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employment practices occurring at any time within 6 months prior to the filing of the charge with the Commission and the giving of notice thereof to the respondent, unless the aggrieved person was prevented from filing such charge by reason of service in the Armed Forces, in which event a period of military service shall not be included in computing the 6 months period.

Section 707 (e) provides that the court may enjoin the employer-employment agency or labor organization from engaging in an unlawful employment practice under this act, and the court is required to order the respondent to take such affirmative action, including reinstatement or hiring of employees with or without back pay, as may be appropriate. The back pay is payable by the employer, employment agency or labor organization, as the case may be, but it shall be reduced by interim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the aggrieved person. In other words, it is mandatory upon the court to order an employer to hire or reinstate or to promote the aggrieved, as the case may be, and to order to payment to the aggrieved of any back pay, if such individual was fired or refused employment or refused promotion because or discrimination on account of race, color, religion, or national origin.

Section 707 (f) provides that in any case in which issues of fact are presented, the court may appoint a master and require him to submit with his report a recommended order. The master shall be compensated by the United States for his services and shall be reimbursed for necessary expenses incurred in performing his duties under this section. The subsection makes it mandatory upon any court before which such a proceeding is brought to advance the proceeding on the docket and expedite its disposition.

Section 707 (h) makes the Commission liable for costs the same as a private person in any action or proceeding under this title.

Section 708 provides that no person shall be relieved or exempted, by virtue of this act, for any liabilities or duties imposed by present or future State laws or laws of political subdivisions of States. The section also provides that. in cases where there are State or local agencies effectively empowered to eliminate and prohibit racial discrimination in employment, the Commission, if it

determines that such agency is effectively exercising such power, is required to seek written agreements with that agency under which the Commission must refrain from bringing civil action in any cases referred to in such agreement. No person would be permitted to bring a civil action under section 707 (c) in any class of cases referred to in such agreement. The Commission is required to rescind any such agreement when it determines that a State or local agency is no longer effectively exercising such power.

Section 709 (a) provides that in connection with any investigation of a charge filed under this title the Commission or its designated representatives shall "at all reasonable times" have access to any evidence of any person being investigated or proceeded against relating to any matter in question or under investigation. The Commission is authorized to examine and copy any such evidence. Presumably the Commission's determination as to what constitutes "all reasonable times" is final.

Section 709(b) authorizes the Commission to utilize the services of State and local agencies and their employees, charged with the administration of State FEP laws, in carrying out the Commission's functions and duties under this title. The Commission is authorized to reimburse such State and local agencies and their employees, within the limitation of funds appropriated for such purpose.

Under section 709 (c), it will be mandatory upon every employer, employment agency, and labor organization subject to title VII to make and keep such records relevant to the determinations of whether unlawful employment practices have been or are being committed, as the Commission shall prescribe by regulation or order, after public hearing, as reasonable, necessary, or appropriate for the enforcement of title VII. It will be mandatory upon every employer, employment agency, and labor organization subject to this title to preserve records for such periods as the Commission shall prescribe by regulation or order after public hearing as reasonable, necessary, or appropriate for the enforcement of title VII, and it will be mandatory upon every employer, employment agency, or labor organization subject to title VII to make such reports from such records as the Commission shall prescribe by reg

ulation or order after public hearings, as reasonable, necessary, or appropriate for the enforcement of title VII.

It will be mandatory upon the Commission to formulate regulations requiring each employer, labor organization, and joint labor-management committee subject to title VII which controls an apprenticeship or other training program to maintain such records as are reasonable and necessary to carry out the purposes of the title, and such records must include, but will not be limited to, a list of applicants who wish to participate in such program, together with the chronological order in which such applications were received, and shall furnish to the Commission, upon request, a detailed description of the manner in which persons are selected to participate in such apprenticeship or other training programs.

Of course, any employer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint labormanagement committee may apply to the Commission for an exemption from the application of such regulation or order issued under this section if it is believed that the application of the regulation or order to that particular employer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee would result in undue hardship.

Also,

any employer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee may bring a civil action in the U.S. district court for the district where such records are kept, for relief. If the Commission or the court finds that the application of the regulation or order would indeed impose an undue hardship, the Commission or the court, as the case may be, may grant appropriate relief.

Under section 711, it would be mandatory upon every employer, employment agency, and labor organization to post and keep posted in conspicuous places upon its premises notices to be prepared or approved by the Commission setting forth the provisions of title VII and such other relevant information which the Commission deems appropriate to effectuate the purposes of this title. Any employer, employment agency, or labor organization which willfully fails to post and keep posted in conspicuous places such a notice as is required by this section shall be punishable by a fine of not less than $100 or more than $500 for each separate offense.

