but only provides a place where punishment may be inflicted.-Williams, Ex parte, 87 Cal. 78, 25 Pac. 248.

[g] Under Statutes of 1877-78, page 953, authorizing the city criminal court or the municipal criminal court of the city and county of San Francisco, in any case where a prisoner might be sentenced to the county jail or the state prison, instead thereof to commit the prisoner to the house of correction, such person not being over twenty-five years old, and Constitution, article 22, section 3, abolishing said courts, and article 6, section 5, vesting jurisdiction in cases amounting to felony, in the superior court, the latter court has authority to commit to the house of correction in felony cases.- -Williams, Ex parte, 87 Cal. 78, 24 Pac. 602.

[h] Under charter of city of Santa Rosa, persons found guilty of violating city ordinances should be committed to the city prison, and those found guilty of violation of the criminal laws of the state, where imprisonment is ordered, should be committed to the county jail.-County of Sonoma v. City of Santa Rosa, 102 Cal. 426, 36 Pac. 810.

[i] Under Statutes of 1885, page 214, and Statutes of 1891, page 292, providing that, when imprisonment is ordered by a police court, it is to be suffered in the city jail, one convicted in such court of violating Statutes of 1877-78, page 918, relating to the practice of medicine, should be confined in the city jail, though such act provides for imprisonment in the county jail.-Ambrosewf, In re, 109 Cal. 264, 41 Pac. 1101.

[j] Where defendant convicted of misdemeanor in a police court, and sentenced to imprisonment for six months in county jail, was, pending his imprisonment, sentenced to the state prison, upon conviction of a felony, on his plea of guilty, his imprisonment in the county jail more than forty days after latter sentence, is unlawful, and upon habeas corpus the prisoner will be remanded to the sheriff for imprisonment in the state prison forthwith.-McGuire, Ex parte, 135 Cal. 339, 87 Am. St. Rep. 105, 67 Pac. 327.

FOR AUTHORITIES FROM OTHER STATES:

See 12 Cyc. 969-971; 15 Cent. Dig., cols. 1102-1110, §§ 3320-3328.

CRIMINAL LIBEL AND SLANDER. See Libel and Slander, VI.

CRIMINAL PLEADING. See Indictment and Information.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. See Criminal Law.

CRITICISING COURT.

As contempt. See Contempt, § 8.

CROPPING CONTRACTS.

See Crops, § 4.

CROPS.

Include the annual products of the soil while unsevered therefrom, growing spontaneously or by cultivation, immature or ripe; and nature and incidents of rights of property therein in general.

OWNERSHIP-IN GENERAL, § 1.

ADVERSE POSSESSORS, § 2.

EFFECT OF SALE, § 22.

EFFECT OF TRANSFER OF TITLE TO LAND, § 3.

CROPPING CONTRACTS, § 4.

ACTION FOR WRONGFULLY HARVESTING, § 5. What constitutes agricultural crops. See Agriculture, § 3.

Promotion of agriculture in general, agricultural so

cieties and agricultural liens. See Agriculture. Liability of growing to seizure under writ of attachment. See Attachment, § 30.

Mode of levying attachment on growing crops. See Attachment, § 89.

Bounty for raising mulberry trees. See Bounties. Right to mortgage. See Chattel Mortgages, § 10. Description in chattel mortgage of crops to be grown. See Chattel Mortgages, § 22.

Duration of lien of chattel mortgage on. See Chattel Mortgages, §§ 38-39.

Construction of contract to plant, cultivate and harvest. See Contracts, § 142.

Judicial notice of time of harvesting. See Evidence, § 3.

Liability to execution. See Execution, § 9. Right of execution purchaser to crops. See Execution, 118.

Necessity that contract for sale of growing crop be in writing. See Frauds, Statute of, § 33. Necessity for change of possession of as between transferee and creditor of transferrer of crops. See Fraudulent Conveyances, §§ 66, 67. Harvested crops as part of homestead. See Homestead, § 54.

Right to enjoin removal of. See Injunction, § 52. Renting on shares. See Landlord and Tenant, §§

129-133.

Right to crops grown on mortgaged land. See Mortgages, 93.

Right to crops on foreclosure sale of mortgaged land. See Mortgages, § 299.

On government lands. See Public Lands, § 9. Timber culture on government lands. See Public Lands, § 32.

Trees not grown for their fruit or annual products, protection and promotion of growth of such trees and of forests. See Woods and Porests.

FOR AUTHORITIES FROM OTHER STATES: What are emblements: 40 Am. Rep. 96, notes.

§ 1. Ownership-In General.

[a] Mere cutting of hay beyond actual occupancy does not devest possession so as to give title to hay.-Page v. Fowler, 37 Cal. 100.

[b] Crops raised by a surviving partner in possession of land patented to a deceased

[a] The owner of land, after recovery thereof from one in possession under a claim of an interest therein, cannot replevy the crops grown and harvested by defendant while in such adverse possession.-Page v. Fowler, 37 Cal. 100, 39 Cal. 412, 2 Am. Rep. 462; (1894) Groome v. Almstead, 101 Cal. 425, 35 Pac. 1021.

