Page images
PDF
EPUB

The device of home rule was also resorted to; that is, the cities were given power to manage their own affairs. The arguments which have generally been advanced in favor of this device may be briefly summed up. First, the legislature is very often partisan. In support of this claim unlimited data could easily be advanced. Second, the legislature does not have time to consider local affairs. The mere division of the number of minutes a legislative body is in session into the number of bills introduced for consideration will reveal a very interesting situation which seems to bear out this claim. Third, the legislature is predominantly rural and, therefore, has little interest in, and feels little responsibility for, the administration of muncipal affairs. It is, perhaps, not irrelevant to ask what the legislator from Gayville cares about the concerns of New York City, or what the legislator from New York City cares about the condition of the streets in Cohoes. Fourth, many city problems are essentially local. Fifth, home rule fixes responsibility; sixth, it makes experimentation possible; and finally, it has a broad educational value.

Against home rule it is maintained that municipal councils are often untrustworthy-a fact easily substantiated; that all municipal affairs are matters of state concern; and that the whole trend of the times is toward centralization. And so the controversy goes.

The advocates of home rule seem to be getting the better of the argument. Eighteen states have adopted

the policy, including a majority of those containing large cities, and considerable sentiment in favor of it exists elsewhere.

Two types of home rule are possible-that guaranteed in the state constitution and that granted by mere act of the legislature. The former has the advantage that it carries to the legislature from the people a mandate to abstain from interfering in local affairs. It has the disadvantage, however, of throwing upon the already overburdened courts the determination of what are "municipal affairs." Legislative home rule, although having the disadvantage of being dependent upon the whim of the legislature, at least permits a more comprehensive statement as to "municipal affairs,” thus relieving the courts of some of the burden, and makes easier any adjustment which may be necessary between state and local functions. The general tendency, however, has been to enact constitutional home-rule amendments.

The question may well be asked: Is not this trend toward decentralization inconsistent with the movement toward nationalism? In so far as it is, the mod

accentuation of national and local problems constitutes the explanation. But the inconsistency is probably more apparent than real, for as the legislature has been laying down its powers the administration has been taking them up. To-day there is vastly more state administrative control than ever before-though it is still very slight. Without question, in so far as local functions are of state concern, they will come more

and more under the influence of state administrative supervisory officers, who will probably be specialists in the fields under their jurisdiction and thus be able to administer a wiser and more effective supervision than the legislature.1

The problem which confronts us, then, is that of determining whether the modern trends are wise and to be encouraged, or whether they are unsound and to be discouraged.

1 It should be said that the similarity of functions of the rural subdivisions of the states has made the problem of their relation to the state government less acute. It is still possible in most states to govern these communities by general law. As their problems become more and more complex, it can be expected that their relations to the state governments will follow a course similar to that of the cities.

Suggested Reading

McBain, Howard Lee. American City Progress and the Law.

CHAPTER XII

FORMS OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT

Four general types of municipal government exist in the United States. The first is the old or weakmayor-council form; the second is the new or strongmayor-council form; the third, the commission plan; and the fourth, the city-manager plan.

The first, it will be noted, resembles in a great many particulars the plan of organization commonly found in the states. Diffusion of power and absence of responsibility seem to be its keynote. The historic doctrines of separation of power and checks and balances prevail. A multiple executive composed of the mayor, the city treasurer, the city auditor, the assessors and sometimes one or two lesser officers, conducts the administration. They are responsible only to the people who elected them. The city council is usually a uni-cameral body, i. e., composed of only one house. Its members are practically always chosen by wards and owe their first loyalty to the geographic

1 This chapter is based in large measure on the Chart of Typical City Governments issued by the League of Women Voters of New York City. Credit must also be given to them for the charts on pages 139, 141, 143 and 147.

area which they represent. More difficult, indeed, is it to place the allegiance of the civil service. Some slight power of appointment rests exclusively in the hands of the mayor; some, in the hands of the council; the bulk of it, however, is divided between the two. In practically all cases the mayor's nominations to office must be approved by the council. Thus the "checks" appear. And municipal councils where they have possessed this power have, indeed, made use of it. Somewhat to "balance" the loss of authority thus involved, the mayor is given the power of veto over councilmanic enactments.

In favor of this particular type of municipal organization it is argued that party responsibility is preserved; that popular control is assured; that political leadership is developed; and that our national parties are maintained intact in the cities. Against it are the charges that it scatters responsibility; that it is costly, complicated and inefficient; that it places in charge of the administration a man elected on questions of policy or popularity who is in nowise equipped to handle the technical problems of a modern city; that the shortness of his term of office (usually two years) inclines him to work for re-election rather than for administrative efficiency; in fact, that the shortness of the term is such that not even the department heads can master the details of their respective departments. It is contended, furthermore, that the quality of the council is inevitably poor, that petty districts produce petty men, that ward politics breeds the ward heeler, that this

« PreviousContinue »