staff and certain select persons, to the exclusion of other committee members.

Sometime prior to October 22, 1963, Subcommittee No. 5 of the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives had prepared a substitute bill for H.R. 7152. Title I of the substitute was read and discussed by the full Judiciary Committee prior to October 22, and at a meeting held on that date a motion was made by the gentleman from West Virginia to report the subcommittee substitute to the House of Representatives. Before final action could be had on this motion, a point of order was made that the House of Representatives was then in session. The chairman of the committee called a meeting for the following morning, the 23d, and then on the 23d, within an hour of the time of the meeting it was postponed to the 24th, and then on the 24th, a short while before the meeting was scheduled, it was postponed again, and later postponed to Tuesday, October 29. These various postponements were made by the chairman without any prior consultation with any of the signers of this report.

On October 29, the full committee met at 10:30 a.m. The motion of the gentleman from West Virginia was promptly voted down, after which Chairman Celler offered a 56-page mimeographed substitute which he described as an amendment and moved that the committee approve the bill. The chairman announced that he would recognize a member of the committee to move the previous question and in it were ordered that no amendments could be offered to his proposal; no debate had; and no questions asked or answered.

The bill was, upon order of the chairman, read hastily by the clerk, without pause or opportunity for amendment. Several members of the committee repeatedly requested to be permitted to ask questions, have an explanation of the bill, discuss it, consider its provisions, and offer amendments. The Chair refused to grant such requests or to recognize these members of the committee for any purpose. After the reading of the bill in the fashion hereinabove described, the chairman announced that he would allow himself 1 minute to discuss the bill, after which he would recognize for 1 minute the ranking minority member, the gentleman from Ohio. This was an ostensible attempt to comply, technically, with the rules of the House but did not amount to debate, as debate is generally understood. Neither of these gentlemen discussed the bill for more than 1 minute; both of them refused to yield to any other member of the committee; and neither of them debated the bill nor discussed it in any fashion other than to say that they favored it. They made no effort in the 2 minutes consumed by both together to even so much as explain the provisions of the bill. In short, there was no actual debate or even any opportunity for debate.

Immediately upon the conclusion of the remarks from the gentleman from Ohio, the ranking minority member, the chairman recognized a member of the committee friendly to the chairman's proposal who moved for the previous question. The clerk of the committee immediately called the roll upon the motion to approve the bill and before the tally could be completed or the vote announced, the House was in session. The committee met later in the afternoon and, the tally of vote upon the motion to approve the bill having been completed and announced at the morning meeting after the House session had commenced, a motion was made and adopted that H.R. 7152 be re

ported to the House. The chairman treated the vote taken upon the bill at the morning session as being valid.

The signers of this minority report in reciting these facts relating to the procedures employed in the full committee do not do so in any captious spirit, but relate these facts to inform the Congress of the tactics employed to bring this bill before the House.

GENERAL NATURE OF THE LEGISLATION

As stated above, the full-committee substitute for H.R. 7152 was railroaded through the Committee on the Judiciary without an opportunity by members of that committee to discuss, debate or amend the 56-page mimeographed document. While this document was being forced through the committee wholly without study, it was hailed as "moderate" legislation and as a "compromise" when in truth and in fact it was no less extreme and vicious than the subcommittee proposal. In coordination with these statements, the reported bill was denounced, publicly, by civil rights political pressure groups for the apparent purpose of creating the impression the substitute measure was, in fact, a "watered down" version of the unacceptable subcommittee proposal.

Now that we, as members of the committee, have had some opportunity to compare the reported bill with the subcommittee proposal, we find that the bill, as reported, is no compromise at all. It actually broadens and strengthens many powers conferred upon the Attorney General in the subcommittee proposal and grants new sweeping and unlimited authority to the President, while retaining all of the most viscious and harsh provisions of the subcommittee proposal.

Throughout this entire report the construction we have placed upon the provisions of the reported bill are based upon that which we believe will be advanced by the administration, evidenced by numerous Executive orders, other administrative actions and statements of officials in the executive branch of the Federal Government. We do not mean to say that such construction is necessarily correct or that the powers granted are constitutional. Broad, obscure, and undefined wording is repeatedly used in the bill.