Section 714 provides that whoever forcibly assaults, resists, opposes, im

pedes, intimidates, or interferes with any officers, agents or employees of the Commission in the performance of their official duties shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than 3 years or both. Under section 714, whoever, in the commission of any such acts uses a deadly or dangerous weapon, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than 10 years or both.

Section 715 authorizes an appropriation not to exceed $2,500,000 for the administration of title VII during the first year after its enactment and not to exceed $10 million for the administration of title VII during the second year after the date of its enactment. It should be noted here that title VII, with the exception of sections 704, 705, and 707, shall not become effective until 1 year after the date of its enactment. Consequently, the act would authorize an appropriation of up to $2,500,000 for the administration of this title during the first year after its enactment, in which first year the thrust of the provisions against unlawful employment practices would not be effective. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission would be created during the first year and it could proceed to appoint officers, agents, attorneys, and employees and establish regional offices. It could begin to conduct technical studies and provide technical assistance to persons subject to the title. It can proceed to seek written agreement with State or local FEP agencies. It may formulate the regulations or orders under which records will be required to be kept, and the making and keeping of such records will be required effective upon enactment of the act. The posting and keeping posted of notices, as required in section 711, by every employer, employment agency, and labor organization, under penalty of fines, for willful violation, shall become effective during the first year after enactment of the act.

Section 717 requires the Secretary of Labor to make a full and complete study of factors which might tend to result in discrimination in employment because of age. The Secretary of Labor shall also make a report to the Congress "not later than July 30, 1964," containing the results of such study and such recommendations for legislation to prevent arbitrary discrimination because of age as he deems advisable. In my judgment, this is the most laudable in this act.

The date for submittal of the Secretary of Labor's report to Congress would have to be extended of course. I do think, however, that there is ample information available to the Secretary of Labor concerning discrimination in employment because of age to have permitted the submission of recommendations for legislation to prevent arbitrary discrimination in employment because of age now rather than merely to recommend the submission of a report concerning factors which tend to result in discrimination. As a matter of fact, I consider legislation along that line to be far more important, far less controversial, far less difficult to administer, once enacted, than the legislation which is being de

bated. However, I suppose it is understandable that such legislation must not take precedence over this bill in view of the fact that people, although subjected to discrimination because of age, have not yet taken to the streets in protest, have not yet resorted to acts of civil disobedience and violations of local laws, and have not enlisted the support of church groups and the press in behalf of their cause. Their cause is much less emotional, even though Negroes as well as whites are discriminated against because of age. This is just another indication that the legislation before us today is here because of the desire for the support of a politically potent voting bloc.

EDITORS' NOTE: Senator McClellan (D., Ark.) sought to make it illegal to discriminate against an individual "solely" because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. The amendment was rejected by a roll-call vote of 39 for, 50 against.

Senate

6-15-64

pp. 13837-13838

Mr. MCCLELLAN. Mr. President, I call up my good amendment No. 547 and ask that it be read.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be stated.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. On page 33, line 1. after "employment," insert "solely".

On page 33, line 7, after "employee," insert "solely".

On page 33, line 12, after "individual" insert "solely".

On page 33, line 14, after "individual" insert "solely".

On page 33, line 19, after "individual" insert "solely".

On page 34, line 1, after "employment," insert "solely".

On page 34, line 10, after "individual" insert "solely".

Mr. MCCLELLAN. Mr. President, on my amendment, I ask for the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered. Mr. MCCLELLAN. Mr. President. I yield myself 1 minute.

This amendment ought to be accepted. It merely inserts one word-"solely."

The bill provides that it shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to do several things. I shall read one as an illustration:

(1) To fail or refuse to hire or discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

If that is what is meant, if that is really the purpose of the bill, we should insert the word "solely," so that there will not be a dragnet, a catchall, to leave something uncertain for a court to interpret. Let us use the word "solely."

I hope the word "solely" will be accepted.

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, I yield myself 15 seconds.

The Senator from Arkansas, as always, seeks to provide the benefit of great clarity and simplicity in his objectives and methods. The difficulty with this amendment is that it would render title VII totally nugatory. If anyone ever had an action that was motivated by a single cause, he is a different kind of animal from any I know of. But beyond that difficulty, this amendment would place upon persons attempting to prove a violation of this section, no matter how clear the violation was, an obstacle so great as to make the title completely worthless. I therefore regret that we

are obliged to oppose the amendment, From reading subparagraph (1), it is and also to recommend that it be rejected.

Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, I yield myself half a minute. This subject was considered at some length. The difficulty is that a legal interpretation or a court interpretation of the word "solely" would so limit this section as probably to negate the entire purpose of what we are trying to do.

Mr. CASE. There is no doubt about it. Mr. MCCLELLAN. I yield myself half a minute.

Then it is not intended to stop at what it is said is intended. Therefore, the provision is a dragnet. The proponents want to leave the section open to any kind of wild interpretation. The victim will not know why he has been rejected. It is unfair to the person whom it is in

tended to make the victim.

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, I yield myself 5 seconds.

Whatever might be the truth of the last suggestion so far as I am concerned, no one could possibly say that it was true so far as the Senator from Washington is concerned. The suggestion is really absurd on its face. I suggest that the amendment be rejected.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, I yield myself 1 minute.

Having heard both presentations, I cannot for the life of me understand why someone would want to insist on leaving out the word "solely," because my impression was that if it were desired to hire someone because he was a brotherin-law or a first cousin, a person could not complain that he failed to get the job because of his race.

To say that a person who wanted to hire a relative or one who had been a close personal friend for many years would have to hire someone of a different color because he got there first is unreasonable.

If Senators are talking about two persons with regard to whom the employer had had no previous contact, or of whom he had had no previous knowledge, one way or the other, that provision would make sense. That is why the word "solely" is proposed to be included.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, I yield myself 1 minute.

The

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Senator from Ohio is recognized for 1 minute.

Mr. LAUSCHE. I join the Senator from Arkansas in favoring the inclusion of the word he wishes to have included.

obvious that the offense would be considered committed when equality of treatment was denied on account of religion, race, sex, or national origin.

The Senator from Arkansas wishes to make this point clear. Therefore, he proposes the inclusion of the word "solely," in terms of denial of employment because of race, color, sex, or national origin.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator from Ohio has expired.

Mr. LAUSCHE. I yield myself 10 seconds more, Mr. President.

The PRESIDING OFFICER, Senator from Ohio may proceed.

Mr. LAUSCHE.

The

argument that the inclusion of the word Mr. President, the proposed to be included would negate specious and captious, and is an attempt the provision is, in my opinion, absolutely to find, on some pretext, a reason for opposing the amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there is to be no further debate on the pending amendment, the question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Arkansas. The yeas and nays have been ordered; and the clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk called the roll. Mr. HUMPHREY. I announce that the Senator from Maryland BREWSTER], the Senator from Oregon [Mr. [Mr. MORSE], the Senator from Virginia [Mr. ROBERTSON], and the Senator from Arizona [Mr. HAYDEN] are absent on official business.

I also announce that the Senator from California [Mr. ENGLE], is absent because of illness.

I further announce that the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. CLARK], and the Senator from Texas [Mr. YARBOROUGH), are necessarily absent.

I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. CLARK], and the Senator from California [Mr. ENGLE], would each vote “nay.”

On this vote, the Senator from Maryland [Mr. BREWSTER], is paired with the Senator from Virginia [Mr. ROBERTSON]. If present and voting, the Senator from Maryland would vote "nay," and the Senator from Virginia would vote "yea."

Mr. KUCHEL. I announce that the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. Cooper), and the Senator from Illinois [Mr. DIRKSEN] are absent on official business.

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EDITORS' NOTE: Congressman Celler (D., N. Y.) introduced an amendment making clear that the courts have no authority to grant remedial relief under Title VII if an individual was discriminated against for "any reason other than discrimination on account of race, color, religion, or national origin." This change, with the addition of the qualification "sex" (inadvertently omitted in the House version), was incorporated in the bill as finally adopted as the final sentence of Section 706(g).

House

2-8-64 p. 2567

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. CELLER Mr. CELLER. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. CELLER: On page 77, line 4. strike out "cause" and insert in lieu thereof the following: "any reason other than discrimination on account of race, color, religion, or national origin."

Mr. CELLER. Mr. Chairman, the purpose of the amendment is to specify cause. Here the court, for example, cannot find any violation of the act which is based on facts other-and I emphasize "other"-than discrimination on the grounds of race, color, religion, or national origin. The discharge might be based, for example, on incompetence or a morals charge or theft, but the court can only consider charges based on race, color, religion, or national origin. That is the purpose of this amendment.

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