[b] Action cannot be maintained to recover grain sown and harvested by defendant on land to which he claimed title, and of which he had actual and adverse possession.-Martin v. Thompson, 62 Cal. 618, 45 Am. Rep. 663.

§ 22. Effect of Sale.

[a] Where the owner of the soil conveys "all the hay now cut or that shall be cut this year on the range,'' such hay became personalty in the hands of the purchaser.-Allen v. Bryant (Cal. App.), 88 Pac. 294.

§ 3. Effect of Transfer of Title to Land.

[a] Defendant contracted to exchange his fruit farm with plaintiff for certain real estate belonging to plaintiff, and deeds were made out and delivered in escrow, to be delivered to the parties when the title to the properties should be made satisfactory. Thereafter defendant recommended to plaintiff that the person then in charge of the orchard was a competent person to continue in charge thereof, and informed such person that thereafter he would be working for plaintiff instead of defendant; and bills for the expense of carrying on the orchard were sent

to plaintiff directly or through defendant, the bills being paid by plaintiff. Thereafter, and prior to the delivery of the deeds, a crop of prunes growing on the orchard were prepared for market and sold by defendant, who refused to pay over the proceeds to plaintiff. Subsequently the deeds were delivered. Held that, the delivery of the deeds relating back to the date of their execution, and plaintiff having been put in possession of the premises and having defrayed the

expense of the crop, he was entitled to the proceeds thereof.-Marr v. Rhodes, 131 Cal. 267, 63 Pac. 364.

[b] A grantee in a deed deposited in escrow, to be delivered on the grantor's death, held entitled to the share of the crops growing at grantor's death, to be delivered by a lessee as rent.-Wilhoit v. Salmon, 146 Cal. 444, 80 Pac. 705,

FOR AUTHORITIES FROM OTHER STATES:

See 12 Cyc. 977-979; 15 Cent. Dig., cols. 1120-1122, §§ 2-4.

§ 4. Cropping Contracts.

See, also, Landlord and Tenant, §§ 129-133. [a] One entitled to two-thirds of the crops and fruits under a cropping contract, and to the remaining one-third by purchase from the occupant in adverse possession, is not affected by a judgment in replevin brought against the occupant for the possession of the crops by the plaintiffs in the ejectment suit, to whom possession was delivered in the replevin suit, and such owner may recover damages from them for the conversion of the crops.-Johnston v. Fish, 105 Cal. 420, 45 Am. St. Rep. 53, 38 Pac. 979.

[b] Under a cropping contract by the terms of which the entire crop of grain raised was to belong to the owner of the land until division should be made, and one-half of the crop was to be segregated on the ground, to be given to the cropper at the conclusion of the threshing and sacking of the crop, where it appeared that all of the crop, excepting one sack, had been threshed and sacked, and onehalf thereof delivered by the cropper to the order of the owner of the land, and the remaining half remained in the field, such remaining half of the threshed and sacked crop is to be deemed the property of the cropper, and is subject to attachment by his creditor. Crocker v. Cunningham, 122 Cal. 547, 55 Pac. 404.

Care required of drivers on.

CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISH

MENT.

See Criminal Law, § 826.

CRUELTY.

As ground for divorce. See Divorce, § 11.

CRUELTY TO ANIMALS.

See Animals, § 12.

CULTIVATION.

See Agriculture; Crops.

CULVERTS.

Bee Waters and Watercourses.

CUMBERSOME PROPERTY.

Mode of levying attachment on property not capable of manual delivery. See Attachment, § 88.

Deeds, 40. Statutes curing defects in probate sales. See Executors and Administrators, § 437. Statutes curing defects in conveyances of city property. See Municipal Corporations, § 74. Statutes curing defects in conveyances by or to cities. See Municipal Corporations, § 78. Statutes curing defects in state land grants. See Public Lands, § 170.

Validity of special curative acts. See Statutes, § 34.

Retroactive operation of. See Statutes, § 105. Statutes curing defects in assessment-rolls. See Taxation, 92.

CURATORS.

See Executors and Administrators; Guardian and Ward; Infants; Insane Persons; Parent and Child.

CURING ERRORS.

By subsequent proceedings in cause. See Appeal and Error, § 1257.

By instructions or rebuke of court. See Criminal Law, § 370.

In equity pleadings by subsequent pleadings. See Equity, 95.

In parties. See Parties, § 53.

In civil pleadings. See Pleading, §§ 226-228.
In civil process. See Process, § 61.

CUSTODY OF PARENT.

As element of abduction. See Abduction, § 4.

CUSTODY OF PERSON.

Of ward. See Guardian and Ward, § 34.
Of insane person. See Insane Persons, § 19.
Determination of right to. See Habeas Corpus.

CUSTODY OF PROPERTY.

Custody of attached property. See Attachment,

113.

Right to custody of attached property after dissolu-
tion of attachment. See Attachment, § 146.
And care of property by bailee. See Bailment, § 6.
By common carriers. See Carriers, §§ 18-20.
Mortgaged chattels. See Chattel Mortgages, § 47.
County funds. See Counties, § 130.

