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be said of the somewhat tentative moves made by the Oil Division of the Fuel Administration toward fixing the price of petroleum and its products. In July, 1918, the Oil Director made some proposals with regard to fixing the differential between the prices of crude and those of refined products; and about the middle of August he announced a plan to stabilize the price of crude oil, stating his belief that this would prevent radical changes in the price of refined products. It does not appear, however, that the plan had any appreciable affect upon prices.

It seems fair to conclude that, from the foregoing point of view, there were three chief types of price fixing: (1) maximum prices, in the case of basic staples which have wide public interest, often recognized as "pegged" prices when any scarcity or rapidly advancing cost exists; (2) definite prices, (a) to encourage production by guaranteeing returns, (b) government purchases (direct or indirect) in the nature of single transactions; (3) margins, (a) absolute amount per unit, (b) percentage on sales, cost, or investment, this method being used when it was desired to cover the distribution of products, the marketing of which was not integrated with manufacture. The minimum price, strictly speaking, was the exception, but is logically associated with the definite price which is both maximum and minimum.

In this re

Another distinction of some importance with regard to the method of fixing prices involves the point at which the price named was to apply. Some prices were made on an f. o. b. factory basis, while others were on a delivered basis. spect the practice prevailing in the industry was partly followed. The tendency, however, was to fix prices on an f. o. b. factory or mill basis, a natural tendency when the price is based on cost. In a majority of cases, prices came to be made f. o. b. the producer's plant.

In many cases, however, it was common to quote prices f. o. b. some market basing point. This was notably the case with such products as copper, which was always quoted f. o. b. New York, although the metal was secured from mines in Michigan, Montana and Arizona, and refined at various seaboard points.

The price of "packer" hides when fixed was "based on Chicago freight," which meant that three-fourths of a cent per pound was to be deducted from the price made by the Pacific Coast producers, and that in shipments from other states, the price was not to exceed the price on Chicago shipments. Further, the price of North Carolina pine was fixed on the basis of deliveries to Virginia "gateways."

In the case of commodities for which there were several competing producing areas, there was often a tendency to quote prices on a delivered basis. Prices delivered were fixed on New England spruce, Pennsylvania hemlock, cement, hollow building tile, iron and steel scrap, and oil products for the navy. The situation in the case of hollow building tile will furnish some explanation of this tendency. The chief producing area for this commodity is centered in Ohio, while there are other producing territories in the south, in New Jersey and elsewhere. In order to stabilize market conditions and to divide the market, the representatives of the industry desired to fix prices on a delivered basis. In this way, by fixing a delivered price sufficiently low, they would prevent the low-cost producers in Ohio from coming too far east with their product; while, if the price were fixed f. o. b. the plant, there would be no limit to the area which might be covered by the low-cost producer, except cost of freight and desire for profit. The producers of yellow pine lumber also objected strongly to fixing prices on an f. o. b. mill basis, their motive being to preserve the status quo in the distribution of territory among the southern pine producers, and between such producers and the west coast lumbermen. They argued that an average base price on millrun lumber would be affected by changing the market areas; that delivered prices were the custom of the trade; that the weight of lumber, and consequently the freight rate, was uncertain, (the amount of moisture being affected by seasonal conditions); and that the disturbances in producing areas which would result, would be a public disadvantage. Nevertheless, the tendency was away from the delivered basis, as is illustrated by the fact that southern pine lumber prices were made f. o. b. mill; and that in the case of hemlock lumber, the system of

delivered prices was discontinued in May, 1918, and f. o. b. mill prices were substituted therefor.

Had the war continued much longer, there can be little doubt that adjustments in railway rates would have become a part of the price-fixing program,-just as rates on government railways have in several countries been a part of the system of protection. Special railway service was given in a number of instances as a direct part of price fixing, as, for example, the arrangements made to furnish transportation to the Douglas fir lumber mills for the purpose of relieving them of accumulations of low-grade lumber. In the case of price fixing on manganese ore produced in the United States, an integral part of the scheme was the announcement of special railway rates applying to such ores.

Prices were fixed for various periods of time, but in general it may be said that on account of changing conditions the periods were short. Perhaps the period most frequently chosen as the one during which the price was to apply was three months. A much shorter period would have created too much. risk and uncertainty in marketing, to say nothing of the strain upon the price-fixing machinery; while a longer period was not, as a rule, desired by the representatives of the industries, especially during a period of increasing costs. Various special exceptions might be cited, such as the case of wheat, in which the price was fixed for the crop of a given season. The prices of meat and coal were fixed for indefinite periods, and the same was true of manganese ore. The price-fixing announcement with regard to New England spruce stated that the price was to remain in effect till July 1, 1918, or such prior time as the Federal Trade Commission might report concerning costs.