The reported bill is not a "moderate" bill and it has not been "watered down." It constitutes the greatest grasp for executive power conceived in the 20th century.

We hereinafter analyze in detail each title of the reported bill and compare it to the subcommittee proposal.

The majority report states, "The bill, as amended, is designed primarily to protect, and provide more effective means to enforce the civil rights of persons within the jurisdiction of the United States." In truth and in fact, the bill, under the cloak of protecting the civil rights of certain minorities, will destroy civil rights of all citizens of the United States who fall within its scope. Congress would abnegate its duty to consider and protect all of the Nation's citizens.

If the proposed legislation is enacted, the President of the United States and his appointees-particularly the Attorney General— would be granted the power to seriously impair the following civil rights of those who fall within the scope of the various titles of this bill:

1. The right of freedom of speech and freedom of the press concerning "discrimination or segregation of any kind" "at any establishment or place", as delineated in the bill (secs. 202-203).

2. The right of homeowners to rent, lease, or sell their homes as free individuals (secs. 601-602).

3. The right of realtors and developers of residential property to act as free agents (secs. 601–602).

4. The right of banks, savings and loan associations and other financial institutions to make loans and extend credits in accordance with their best judgment (secs. 601-602).

5. The right of employers "to hire or discharge any individual” and to determine "his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" (title VII).

6. The seniority rights of employees in corporate and other employment (title VII, title VI via sec. 711(b)).

7. The seniority rights of all persons under the Federal civil service (sec. 711(a)).

8. The seniority rights of labor union members within their locals. and in their apprenticeship programs (title VII, title VI via sec. 711(b)).

9. The right of labor unions to choose their members, to determine the rights accorded to their members, and to determine the relationship of their members to each other (title VII, title VI via sec. 711(b)). 10. The right of farmers to freely choose their tenants and employees (title VI and title VII).

11. The right of farm organizations to choose their members, to determine the rights accorded to their members, and the relationship of their members to each other (title VI and title VII).

12. The right of boards of trustees of public and private schools and colleges to determine the handling of students and teaching staffs (title IV, title VI, title VII).

13. The right of owners of inns, hotels, motels, restaurants, cafeterias, lunchrooms, soda fountains, motion picture houses, theaters, concert halls, sports arenas, stadiums and other places of entertainment to freely carry on their businesses in the service of their customers (title II, title VI, and title VII).

14. The right of the States to determine the qualifications of voters in all Federal elections and many State elections (title I).

15. The right of litigants to receive evenhanded justice in the Federal courts; this legislation places civil rights litigants (particularly the Attorney General) in a special category with preferences and advantages not afforded parties in any other form of litigation (sec. 101(d), title IX).

In brief, the proposed bill now reported to the House by the committee does the following:

1. Amends every Federal statute setting up or appropriating money for any program or activity involving Federal financing by a mandatory requirement that every Federal department and agency "shall take action to effectuate" the purposes of the act (secs. 601-602). Persons with less than 25 employees are not excepted from this title of the bill. This makes available to the President and his chief law enforcement officer, the Attorney General, enormous and unlimited funds for sociological manipulation in the field of civil rights.

2. The various definitions contained in the bill, particularly titles II and VII, would extend "interstate commerce" so as to encompass substantially all intrastate commerce and thus bring under Federal control all phases of commerce, whether interstate or intrastate. Actions of any persons under color of local custom or usage, or which are encouraged, fostered, or required by any State or political subdivision thereof are classified as "State action" and subject to Federal control. This authority, if granted, would extend Federal control into the business and the home of almost every individual in the United States (secs. 201 and 202).

