FISCAL YEAR 2000 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT-SERVICE LITTORAL WARFARE PROTECTION AND SHIP RECAPITALIZATION HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Washington, DC, Tuesday, March 9, 1999. The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 12:05 p.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Duncan Hunter (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DUNCAN HUNTER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, MILITARY PROCUREMENT SUBCOMMITTEE Mr. HUNTER. The Subcommittee will come to order. This afternoon we welcome witnesses from the Department of the Navy to receive testimony on the modernization programs required by our Maritime Forces to protect them from a myriad of threats they can expect to confront in the world's littoral regions. Most notably, mines in the shallow water and surf zones, AntiShip Cruise Missiles, and torpedoes launched from diesel electric submarines. Since the Gulf War, both the Navy and Marine Corps have formalized their focus on littoral operations in their strategic vision documents; The Navy's Forward From the Sea; The Marine Corp's Operational Maneuver From the Sea. These documents outline the doctrine required to meet the security challenges that will confront U.S. Maritime Forces in the 21st Century. As a consequence of changing doctrine, the primary combat mission of U.S. Naval Forces in the post-Cold War Era has evolved from winning a major war at sea, to one of power projection ashore in littoral regions. Therefore, both the Navy and Marine Corps must be capable of operating in these regions with little resistance on short notice and with great flexibility. Desert Storm highlighted deficiencies in the Sea Services' ability to successfully meet certain littoral threats. Specifically, the capability to counter relatively unsophisticated threats such as AntiShip Mines. Iraq used sea mines extensively and effectively during the Gulf War, which complicated and constrained Naval operations. Two of these unsophisticated mines, allegedly costing less than $1,500 apiece, achieved a mission kill against a state-of-the-art Aegis Cruiser and inflicted serious damage to a large Amphibious Helicopter Carrier. These weapons continue to be a threat from relatively low tech military forces throughout the world, and especially in the Arabian Gulf Region. The mismatch between resources and requirements for mine warfare has been particularly evident over the last decade. The Service has spent less than 1/2 of one percent of its total budget on this critical area. The Secretary of Defense has indicated, on three separate occasions from November 1997 to January 1999, in correspondence to the Navy, his great concern about the lack of resources being applied to mine warfare. Stating, and I quote from his April 1998 letter, "I remain concerned about the lack of commitment of necessary resources to bring about the desired transformation of mine warfare within the shortest possible time. Over the past several years, we have spent a great deal of our resources on RDT&E Programs, none of which have resulted in any transition to production. We cannot continue in this manner in the future." He went on to state that funds for Naval Mine Warfare Programs were to be fenced from further funding reductions, until a current, dedicated capability for the fleet becomes an organic capability in the fleet. In January 1999, the Secretary of Defense noted that the Navy had still failed to fully-fund this effort. So, he directed that an additional $315 million be added to the Navy's budget to fully-fund its Organic Mine Warfare Initiatives. Just as mines present a relatively simple, inexpensive, and easily deployed threat against U.S. Naval Forces in the littoral, the spread of other threats, such as the sale of sophisticated Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles, ASCMs, and Diesel Submarines by Russia and other countries, could greatly complicate the ability to employ Navy and Marine Corps forces in potential trouble spots. ASCMs have widely proliferated throughout the world. Many small and relatively unsophisticated militaries have the capability to employ them against U.S. Naval Forces. One has only to look to the Arabian Gulf, as examples of this threat, where there are both ship and shore launch versions of the Chinese Silk Worm Missile used by Iran to protect its Gulf Coast line and air-launched French Exosit Missiles in the Iraqi inventory. Most can still recall the severe damage inflicted on the USS Stark in 1987 from an Exosit Missile fired by an Iraqi Mirage F1 Attack Jet. In order to meet these ASCM threats, the Navy has invested considerable resources principally because of the danger ASCMs pose to aircraft carriers. While Aegis Cruisers and destroyers are extremely capable against ASCMs, there is always the possibility of missiles alluding Aegis ships requiring other combatants, such as amphibious ships, to defend themselves. To address this requirement, the Navy is investing in the Ship Self-Defense System for amphibious ships and aircraft carriers. As a result, the new LPD-17 San Antonio Class Amphibious Assault Ship will be constructed with this system on board. Torpedoes launched from Diesel Electric Submarines also present a particularly challenging threat for Naval Forces operating in littoral areas. Although the threat is not as widespread as ASCMs, submarine technology has widely spread into potential trouble spots in the world. For example, the North Korean Diesel Submarine_Force