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to committee. In a state of the character of Massachusetts, where wide publicity is given to the hearings and a regular calendar is maintained, they are without doubt decidedly worth while. In other jurisdictions the hearings are more or less perfunctory, often being held merely for form rather than for accomplishment.

Sometimes special investigating committees are appointed, of which the Teapot Dome inquiry is an example. They are the exception, however, rather than the rule.

In connection with these hearings the question arises: Is the practice of holding hearings for the House and Senate committees wise? Should there not be joint hearings? That side which is represented by selfish economic interests will always be represented, no matter how many the hearings. But does the double hearing do anything more than throw an additional burden upon the few civic-spirited organizations which attempt to present the public point of view? Usually they are not very well financed, and the necessity of making two appearances upon the same subject undoubtedly causes some of them to concentrate their efforts upon fewer measures than they otherwise would. The double hearing certainly lessens the news value of a single hearing, for the fact that there will be a second hearing diminishes the dramatic effect that a "last fight of the pressure groups" might have. The fact that there already has been a hearing in its turn takes the edge off the second one. And so the question has very properly

been asked: What does the double hearing accomplish?

In connection with the second phase of committee work-deliberation-several problems arise. First and fairly important is the question of committee meetings. The numerous committees as a rule unnecessarily numerous of our legislative bodies inevitably make for conflicts of committee appointments. The result is that it is frequently difficult to get a committee together. This means for the conscientious, hard-working chairman a tremendous burden in the way of adjustments. It means for the chairman who desires to see his will rather than the committee's prevail, the opportunity for manipulation and intrigue. A judiciously selected hour of meeting can very frequently be made to exclude a sufficient number of the "otherwise minded" to change what would be a defeat for the chairman into a victory. In fact, it is told that a certain Pennsylvania chairman held a meeting of his committee and reported favorably on a number of measures when he was the only member of the committee present at the meeting. Such manipulation is, of course, indefensible. The problem is how to prevent it. The requirement of a quorum will check the practice in its extreme form, but other safeguards are also necessary.

The second and probably more important problem is whether or not committee deliberations should be public. "Open covenants, openly arrived at," was the slogan of a distinguished statesman of our times.

His chief argument was that the public is entitled to know how public business is being conducted. Nevertheless, when Mr. Wilson went to Paris, negotiations were carried on behind closed doors. The fact that discussion in public makes compromise more difficult is the chief reason for secret deliberation. It seems to be a very human failing for a man who makes a public statement to stick to it and look for evidence to support his contention. Sound conclusions can be reached only in the light of facts. If, therefore, public deliberation inclines men to take positions with less regard for facts than does secret, some question at least may be raised as to its wisdom.

Closely akin to this is the question of publishing a record of committee votes. In favor of secrecy here less can be said. If the greatest portion of a man's legislative work is done in committee, it follows that the public should be enabled to judge him upon it. Although a man's vote does not always indicate his position upon the various public questions brought up for consideration, nevertheless, as a general rule it is a safe barometer. And since a record is maintained of the votes on the floor of the legislature, little logical objection can be advanced to the publication of the votes in committee. This is one of the arguments advanced by those who desire legislative reform. And their point seems well taken.

In connection with the third function of a committee reporting the chief danger of the present system is that bills may be smothered in committee

even when they have the support of a majority in the House. To prevent this certain state constitutions provide that every bill must be reported out. The result has been that certain of the legislatures, at least, have been deluged with committee reports. Elsewhere reports are made mandatory upon the petition of a certain number of representatives or senators, as the case may be. This is now the rule in Congress, although an innovation of the session just closed. Elsewhere this right of petition is checked by the provision that no bill to which a committee is unanimously opposed need be reported out. Whatever be the expedient, it is obvious that "graveyard committees" should, if possible, be eliminated. Committees of the character of the Pennsylvania "Judiciary Special," more familiarly known as "The Pickling Vat," where such legislation as was opposed by the dominant clique in the Republican party found its final restingplace by virtue of the committee assignment, and the party escaped any responsibility for its defeat, are indefensible.

Suggested Reading

Luce, Robert. Legislative Procedure. (1922)

CHAPTER XV

THE LEGISLATIVE GAUNTLET

"Government by Committees" has long been a favorite characterization of our legislative procedure. And certainly the committee stage is a crucial stage in a bill's career. It is not, however, the whole gauntlet. Nor are the committee chairmen, powerful as they are, the sole leaders of the legislative body. The progress of a bill through a legislature may well serve to illustrate this.

All bills as they are reported out of committee are placed on a calendar, that is, on a list from which they are to be taken in order of precedence. There they tend to stay. The volume of business is such both in Congress and in the average state legislature, that not even all these proposals may be taken up. Hence the less important must give way to those of a more pressing character. The decision concerning what shall be taken up is placed in the hands of the rules committee in Congress. In conjunction with the steering committee, an unofficial committee of the majority caucus, this small group of men practically controls the business of our national legislature. Both the actual calendar and the time that may be devoted to

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