3. The reported bill creates an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to police and control the hiring, discharge, and terms of compensation, conditions and privileges of employment of all persons employed by any business or industry "affecting commerce" and which has 25 or more employees (title VII). The administration's original bill was much more limited, in that it applied only to employers involved in programs and activities financially assisted by the Federal Government. The Commission is to be supported by $2,500,000 for the first year and $10 million per year thereafter. The power granted by this title, if invoked, would destroy seniority in unions, corporate employment and apparently in civil service. Precedents destroying seniority have already been set in limited fields by Executive orders and administrative regulations. The exception of employers who have less than 25 employees (the exception is fixed at 100 employees for the first year and 50 employees for the second year) does not apply to those participating in any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance by way of grant, contract, or loan under title VI coupled with section 711(b).

4. The reported bill draws under Federal control inns, hotels, motels and other lodging houses, restaurants, cafeterias, lunchrooms, soda fountains, gasoline stations, motion picture houses, concert halls, theaters, sports arenas, stadiums, and other places of exhibition and entertainment. It also includes any other establishment located within the premises of a covered establishment or on the premises of which a covered establishment is located (title II). It destroys the right of owners of such establishments to serve whomsoever they please. If this action is proper, it should logically apply across the board. Hence the exception of lodging establishments actually occupied by the proprietor which contain not more than five rooms for rent is clearly included for political purposes. This constitutes one form of discrimination.

5. A combination of (a) conferring new powers upon the U.S. Commissioner of Education (title IV), (b) requiring action by every agency and department of the Federal Government administering activities or programs involving Federal financial assistance (title VI), and (c) granting unlimited authority to the President to take whatever action he deems to be appropriate concerning employment in such programs (sec. 711(b)), results in the following: Public and private schools and colleges benefiting from any Federal financial program are placed under Federal control in the handling of pupils and the selection of faculty members insofar as they relate to race, color, or national origin and desegregation or discrimination in connection therewith.

6. The bill is designed to divest from State authorities and invest in Federal authorities the determination of the qualification of voters

in all Federal elections and many State elections (title I). It has been framed to include all State and local elections where any Federal election is held as a part thereof. It appears that this title would affect the election of State or local officials in 46 States ("The Book of the States, 1962-63", p. 23-25). These are Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming.

7. The power of the Attorney General to file suits in the name of or in behalf of the United States is broadened so that, if this bill is enacted, such suits could be filed by him affecting voting (under existing authority), "places of public accommodation" (sec. 204), all public facilities (sec. 301), education (sec. 407), and, apparently, all programs and activities assisted by Federal financing (sec. 711(b)).

8. The orderly and usual procedures in litigation in Federal courts are varied to place civil rights actions in a special preferred category (sec. 101 (d), sec. 203, sec. 707, and title IX).

The most flagrant and dangerous departure from accepted rules of civil procedure is embodied in title IX. Under existing law, certain civil or criminal actions brought in the State courts may be removed to the Federal court in the district and division in which the action is pending. The law of removal provides that immediately upon the filing of a removal petition by the defendant and the posting of a minimum bond, the State court is divested of jurisdiction to proceed. No process of any kind can issue by the State court, no depositions can be taken, hearings scheduled or in progress must be suspended and the State court is powerless to maintain the status quo. Title 28, section 1447 (d) presently provides that an order of remand to the State court is "not reviewable on appeal or otherwise." This enables the State court upon remand by the Federal district court to promptly resume jurisdiction and proceed with the disposition of the cause and the enforcement of its orders. Any Federal questions are reviewable by the Federal courts through regular channels.

Title IX would add to section 1447 (d) the words, "except that an order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed pursuant to section 1443 of this title shall be reviewable by appeal or otherwise." Thus the jurisdiction of the State courts (in these cases alone) could be nullified for months by the simple filing of a petition to remove, followed by an adverse order of the U.S. district court, even though followed by an adverse judgment of the U.S. court of appeals upon the appeal. This seemingly simple amendment would permit the whim of the civil rights litigants (and none other) to destroy the efficacy of State courts. For all of the years past this right has been reserved to the U.S. district courts, on the motion to remand, and not to the litigant.

It should be noted that the administration bill contained references · to "racial imbalance" in connection with desegregation in public education. The subcommittee proposal and the reported bill have omitted this reference. It appears that this action is a matter of "public relations" or semantics, devised to prevent the people of the United States