win; third, if the parties go to pieces, the government they built up must go to pieces, too; fourth, then there'll be h to pay.

"Could anything be clearer than that? Say, honest now, can you answer that argument? Of course, you won't deny that the government was built up by the great parties. That's history and you can't go back of the returns. As to my second proposition you don't deny that either. When parties can't get offices

they'll bust. They ain't far from the bustin' point now, with all this civil service business keepin' most of the good things from them. How are you goin' to keep up patriotism if this thing goes on?" 1

And that the spoils system does stimulate a certain type of individual to political activity, few will deny. Why, then, has this method of choosing men to office been abandoned in the most progressive jurisdictions? There are at least six charges against it. First, it causes an unnecessary increase in offices; second, it fills the offices with incompetent men; third, it impairs efficiency through the development of an exceedingly rapid turnover; fourth, it wastes the time of both administrators and legislators; fifth, it causes an increase in the cost of government; and sixth, it breeds corruption.

The truth of the first charge will be attested by anybody living under a jurisdiction in which the spoils system still prevails. Frequently, the daily papers carry puns on the situation. The cartoonist who portrayed a clerk in a Government office declining a cup of coffee offered him at lunch with the horrified exclamation, "My dear fellow, it will keep me awake all the afternoon," but pictured, more than likely, an actual incident. Or if the incident was not real, it at least seemed very much in keeping with the general repute of the Government service.

That appointments made in consideration of party work rather than upon the basis of qualifications for 1 Riordin, op. cit., p. 25.

office will result in the appointment of incompetent men, needs no proof.

The expense involved in the labor turnover is not, perhaps, so generally realized. Only when one discovers that private capital estimates the cost of replacing an industrial employee at from ten dollars to three hundred dollars, depending on the degree of skill involved, and the cost of replacing a clerk at approximately one hundred dollars, is it possible to attain a real conception of the cost of the spoils system. The principle of the spoils system, carried to its logical conclusion, would bring about a complete change of personnel with each change of administration. At no time, however, has the principle been applied in its entirety. Necessity makes imperative the retaining of a certain number of men who are acquainted with the routine of the service. To the extent that it has been applied, however, by just so much has the efficiency of the service been impaired. And to just that degree has the nation suffered.

Furthermore, the pressure upon both legislators and administrators has very frequently consumed so much of their time that they have in fact become nothing more than office brokers. The real work for which they were elected has suffered accordingly.

The final charge against the system is that it breeds corruption. In general, offices are used for the buying of political support when they are distributed under the spoils system. Offices, not principles, become the chief stimulus to political effort. Ethically it is hard

to see any difference between the man who sells his political influence for office and the man who sells his vote for money, save in the matter of degree. Nor is it any wonder that serious scandals occur with this type of individual in office. It is, indeed, an easy transition from the stage of thought which permits the manipulation of public office for political advancement to one which permits the use of official position for aggrandizement in other ways.

This, then, is the spoils system and these are the charges against it. What method of choosing individuals to fill the administrative service has been devised to replace it?

The usual remedy has been the merit system. A civil service board has been appointed for the purpose of eliminating spoils and developing a system of personnel management. The purpose of the board might be stated as the reduction of the labor turnover, the recruitment of the highest type of personnel, and the development of zeal in the service.

A system of examinations has been devised for the elimination of the unfit. These examinations are usually designed to test the applicant's ability to fill the particular position in question. They vary according to the character of the work to be performed. In New York common labor is given a physical examination and a strength test. Applicants for positions as inspectors of blasting are sent down into an excavating project and allowed to demonstrate their ability to do blasting. Inspectors of weights and measures are