The National Security Constitution: Sharing Power After the Iran-Contra AffairYale University Press, 1990 M01 1 - 340 pages Was the Iran-Contra affair caused by executive lawlessness or legislative folly? Or did it result instead from structural defects in our national security decision-making system? In this important new book, Harold Koh argues that the affair was not aberrational but symptomatic of a chronic dysfunction in America's foreign policy process. Combining practical knowledge of government with insights from law, history, and political science, Koh presents the definitive historical and constitutional analysis of the Iran-Contra affair, the subsequent investigations, and the trial of Oliver North. He then discusses the implications of the Iran-Contra scandal for the constitutional conduct of national security policy and offers prescriptions to improve this decision-making system. Koh contends that the Iran-Contra affair arose not from Watergate, as many have claimed, but from Vietnam, for it was only the latest episode in a series of foreign policy decisions made by unrestrained executive discretion. Koh shows that throughout its history America has operated under a 'National Security Constitution, ' a constitutionally defined national security process that views that administration of foreign affairs as a power shared by the president, Congress, and the courts. Yet the executive branch has increased its role in making foreign policy at the expense of the other branches, placing in jeopardy this vision of constitutional balance. Koh advocates a national security charter to reform the foreign policy-making process and offers innovative proposals about war powers, international agreements, emergency economic powers, intelligence oversight, and information control. His proposals would restrain the executive and restore and reinvigorate the constitutional roles of Congress and the federal judiciary in national security decision-making. This challenging book forces government decision-makers, scholars, and concerned citizens to reexamine the process by which the United States will conduct its foreign affairs into the next century. |
Contents
An Autopsy | 11 |
Recognizing the Pattern of History | 38 |
The National Security Constitution | 67 |
The IranContra Affair as an Assault on | 101 |
Why the President Almost Always Wins | 117 |
Why the President Almost Always Wins | 134 |
Common terms and phrases
1st Sess administration agency American Foreign arms sales attorney authority balanced institutional participation bill Boland amendments Chadha challenge chapter claim classified information conduct Cong Congress congressional constitutionally core consultative group covert action Curtiss-Wright D.C. Cir Dames & Moore decision declared defense domestic emergency enacted executive branch federal foreign affairs foreign policy Foreign Relations Framers framework statute Henkin Hostage House IEEPA independent counsel initiative Int'l interbranch Iran Iran-contra affair Iran-contra committees Iran-Contra Report Iranian hostage crisis Jackson Judge judicial review Justice legislative veto ment military national security charter National Security Constitution Office Oliver North post-Vietnam Powers Resolution President Reagan presidential power principles procedures proposal provisions reform require role Select Comm Stat statutory supra note supra note 21 Supreme Court tion tional tive Tower commission Trade treaty trial United Vietnam violations Walsh War Powers Resolution Yale L.J. Youngstown