child labor, minimum wages, working hours, trade union relations, insurance acts, or what not. These constitute the main limitations on the states, though by no means all. Nor do they constitute nearly all the limitations upon the state governments. The state and the state government, be it remembered, are two different things. The former is a geographic and legal entity comprising within it the entire social organization of its inhabitants; the latter, on the other hand, is but the agency through which the state functions. Upon the state government, as well as the federal, rest the historic restrictions of the bills of rights. These we will discuss more fully in a later chapter. There is also in most state constitutions a section setting up the framework of government; another dealing with state finances; a third, providing for the control of economic interests; a fourth, outlining a social and educational program; and finally an amending clause. In at least one sense, all these provisions are limitations upon the state governments, since it is beyond the power of those governments to change them. And although it must be said that they are not limitations upon the power of the state, they are limitations upon its activity. Nevertheless, despite all these limitations, one has but to skim over the names of the administrative agencies of the average state to be impressed with the enormous domain over which the state rules,—to realize the tremendous task the American state has undertaken. To carry on its activities adequately, the 43. Poor Law 44. Prison Law 45. Public Buildings Law 63. Town Law 64. Transportation Corporations Law 65. Village Law 66. Workmen's Compensation Law 48. Public Officers Law 49. Public Service Commis- 67. Unconsolidated Laws sion Law Thus, although relatively the sphere of the state has grown smaller, the state and the state government still play an exceedingly important part in the ma chinery of our government. In fact, actually the state government is more important today than it has ever been before. Suggested Reading Beard, Charles A. American Government and Politics. (1924) Holcombe, A. N. State Government in the United States. (1920) Mathews, J. M. Principles of American State Administration. (1920) CHAPTER X CHECKS ON TYRANNY Historical circumstance, and not political philosophy, explains the growth of most governmental institutions. Nevertheless, the constitutions of the United States and of the various states have embodied in them several distinct theories of government. Not least significant are those designed to check the growth of tyranny in whatever form it may appear. First, is the theory of separation of powers. Montesquieu, a French philosopher of the eighteenth century, on visiting England had been much impressed with English liberties, which appeared in striking contrast to those of the French under Louis XV. In 1748 he published a book called "The Spirit of the Laws," which had a tremendous vogue. In it he ascribed English liberties to the fact that govermental power in that country was divided into three parts: executive, legislative, and judicial. No part, he maintained, was all powerful, and all parts would be checked in any attempted usurpation by the others. The vogue of this book and the fact that the colonists had been living under governments whose power was so divided, combined to write the principle into the law of our land. True, the separation of powers in the colonies had not been instituted for the purpose of preserving colonial liberties, but rather as a means of furthering English power. The governor was appointed by the king for the sake of maintaining English control. The courts were independent of the legislature, so that through them-particularly the Privy Council-the actions of the legislature might be subjected to an English veto. In fact, only the lower house of the legislative assemblies was really concerned with colonial liberties. All this, however, was overlooked, and Montesquieu's doctrines were embedded in our fundamental law. A further development of the principle was the theory of checks and balances. Very logically it was asked, if the separation of powers made for the furtherance of liberty, would not a further subdivision of powers do likewise? Would it not be well to divide legislative power between two bodies and balance one against the other? Might it not be wise to decentralize executive power and divide it among several offices? There still remained the possibility of arbitrary action by the different governmental agents within their respective fields. Could not this be prevented? Could not further checks be added? If each department of the government was given power to check any action by another, could not the mutual jealousies of the various parts then be depended upon to keep each in its proper place? Thus there developed the |