could complicate U.S. Navy operations around the Korean Peninsula, just as Iran's Advanced Russian Kilo Class Submarines have the potential to threaten operations in the Arabian Gulf and North Arabian Sea. Although the Navy has both towed and expendable countermeasures that ships can employ to confuse torpedoes, there is no similar system to a self-defense missile that would destroy a torpedo in the water. The Navy is developing upgrades for its Towed Decoy Systems to improve their capability against evolving torpedo threats. Additionally, the Navy is also procuring the Launched Expendable Acoustic Device, a ship launched acoustic decoy intended to confuse a torpedo as it homes on the launching ship. However, the Navy has no systems that are intended to detect, track, and destroy a torpedo in a manner similar to that of SelfDefense Missile Systems. Today, we will hear about the Navy and Marine Corps progress to meet these littoral warfare threats from our first panel. We would like to welcome at this time Mr. Dale Gerry, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Mine Warfare Programs. Secretary Gerry, thank you for being with us today. Major General Dennis T. Krupp, Director for Expeditionary Warfare, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. I thank you General. Rear Admiral Michael G. Mullen, Director of Surface Warfare, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. Thank you, Admiral, for being with us. Major General Select Jan C. Huly, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, Policy, and Operations, Headquarters, Marine Corps. Thank you, General, for being with us. Our second panel is going to focus on shipbuilding requirements needed to carry out both the Navy's "Forward From the Sea" and the Marine Corps "Operational Maneuver From the Sea" doctrine. During the Full Committee, and I am going to talk about them a little bit here before we get into our first panel in terms of statements. During the Full Committee's February 24th hearing on the fiscal year 2000 defense budget request, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral J. Johnson, stated that his number one long-term concern is building enough ships and enough aircraft to recapitalize a force. He went on to add, "We need a minimum of 305 ships fully manned, adequately trained, and properly equipped." I accept Admiral Johnson's remarks as the Navy's public commitment to this fleet size as being minimum necessary to support both peacetime forward presence and war fighting requirements. Even though this fleet size has been reduced from the 346 ship requirement that was established by the Bottom Up Review only six years ago, the Navy's Shipbuilding Program over the past several years has been insufficient to support this smaller number. Everybody is familiar with the five to six ships year production rate. With an average ship service life of 30 to 35 years, it is only going to be a matter of time before we get down to a 200 ship Navy. We are building to a 200 ship Navy today. I credit the Administration for funding increases in the President's budget for fiscal year 2000 that began to recapitalize shipbuilding programs. However, not until fiscal year 2005 does the budget provide for building nine ships per year. It is going to be done, presumably, by another President, another Secretary of Defense who is appointed by another President, who has yet to be named, over which this President has absolutely no legal constraints or authority. Nonetheless, the President's blueprint has been laid out before Congress and before the American people as a commitment to substantially increase the ship build rate. There are currently only six major ship yards engaged in new construction of ships for the U.S. Navy. It has become increasingly difficult to support these facilities with the low military shipbuilding rates for the past several years. There have been recent merger and acquisition proposals to reduce excess capacity and consolidate this industrial base. Additionally, many of the construction ship yards have begun competing for Navy maintenance work that was previously performed in Government-owned and private sector maintenance yards. As the shipbuilding industrial base continues to so-call right size, concentration of market power could raise issues regarding competition in the shipbuilding market. I look forward to a frank and open discussion of the adequacy of the Navy's shipbuilding plan and the state of the U.S. shipbuilding industry. Our shipbuilding panel today will be comprised of Navy, industry, and Congressional Research Service witnesses. I am pleased to welcome Mr. Michael Hammes, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Ship Programs. Mr. Jerry St. Pe, Chairman of the Board, American Shipbuilding Association and, of course, our good friend, Mr. Ronald O'Rourke, our National Defense Specialist, Congressional Research Service. Before we begin with the first panel, I want to call on my good friend from Virginia, the Ranking Democrat on the Subcommittee, Mr. Sisisky, for any remarks that he would like to make. Norm. [The prepared statement of Mr. Hunter can be found in the Appendix on page 257.] STATEMENT OF HON. NORMAN SISISKY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA, RANKING MEMBER, MILITARY PROCUREMENT SUBCOMMITTEE Mr. SISISKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Before we begin, I want to join you in welcoming our distinguished witnesses and thank them for agreeing to serve on our two panels this afternoon. |