The Institutional Economics of Market-Based Climate PolicyElsevier, 2004 M08 10 - 340 pages The objective of this book is to analyze the institutional barriers to implementing market-based climate policy, as well as to provide some opportunities to overcome them. The approach is that of institutional economics, with special emphasis on political transaction costs and path dependence. Instead of rejecting the neoclassical approach, this book uses it where fruitful and shows when and why it is necessary to employ a new or neo-institutionalist approach. The result is that equity is considered next to efficiency, that the evolution and possible lock-in of both formal and informal climate institutions are studied, and that attention is paid to the politics and law of economic instruments for climate policy, including some new empirical analyses. The research topics of this book include the set-up costs of a permit trading system, the risk that credit trading becomes locked-in, the potential legal problem of grandfathering in terms of actional subsidies under WTO law or state aid under EC law, and the changing attitudes of various European officials towards restricting the use of the Kyoto Mechanisms. |
Contents
| 1 | |
| 25 | |
Part II New Institutional Economics | 83 |
Part III Institutional Law and Economics | 139 |
Part IV NeoInstitutional Economics | 198 |
Part V Conclusion | 265 |
Appendix Questionnaire | 281 |
References | 291 |
Subject Index | 315 |
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Common terms and phrases
analysis Annex B Parties assigned amounts auctioning baseline CDM projects ceiling on trade chapter climate change commitment period competitive distortions compliance CoP6 credit trading credit-based approaches developing countries domestic action Edward Elgar effectiveness efficiency emission ceiling emission reductions emitters equity European Commission existing environmental policy FCCC flexible instruments GHG emissions grandfathered firm grandfathered permits greenhouse gas harmonization host country hypothesis instance institutional economics institutional lock-in Jepma JI projects Joint Implementation Kyoto Mechanisms Kyoto Protocol law and economics level playing field limit emissions trading market transaction costs market-based climate policy Michaelowa negotiating power Nentjes neo-institutional neoclassical neoclassical economics opportunity costs path dependence approach permit allocation permit trading perspective political transaction costs polluter pays principle pollution property rights reason respondents restrict sector set-up costs sub-optimal sunk costs superior alternative supplementarity switching costs technological trading in order trading system wanted to limit Woerdman
Popular passages
Page 172 - Save as otherwise provided in this Treaty, any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the common market.
Page 151 - The exemption of an exported product from duties or taxes borne by the like product when destined for domestic consumption, or the remission of such duties or taxes in amounts not in excess of those which have accrued, shall not be deemed to be a subsidy.
Page 161 - Today, however, we have to say that a state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.
Page 200 - the use of the mechanisms shall be supplemental to domestic action and domestic action shall thus constitute a significant element of the effort made by each Party included in Annex I to meet its quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments...
Page 300 - Environment (VROM) and the Dutch National Research Programme on Global Air Pollution and Climate Change (NRP).
Page 7 - For that which is common to the greatest number has the least care bestowed upon it. Every one thinks chiefly of his own, hardly at all of the common interest; and only when he is himself concerned as an individual.
Page 40 - Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol may, at its first session or as soon as practicable thereafter, further elaborate guidelines for the implementation of this article, including for verification and reporting. 3. A Party included in annex I may authorize legal entities to participate, under its responsibility, in actions leading to the generation, transfer or acquisition under this article of emission reduction units.
Page 110 - The creation of money is in many respects an example of a public good. The identification of transaction costs in different contexts and under different systems of resource allocation should be a major item on the research agenda of the theory of public goods and indeed of the theory of resource allocation in general. Only the most rudimentary suggestions are made here. The "exclusion principle...
Page 153 - ... assistance to promote adaptation of existing facilities to new environmental requirements imposed by law and/or regulations which result in greater constraints and financial burden on firms, provided that the assistance: (i) is a one-time non-recurring measure; and (ii) is limited to 20 per cent of the cost of adaptation...