The Past as Prologue: The Importance of History to the Military ProfessionWilliamson Murray, Richard Hart Sinnreich Cambridge University Press, 2006 M05 8 In today's military of rapid technological and strategic change, obtaining a complete understanding of the present, let alone the past, is a formidable challenge. Yet the very high rate of change today makes study of the past more important than ever before. The Past as Prologue, first published in 2006, explores the usefulness of the study of history for contemporary military strategists. It illustrates the great importance of military history while simultaneously revealing the challenges of applying the past to the present. Essays from authors of diverse backgrounds - British and American, civilian and military - come together to present an overwhelming argument for the necessity of the study of the past by today's military leaders in spite of these challenges. The essays of Part I examine the relationship between history and the military profession. Those in Part II explore specific historical cases that show the repetitiveness of certain military problems. |
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Page 1
... past for help. Events crowd one another too rapidly. Technology matures too quickly. Crises succeed each other too abruptly. Coping with a demanding present and confronting an ominous future, few current civilian and military leaders ...
... past for help. Events crowd one another too rapidly. Technology matures too quickly. Crises succeed each other too abruptly. Coping with a demanding present and confronting an ominous future, few current civilian and military leaders ...
Page 2
... past.3 One of the great myths of the twentieth century is that armies study only their last war and thus do poorly in the next. That, for example, is the con- ventional explanation for the Franco-British allies' military defeat of 1940 ...
... past.3 One of the great myths of the twentieth century is that armies study only their last war and thus do poorly in the next. That, for example, is the con- ventional explanation for the Franco-British allies' military defeat of 1940 ...
Page 3
... past. Instead, modern militaries are consumed with the recruitment and training of generations of young men, the management of large military bureaucracies, and the routine administrative burdens of command. In the day-to-day business ...
... past. Instead, modern militaries are consumed with the recruitment and training of generations of young men, the management of large military bureaucracies, and the routine administrative burdens of command. In the day-to-day business ...
Page 4
... past but rarely examine it critically. Such examination would challenge the routines that smooth the bureaucratic process. We already noted the impact of peacetime routine on the willingness and ability of military organizations to ...
... past but rarely examine it critically. Such examination would challenge the routines that smooth the bureaucratic process. We already noted the impact of peacetime routine on the willingness and ability of military organizations to ...
Page 5
... past , and their study permits educated guesses about the range of potential outcomes . But the future is not an object of knowledge ; no increase in processing power will make the owl of history a daytime bird . Similar causes do not ...
... past , and their study permits educated guesses about the range of potential outcomes . But the future is not an object of knowledge ; no increase in processing power will make the owl of history a daytime bird . Similar causes do not ...
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al Qaeda armed armored Army War College Army’s artillery Athenians attack battle battlefield Britain British Army campaign Carl von Clausewitz century civil-military relations civilian Clausewitz Clausewitz's theory Clausewitzian combat command course decade decisions defeat defense despite doctrine enemy example experience fact fight fire forces French future strategic world German global groups guerrilla historians Ibid infantry Institute J. F. C. Fuller Japanese Jellicoe lessons Liddell Hart London major Marine Corps Michael Howard military culture military history military leaders military professional modern nature Naval War College officers operations organization past peace Peloponnesian Peloponnesian War Peter Paret political problem profession professional military education reading rearmament role Royal Navy Russian Russo-Japanese Russo-Japanese War Second World senior social soldiers Staff College study of military suggests tactical tank terrorism terrorists Thucydides tion today’s U.S. Army understanding United Vietnam warfare weapons Williamson Murray York
Popular passages
Page 58 - The absence of romance in my history will, I fear, detract somewhat from its interest; but if it be judged useful by those inquirers who desire an exact knowledge of the past as an aid to the 10 interpretation of the future, which in the course of human things must resemble if it does not reflect it, I shall be content.
Page 106 - Exiled Thucydides knew All that a speech can say About Democracy, And what dictators do, The elderly rubbish they talk To an apathetic grave; Analysed all in his book, The enlightenment driven away, The habit-forming pain, Mismanagement and grief: We must suffer them all again. Into this neutral air Where blind skyscrapers use Their full height to proclaim The strength of Collective Man...
Page 3 - And it may well be that my history will seem less easy to read because of the absence in it of a romantic element. It will be enough for me, however, if these words of mine are judged useful by those who want to understand clearly the events which happened in the past and which (human nature being what it is) will, at some time or other and in much the same ways, be repeated in the future.
Page 8 - It is an analytical investigation leading to a close acquaintance with the subject; applied to experience — in our case, to military history — it leads to thorough familiarity with it. The closer it comes to that goal, the more it proceeds from the objective form of a science to the subjective form of a skill, the more effective it will prove in areas where the nature of the case admits no arbiter but talent.
Page 94 - Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult. The difficulties accumulate and end by producing a kind of friction that is inconceivable unless one has experienced war.
Page 110 - I doubt seriously whether a man can think with full wisdom and with deep convictions regarding certain of the basic international issues today who has not at least reviewed in his mind the period of the Peloponnesian War and the Fall of Athens.
Page 167 - If you want to overcome your enemy you must match your effort against his power of resistance, which can be expressed as the product of two inseparable factors, viz. the total means at his disposal and the strength of his will. The extent of the means at his disposal is a matter — though not exclusively — of figures, and should be measurable. But the strength of his will is much less easy to determine and can only be gauged approximately by the strength of the motive animating it.
Page 133 - As a total phenomenon its dominant tendencies always make war a remarkable trinity - composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason...
Page 109 - So that look how much a man of understanding might have added to his experience, if he had then lived a beholder of their proceedings, and familiar with the men and business of the tune : so much almost may he profit now, by attentive reading of the same here written.