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8. The right of an appeal on remand orders only applicable to civil rights cases was retained although not in the original administration bill (title IX).
9. In title I, the temporary voting referee with impounding provisions was deleted and an all-encompassing three-judge court with direct appeal to the Supreme Court was established in all voting rights cases under the 1957 and 1960 acts. Some examples of what might be argued as being "compromises" on some phases of the bill but which in fact bear little resemblance to a true compromise are as follows:
1. In title I, voting rights-supposedly State elections were eliminated; however, a careful examination of the definition of "vote" under section 101 (3) (A) would appear to write State and local elections back into title I.
2. A more restrictive definition of public accommodations was adopted as it relates to the interstate commerce clause, but then was broadened again by section 201(d) relating to the 14th amendment approach, and a further preemption of all State and local "laws, regulations, rules, or orders relating to any establishment or place" was added without any justification in the hearings.
3. Public facilities was retained as a new title III and it will be claimed that cutting back the definition of any public facility to one that is "owned, operated, or managed" by a State or local government is a substantial compromise, but when it is realized that this new title was not contained in the administration bill, and that section 302 providing for Attorney General intervention in any "equal protection of the law" case was added, it does not appear to be much of a compromise.
4. Title VI dealing with cutting off of Federal assistance programs was limited to "grant, contract, or loan" deleting "guarantee or otherwise," but this is not much of a compromise when the administration bill contained a discretionary title, and this "compromise title" remains mandatory.
5. The claimed compromise in title VII dealing with compulsory FEPC which was the addition of court review with "trial de novo" is a minor compromise when it is realized that such court action is mandatory, can be brought by a person on approval of one member of the Commission, and is contained in a title which was not initially in the administration bill.
The purpose of this discussion of the legislative history of the socalled compromise and of those areas in which concessions were supposedly made is to prove conclusively that the bill, as reported, is a tougher bill than the administration bill and is not sufficiently cut back from the subcommittee version to justify congressional approval and in support of my position that the bill should be recommitted.
This brief listing of the major aspects of the so-called compromise bill on which this report is being drafted and which finally emerged from the committee clearly indicates that it was far from a compromise. The bill as reported out by the committee is much stronger in many major respects than the administration bill of June 20, and does not deserve the title of a "compromise."
It will be claimed by some who helped draft the "compromise bill" that many concessions of major import were made. It is true that some concessions were made but when compared to the important liberal additions previously noted any fair analysis would indicate that far more was conceded in the direction of the tougher subcommittee bill than was compromised.
An anlaysis of the titles with due criticism of some of the major points are contained in the separate views of Mr. Poff and myself. As a member of the subcommittee that considered the bill for so many months, I believe it is my duty to make the foregoing legislative history a matter of record.
Also for the record, I wish to commend the committee for including one provision in the final draft of H.R. 7152, which is a rewrite of our committee bill, H.R. 6496, reported August 18, 1961, on the subject of extension of the Civil Rights Commission, and which contained the Cramer amendment empowering the Commission to investigate all vote fraud cases. This amendment died in the 87th Congress when it was purposely circumvented by adding the Civil Rights Commission extension as a rider to an appropriation bill without the Cramer amendment. This power is added to the civil rights authority as contained in title V, section 104(a)(5) which provides:
investigate allegations, made in writing and under oath or af-
I have been fighting to get this amendment adopted since 1961 because I believe in the right of everyone to vote and believe that it is equally mportant that all votes be counted, properly tabulated, and not watered down by illegal, fraudulent voting. It is common knowledge that in many of the big cities and some rural counties votes are stolen with impunity This results in the rights of all the people to representative government through the elective process being denied. The right to vote and have that vote counted is the cornerstone of our Republic.
In further explanation I include some of the comments from the 1961 report on my amendment, which was contained in Report No. 995, 87th Congress, 1st session.
6. The right to vote is the cornerstone of representative self-government in America. As such, it is imperative that the franchise of every qualified citizen is adequately and effectively safeguarded and protected. Congress, in 1957, concerned with extensive allegations that certain qualified citizens were being arbitrarily denied the right to vote, or to have their vote properly counted, established the Commission on Civil Rights to investigate charges that the franchise of minorities was being abused. This duty of the Commis
sion was set forth in section 104(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1957 (42 U.S.C. 1975c (a)):
"The Commission shall
"(1) investigate allegations in writing under oath or affirmation that certain persons are being deprived of their right to vote and have that vote counted by reason of their color, race, religion, or national origin; which writing, under oath or affirmation, shall set forth the facts upon which such belief or beliefs are based." In 1956, Mr. Herbert Brownell, then the Attorney General, described the proposed operation of the Commission in an executive communication to the Speaker (see p. 14, H. Rept. 291, 85th Cong., 1st sess.):
"Where there are charges that by one means or another the vote is being denied, we must find out all of the facts-the extent, the methods, the results. ***
"The need for a full-scale public study as requested by the President is manifest. The executive branch of the Federal Government has no general investigative power of the scope required to undertake such a study. The study should be objective and free from partisanship. It should be broad and at the same time thorough." Since its creation, the Commission has been most vigorous in pursuing these objectives. Its numerous investigations of alleged franchise deprivations have been widely hailed.