In numerous cases the price was left open, pending some form of determination after the delivery of the commodity. Thus, canned salmon bought by the Subsistence Division of the Army was partly paid for by "advances," pending the determination of the cost of production by the Federal Trade Commission. Considerable quantities of wall board and common brick were delivered for use in government construction during 1918, although the prices were not determined until January and February, 1919.

WASHINGTON, D. C.

LEWIS H. HANEY.

THOUGHTS ON PERMANENT PEACE1

OW that the war is over and the peace conference has assembled, one frequently hears the question: Has history anything

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to teach for our guidance in national and international organization? Whether the answer to this question should be yes or no depends upon what is in the mind of the inquirer. If he wishes to know whether history has concrete lessons to teach, in the sense that problems in the past have been met and satisfactorily solved by particular policies which we can apply to similar problems in the present, the answer must be no. This will be evident from a few illustrations. At the present time (January, 1919) the newspapers are debating the

'Approaches to the Great Settlement. By Emily S. Balch. Huebsch, 1918.—351 pp.

New York, B. W.

Right and Wrong After the War. By Bernard Iddings Bell. Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1918.—ix, 187 pp.

The Choice Before Us. By G. Lowes Dickinson. New York, Dodd, Mead and Company, 1917.—xiii, 268 pp.

Democracy Made Safe. By Paul Harris Drake. Boston, Le Roy Phillips, 1918.— x, 110 pp.

The Restoration of Europe. By Alfred H. Fried. Translated by L. S. Gannett. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1917.-xiv, 157 pp.

The New Map of Africa. By Herbert Adams Gibbons. New York, The Century Company, 1917.-ix, 418 pp.

The Soul of Democracy. By Edward H. Griggs. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1918.—vi, 158 pp.

The Rebuilding of Europe. By David J. Hill. New York, The Century Company, 1917.-x, 289 pp.

War and Progress. By William S. Howe. Boston, Le Roy Phillips, 1918.vi, 136 pp.

The War and the Coming Peace. By Morris Jastrow, Jr. Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott Company, 1918.-144 pp.

Through War to Peace. By Albert G. Keller. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1918.-xi, 181 pp.

Nationality and the War. By Arnold J. Toynbee. New York, E. P. Dutton and Company, 1915.-xii, 522 pp.

In the Fourth Year. By H. G. Wells. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1918.-x, 154 PP.

The End of the War. By Walter E. Weyl. New York, The Macmillan Com. pany, 1918-323 pp.

Les Garanties de la Paix.

Premier partie, Les Leçons du Passé. Par Yves

Guyot. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1918.-iii, 288 pp.

question of intervention in Russia, and presumably the statesmen at Paris are giving it their earnest attention. Ought the Allies to withdraw their troops from Russia and allow the Russians to work out their domestic problems unhindered by outside interference, even though this may mean for Russia a period of anarchy, bloodshed and terror? Or should the Allies intervene in greater force than at present and establish in Russia a government that will keep order and protect life and property? What does history teach with regard to intervention in somewhat similar circumstances?

In the past there have been frequent instances of intervention of one or more powers in the affairs of another when it was in a turbulent or revolutionary state. Were the results good or bad? The question does not require us to pass moral judgment upon the deeds of the past nor to enter into any discussion of the ethical meaning of good and bad. A more objective and satisfactory criterion may be found by looking to the substantial consensus of opinion among historians. One naturally thinks first of the intervention of foreign powers in revolutionary France. In this case the results of intervention were unfortunate not only for France but for the rest of Europe.' The same judgment is usually passed upon the action of the so-called Holy Alliance in sanctioning intervention by Austria in Italy in 1820, and by France in Spain in 1823. It has been the habit of historians to applaud the action of Canning and Monroe in baffling what is said to have been the purpose of the same alliance to intervene in Spanish America with the intention of restoring the revolted colonies to the mother country. More recently the intervention of Russia and Great Britain in Persia, the attempted intervention of Italy in Abyssinia, and the intervention of the great powers in the Balkans after the war of 1912 have all been generally regarded as unjustified and as working for evil. On the other hand, the intervention of the powers in China at the time of the Boxer uprising, of various powers and combinations of powers in the Ottoman Empire on several occasions, and of the United States in Cuba in 1898 has received justification before the bar of history. It may be said,

'On this point see an illuminating article by George Macaulay Trevelyan entitled "The Four Great Wars," in The Living Age, December 21, 1918. Speaking of the effect of this intervention upon England Mr. Trevelyan says, "The terrible reaction of forty years which the war caused in our domestic politics and society, just at the moment when reform was overdue and the problems of the Industrial Revolution required more instead of less political liberty, led for a while to a moral and physical deterioration of the masses, and has left marks even now plainly discernible in the social, educational and political evils of our land."

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