Allegations as to, in criminal pleading. See Criminal Law, § 83.

Right to custody of dead bodies. See Dead Bodies, § 2.

Rights of heirs and distributees to. See Descent and Distribution, §§ 47-49. Custody of funds of drainage districts. See Drains, § 2.

As element of embezzlement. See Embezzlement, § 8.

§ 1. Application and Operation.

[a] A verdict of a jury will not be disturbed on the ground that evidence was offered and received at the trial, after objection, that a custom had prevailed in California, amongst Spanish and Mexican residents, before the acquisition of the country by the Americans, that no more than two witnesses were quisite to attest the execution of a will, when it appears from such evidence that the custom had prevailed generally and for a long time.-Panaud v. Jones, 1 Cal. 488; Tevis v. Pitcher, 10 Cal. 465.

re

[b] Where a party's right is fixed by rules of property, which are a part of the general law of the land, it cannot be devested by any mere neighborhood custom or regulation. Waring v. Crow, 11 Cal. 366.

[c] Evidence of a custom of board of brokers as to delivery of contracts is admissible to rebut a receipt of payment.-Winans v. Hassey, 48 Cal. 635.

[d] Landlord may show by parol evidence that stubble' reserved in lease includes grain uncut after harvest, by custom of locality. Callahan v. Stanley, 57 Cal. 476.

[e] Though evidence of usage is not admissible to relieve a party from his express stipulation or to vary a contract certain in its terms, it has a legitimate office in aiding to interpret the intention of the parties to a contract, the character of which is to be ascertained from general implications and presumptions.-Burns v. Sennett, 99 Cal. 363, 33 Pac. 916.

[a] In an action concerning a disputed boundary between two mining claims, depending on an agreement between the parties, in which the word "north" was used, and parol evidence was admitted to prove that it was the custom of the locality to run boundary lines by the magnetic meridian, and that that was the understanding of the parties, such evidence was admissible, not to contradict or vary the term, but to ascertain the sense in which it was used.-Jenny Lind Co. v. Bower, 11 Cal. 194.

[b] Where a contract for the sale of wool warranted that it should be "in good order,'' evidence of a custom sought to be incorporated into the contract, the effect of which would be to nullify the legal effect of the warranty, was inadmissible.-Polhemus v. Heiman, 50 Cal, 438.

[c] Where a new and unusual word is used in a contract, or where a word is used in a

technical or peculiar sense, as applicable to any trade, or branch of business, or to any particular class of people, it is proper to receive evidence of usage to explain and illustrate it.-Callahan v. Stanley, 57 Cal. 476.

[d] Where a person buys wool subject to "grader's rejection," which term had a wellunderstood meaning, defined by custom, he, having had the wool examined in another manner and having kept it, must pay for it, and it is no defense that afterwards he offered to have it properly examined.-Merehin v. Ball, 68 Cal. 205, 8 Pac. 886.

[e] A custom or usage cannot be proved to explain terms or provisions in contracts or instruments when the meaning of such terms is unambiguous and free from doubt.-Ah Tong v. Earle Fruit Co., 112 Cal. 679, 45 Pac. 7.

[f] Where a contract requires a party to plant "grape vines," and the word "vines" does not appear to have been used in any special or local sense expert evidence is not admissible to show its meaning, but it will be held to mean indifferently either cuttings or rooted plants, according to common usage. Remy v. Olds, 34 Pac. 216, 21 L. R. A. 615. FOR AUTHORITIES FROM OTHER STATES:

See 12 Cyc. 1033-1056; 15 Cent. Dig., cols. 1193-1219, §§ 1-10.

§ 3. Varying Terms of Contract.

[a] The custom of merchants is not admissible in evidence to vary the plain meaning of a written contract.-Corwin v. Patch, 4 Cal. 204.

[b] Usage of trade cannot be proved contrary to plain meaning of unambiguous con tract.-Holloway v. McNear, 81 Cal. 156, 22 Pac. 514.

FOR AUTHORITIES FROM OTHER STATES:

See 12 Cyc. 1082, 1083; 15 Cent. Dig., cols. 1257-1263, §§ 27, 28.

§ 4. Contravention of Law.

[a] Under the Mexican law custom is some. times allowed not only to control, limit, modify, and interpret the general rules of the system, but even to establish a rule in direct contravention of the positive written law. Thus, custom may attain the force of law, not only when there is no law to the contrary, but when the effect of it is to overturn the previous law which stands in opposition to it. (Per Bennett, J.)-Von Schmidt v. Huntington, 1 Cal. 55.

[b] Proof of usage cannot supersede a positive rule of law.-Langenberger v. Kroeger, 48 Cal. 149, 17 Am. Rep. 418.

[c] Custom to pay more than legal rate of interest is not against law.-Auzerais Naglee, 74 Cal. 71, 72, 15 Pac. 371.

FOR AUTHORITIES FROM OTHER STATES:

V.

See 12 Cyc. 1047, 1053-1056; 15 Cent. Dig., cols. 1211-1219, §§ 8-10.