President John F. Kennedy, in a recent letter to Chairman Celler urging extension of the Commission, observed, however, that the Commission has not yet fully realized its "constructive potential." This is certainly true. Limited as it is in jurisdiction to the protection of minority interests, it is presently powerless to investigate franchise abuses not based upon "color, race, religion, or national origin."
Yet, as Mr. Byron R. White, Deputy Attorney General, recently observed in a communication to your committee, dated August 7, 1961:
"Apart from the Commission there is no Federal executive agency charged with continuing responsibility for gathering information calculated to assist in the guaranteeing of the protection of constitutional rights ***
If it is true that the denial of freedom to any American is a diminution of freedom to all Americans, then we cannot tolerate restrictions on the franchise from any quarter-for any cause. If the constitutional right to vote is worth protecting through a Federal agency for any Americans, it is worth protecting through such agency for all Americans. The time is past, if ever there was such a time, when constitutional protections can be administered in a discriminatory or segregated manner. It is with this conviction, it is to embrace within the ambit of the Civil Rights Commission's operations the job of safeguarding everyone's right to vote, the most fundamental civil right under the Constitution, that paragraph (4) is offered.
The proposed amendment would broaden the functions of the Commission to cover all citizens seeking franchise pro
tection. If the Commission, in the past, performed a useful function, and our action in extending its life would indicate it has, then filling the present civil rights gap in its responsibilities under the proposed amendment should provide it with an even greater challenge and opportunity for service.
It should be noted well that the new investigative power granted the Commission does not extend to any case involving a purely State or local election.
As with its original authorization to initiate Commission action, allegations must be submitted in writing, under oath or affirmation. It is not permitted to act on mere hearsay or rumor. Unlawfully according the franchise, as well as its denial, is made a ground for Commission action. And, as is already the case, primary elections, as well as general elections, are embraced within the scope of its broadened resibilities.
The proposed amendment is not directed at any locality, party, or election. Rather it is responsive to a long-felt general need. Charges of voting irregularities have probably been made in every election since the founding of the Republic. For the most part, such allegations have been without foundation. But occasionally in our history chicanery has occurred and, because of the lack of effective machinery charged with the responsibility to investigate, has gone unpunished and unexposed to the public view.
Belief in, and respect for, the integrity of the methods by which our leadership is chosen must be maintained. If ever that belief and respect are lost, our freedoms will likewise be lost.
The committee is convinced that the proposed amendment will go a long way toward insuring the preservation of the integrity of the ballot in this country.
WILLIAM C. CRAMER,
88TH CONGRESS 1st Session
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES REPT. 914
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1963
DECEMBER 2, 1963.-Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed
Mr. McCULLOCH, from the Committee on the Judiciary, submitted the following additional views.
[To accompany H.R. 7152]
ADDITIONAL VIEWS ON H.R. 7152 OF HON. WILLIAM M. McCULLOCH, HON. JOHN V. LINDSAY, HON. WILLIAM T. CAHILL, HON. GARNER E. SHRIVER, HON. CLARK MACGREGOR, HON. CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, HON. JAMES E. BROMWELL
No legislation of greater significance to the Nation has come before this Congress in our lifetime than the civil rights bill which the Judiciary Committee now presents to the Members of the House.
The 14th amendment to the Constitution of the United States declares:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of the citizens of the United States, nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws (sec. 1).
The Congress shall have the power to enforce by appropriate legislation the provisions of this article (sec. 5).
Almost a century has elapsed since its ratification, yet not since Reconstruction has Congress enacted legislation fully implementing the article. A key purpose of the bill, then, is to secure to all Americans the equal protection of the laws of the United States and of the several States.
The majority report sets forth the purpose, history, and content of the legislation. It spells out the provisions and delineates their scope and application. We subscribe in substance to that report.
There is, however, a need for fuller documentation of the reasons for the bill. The urgency of the measure makes it imperative that