Fair Labor Standards Act, enjoining of violations-by Administrator, Wage and Hour Division, Department of Labor, under Direction of Attorney General, see 29 U.S.C. 204b-29 U.S.C. 216c, 217, June 25, 1938.

Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, enforcement of order by injunction-by U.S. attorney, see 29 U.S.C. 921a-33 U.S.C. 921, March 4, 1927.

Import trade, prevention of restraint by injunction-by U.S. attorney, under direction of Attorney General-15 U.S.C. 9, August 27, 1894.

Wool products, enjoining violation of Labeling Act-by Federal Trade Commission-15 U.S.C. 68e, October 14, 1940.

Securities Act, actions to restrain violations-by Securities and Exchange Commission-15 U.S.C. 77t, May 27, 1933.

Securities Exchange Act, restraint of violations-by Securities and Exchange Commission-15 U.S.C. 78u, June 6, 1934.

Stockyards, injunction to enforce order of Secretary of Agriculture-by Attorney General-7 U.S.C. 216, August 15, 1921. Submarine cables, to enjoin landing or operation-by the United States-47 U.S.C. 36, May 27, 1921.

Sugar quota, to restrain violations-by U.S. attorney under direction of Attorney General, see 7 U.S.Č. 608(7), and 7 U.S.C. 608a-6, May 9, 1934.

Water carriers in interstate and foreign commerce, injunctions for violations of orders of ICC-by ICC or Attorney General— 49 U.S.C. 916, September 18, 1940.

Flammable Fabrics Act, to enjoin violations-by Federal Trade Commission-15 U.S.C. 1195, June 30, 1953.

National Housing Act, injunction against violation-by Attorney General-12 U.S.C. 1731b. This code citation was repealed.

Defense Production Act-50 U.S.C. appendix 2109, July 31,

1951.

National Labor Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act)—29 U.S.C. 160(L), June 23, 1947.

Rent control cases-50 U.S.C. 1896, March 30, 1949.

Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act-21 U.S.C. 332, June 25, 1938.

Trademark infringement-15 U.S.C. 1116, July 5, 1946.
Rubber Act of 1948-50 U.S.C. 1933, March 31, 1948.

International Wheat Agreement Act-7 U.S.C. 1642, October 27, 1949.

Natural Gas Act-15 U.S.C. 1717s, June 21, 1938.

Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act-7 U.S.C. 499k, June 10, 1930.

Shipping Act of 1916-46 U.S.C. 828, September 7, 1916.

Federal Plant Pest Act-Secretary of Agriculture may seek injunctive relief to enforce orders relating to treatment and disposal. 7 U.S.C. 150dd(b); Public Law 85-36 (71 Stat. 33), May 23, 1957.

Civil Rights Act of 1957-Attorney General may ask for injunctive relief to prevent illegal practices relating to voting rights. 42 U.S.C. 1971(c); Public Law 85-315 (71 Stat. 637), September 9, 1957.

Federal Aviation Act of 1958-Board or Administrator may seek injunctive relief to enforce rules, regulations, etc., 49 U.S.Č. 1487; Public Law 85-726 (72 Stat. 796), August 23, 1958.

Textile Fiber Products Identification Act-Federal Trade Commission may seek injunctive relief to restrain unlawful acts. 15 U.S.C. 70f; Public Law 85-897 (72 Stat. 1721), September 2,

1958.

Federal Hazardous Substances Labeling Act-Permits injunctive relief to restrain violations of the act-15 U.S.C. 1267, 1268; Public Law 86-613 (74 Stat. 378), July 12, 1960.

Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1961-Permits injunctive relief of any withholding of payment of minimum wages or overtime found by the court to be due employees. 29 U.S.C. 217; Public Law 87-60 (75 Stat. 74), May 5, 1961.

Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1961Attorney General may bring suit for abatement of pollution. 33 U.S.C. 466g(f); Public Law 87-88 (75 Stat. 209), July 20, 1961.

Small Business Investment Act Amendments of 1961. Injunctive relief is authorized to restrain violations. 15 U.S.C. 687c(a); Public Law 87-341 (75 Stat. 755), October 3, 1961.

Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act Amendments of 1961. Injunctive relief to enjoin improper acts or practices. 29 U.S.C. 308(f); Public Law 87-420 (76 Stat. 38), March 20, 1962. One of the latest proposals for use of the "government by injunction" is contained in S. 2136 to amend the Foreign Agents Registration Act by authorizing the Attorney General to proceed against foreign agents through the injunctive process. Another is H.R. 594 pending before the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee providing in general that the Federal Trade Commission, upon complaint that an unfair trade practice is being committed, may issue a temporary cease and desist order to compel the discontinuance of the practice pending completion of proceedings before the Commission. In addition, in the last few decades we have created a multitude of administrative tribunals and so-called independent agencies, boards, commissions, etc., which, after administrative hearings, findings and orders are authorized to seek enforcement of their orders through the injunctive powers of the Federal courts.

Does this mean that the historic method of compelling observance of national policy, in which inhere the protections of the Bill of Rights, is no longer efficient and workable in the complicated society of our time? Or does it mean that the proponents of the new activities which the Federal Government is increasingly undertaking are impatient at the delays and difficulties attending criminal and civil legal proceedings where alleged violators are guaranteed due process of law? Abuses in the use of injunctions by individual citizens and corporations, particularly in labor disputes, led to the enactment of the Norris-La Guardia Act (title 29, sec. 101-115; 47 Stat. 70; March 23, 1932) which limits the use of injunctions in proceedings between citizens.

But now, a remedy which we deny to private citizens in labor disputes, we are employing more and more when the Federal Government proceeds against its citizens.

It is the Government itself employing this extraordinary power of the sovereign; in derogation of the rights of its citizers and circum

venting the protection of their liberties which were built up at great cost over a long period of time.

The undersigned is of the opinion that the objectives of the Civil Rights Act of 1963 (or 1964?) can be attained without resorting to this arbitrary, autocratic remedy which impairs the personal liberties of our citizens. Therefore, the undersigned opposes the use of the sanction of government by injunction in any part of the act.

EXPANSION OF FEDERAL POWER

Our unique Federal system, involving checks and balances and separation of powers, was wisely devised by the framers of our Constitution to prevent an accumulation of power threatening the liberties of individual citizens.

First, there is a separation of powers between the Federal Government and the State governments; and then within each State and the Federal Government, a separation of powers between the tripartite branches, legislative, executive, and judicial.

The balance of equilibrium as between the State and the Federal Government was achieved by enumerating specified powers vested in the Federal Government, reserving the remainder of all governmental power to the States or to the people.

Some of the enumerated powers vested in the Government, however, are couched in such broad terms that they are subject to a wide latitude of interpretation. In some of the more extreme and fantastic interpretations, specified powers could be and, in the view of the undersigned, have been, employed to expand the power of the Federal Government and the orbit of its operation at the expense of State and local governments and the people, in whom all powers not specifically granted to the Federal Government, were to remain.

The Federal Government has been ingenious in finding ways, through interpretation of these broad constitutional phrases to encroach, little by little, over the years, and to establish a precedent here and another one there, with the result that today the vitality, autonomy, and even the viability of State and local governments and the governmental powers of the people are seriously threatened.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE CLAUSE

One such governmental power utilized to aggrandize the National Government's authority at the expense of the States and the people is the power of Congress, stated in article I, section 8, clause 2, "to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States and with the Indian tribes."

The danger of stretching this power by a strained interpretation was classically expressed in the case declaring the NRA unconstitutional in an opinion by Justice Cardozo in A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. et al. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495. Mr. Justice Cardozo, concurring, page 554:

There is a view of causation that would obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is local in the activities of commerce. Motion at the outer rim is communicated perceptibly, though minutely, to recording instruments at the center. A society such as ours "is an elastic medium which transmits all tremors throughout its territory;

the only question is of their size." Per Learned Hand, J., in
the court below. The law is not indifferent to considerations
of degree. Activities local in their immediacy do not become
interstate and national because of distant repercussions.
What is near and what is distant may at times be uncertain.
Cf. Chicago Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1. There is
no penumbra of uncertainty obscuring judgment here. To
find immediacy or directness here is to find it almost every-
where. If centripetal forces are to be isolated to the exclusion
of the forces that oppose and counteract them, there will be an
end to our Federal system. [Italic supplied.]

EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS CLAUSE

Another clause, relevant to this legislation, employed in a somewhat different way to aggrandize the power of the Federal Government at the expense of States and citizens is a strained interpretation of the "equal protection of the laws" clause of section I of the 14th amendment.

It is this clause, it will be noted, that is being relied on by the Supreme Court of the United States, without benefit of any act of the Congress, in currently considering cases on legislative apportionment, based upon the Baker v. Carr decision, 369 U.S. 186.

The philosophy of Baker v. Carr seems to be that where a suit is brought by any citizen or citizens claiming inadequate representation in a legislative body, the courts may undertake in this private litigation, to determine a matter most vital to the autonomy and functioning of a legislative body, namely, its composition.

In the instant legislation, a similar strained interpretation of the "equal protection of the laws" clause was employed to extend the coverage of Title II: Public Accommodations, to practically every business and professional enterprise in the United States.

In a prepared statement read before the House Judiciary Committee, then released to the press, the Attorney General criticized, one might even say ridiculed, this proposed Federal power grab in the following terms:

The subcommittee has added to this coverage (Title II: Public Accommodations) a catchall which prohibits discrimination in any business operating under State or local "authorization, permission or license" (sec. 201 (c) (4)). This addition meets none of the criteria we thought important. Rather it represents an effort to go the full limits of the constitutional power contained in the 14th amendment.

What businesses are covered by this provision are unclear. It would seem to extend Federal regulation to law firms, medical partnerships and clinics, private schools, apartment houses, insurance companies, banks, and potentially, to all businesses which a State does not affirmatively ban. And its application, if a narrower interpretation is proper, is in any event uneven to the extent that it depends upon widely divergent State licensing practices to determine its coverage. In these days of rapidly growing bureaucracy, not only in size, in expenditures, but more importantly in power, and with the Supreme Court indicating no inclination to impose restraint on Federal expan

sion, it remains for the Congress to protect and preserve our federal system insuring that "centripetal forces" will not be "isolated to the exclusion of the forces that oppose and counteract them" and thus, safeguard and promote individual liberty and insure the right of every citizen to fullest participation in his Government.

The undersigned holds the view that the administration bill as originally introduced, the version of the bill reported by the subcommittee and the version reported by the full Judiciary Committee all violate the principles stated above and the undersigned therefore cannot support the legislation in its present form.

It is to be hoped that careful consideration by House Members of the bill during debate in the Committee of the Whole and during the amendment process on the floor of the House will lead to the bill's modification by elimination of objectionable features. In this event, the undersigned will support its passage.

It will be the objective of the undersigned to offer and support amendments to achieve this objective and to that end, there follows a title by title discussion of the bill, setting forth major amendments which the undersigned proposes to offer or support.

TITLE I-VOTING RIGHTS

The original administration bill contained a provision for Federal court appointment of temporary referees to register voters in the event the Attorney General certified that "fewer than 15 percent of the total number of voting age persons of the same race as the persons alleged in the complaint to have been discriminated against are registered (or otherwise reported as qualified to vote)."

The subcommittee added a provision that the votes of persons thus determined to be qualified to vote by the court or temporary voting referees should be impounded pending a determination of the case and a finding that a pattern or practice of discrimination existed.

The Attorney General, testifying before the full Judiciary Committee, strenuously objected to this impounding provision and urged that the votes of such persons be counted even if they affected the outcome of an election, although subsequently, the court might fail to find the existence of a pattern or practice of discrimination, the only jurisdictional basis on which court-appointed voting referees were authorized by the 1960 Civil Rights Act to certify eligibility of voters. Thus, the outcome of an election might have been determined by votes illegally cast. The Attorney General thought this was all right. The compromise version as reported by the full Judiciary Committee eliminated completely the provision for temporary voting referees and thus improved the legislation.

One area of Federal authority with respect to voting is section 2 of the 14th amendment which is mandatory and reads as follows:

APPORTIONMENT OF REPRESENTATIVES IN CONGRESS

SECTION 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Congress,