[1812 A.D.]

ber, the fatal news of Napoleon's occupation of the capital of the empire was confirmed by a despatch from the field-marshal dated the 4th of September and brought in by Colonel Michaud. Kutuzov wrote from the village of Jilin (on the march to the Borovsk bridge) as follows:

"After the battle of the 26th of August, which in spite of so much bloodshed resulted in a victory for our side, I was obliged to abandon the position near Borodino for reasons of which I had the honour to inform your imperial majesty. The army was completely exhausted after the combat. In this condition we drew nearer to Moscow, having daily greatly to do with the advance guard of the enemy; besides this there was no near prospect of a position presenting itself from which I could successfully engage the enemy. The troops which we had hoped to join could not yet come; the enemy had set two fresh columns, one upon the Borovsk route and the other on the Zvenigorod route, striving to act upon my rear from Moscow: therefore I could not venture to risk a battle, the disadvantages of which might have as consequences not only the destruction of the army but the most sanguinary losses and the conversion of Moscow itself to ashes.

"In this most uncertain position, after taking counsel with our first generals, of whom some were of contrary opinion, I was forced to decide to allow the enemy to enter Moscow, whence all the treasures, the arsenal, and nearly all property belonging to the state or private individuals had been removed, and in which hardly a single inhabitant remained. I venture most humbly to submit to your most gracious majesty that the entry of the enemy into Moscow is not the subjection of Russia. On the contrary, I am now moving with the army on the route to Tula, which will place me in a position to avail myself of the help abundantly prepared in our governments. Although I do not deny that the occupation of the capital is a most painful wound, yet I could not waver in my decision.

"I am now entering upon operations with all the strength of the line, by means of which, beginning with the Tula and Kaluga routes, my detachments will cut off the whole line of the enemy, stretching from Smolensk to Moscow, and thus avert any assistance which the enemy's army might possibly receive from its rear; by turning the attention of the enemy upon us, I hope to force him to leave Moscow and change the whole line of his operations. I have enjoined General Winzengerode to hold himself on the Tver route, having meanwhile a regiment of Cossacks on the Iaroslav route in order to protect the inhabitants against attacks from the enemy's detachments. Having now assembled my forces at no great distance from Moscow I can await the enemy with a firm front, and as long as the army of your imperial majesty is whole and animated by its known bravery and our zeal, the yet retrievable loss of Moscow cannot be regarded as the loss of the fatherland. Besides this, your imperial majesty will graciously deign to agree that these consequences are indivisibly connected with the loss of Smolensk and with the condition of complete disorder in which I found the troops.'

This despatch from Prince Kutuzov was printed in the Northern Post of the 18th of September, with the exception of the concluding words of the report: "and with the condition of complete disorder in which I found the troops." The sorrowful news brought by Colonel Michaud did not, however, shake the emperor Alexander in his decision to continue the war and not to enter into negotiations with the enemy. When he had finished listening to Michaud's report, he turned to him with the following memorable words: "Go back to the army, and tell our brave soldiers, tell all my faithful subjects, wherever you pass by, that even if I have not one soldier left, I will put myself

[1812 A.D.] at the head of my dear nobles, of my good peasants, and will thus employ the last resources of my empire; it offers more to me than my enemies think for, but if ever it were written in the decrees of divine providence that my dynasty should cease to reign upon the throne of my ancestors, then, after having exhausted every means in my power, I would let my beard grow and go to eat potatoes with the last of my peasants, rather than sign the shame of my country and of my beloved people whose sacrifices I know how to prize. Napoleon or II or he; for he and I can no longer reign together. I have learned to know him; he will no longer deceive me."

"The loss of Moscow," wrote Alexander to the crown prince of Sweden on the 19th of September, "gives me at least the opportunity of presenting to the whole of Europe the greatest proof I can offer of my perseverance in continuing the struggle against her oppressor, for after such a wound all the rest are but scratches. Now more than ever I and the nation at the head of which I have the honour to be, are decided to persevere. We should rather be buried beneath the ruins of the empire than make terms with the modern Attila."

The letter that Napoleon addressed to the emperor from Moscow, dated the 8th of September, in which he disclaimed the responsibility of the burning of the capital, was left unanswered. In informing the crown prince of it, the emperor Alexander added: "It contains, however, nothing but bragging."

The Retreat of the Grand Army

At length the sorrowful days which the emperor Alexander had lived through passed by, and the hope of better things in the future manifested itself. On the 15th of October Colonel Michaud arrived in St. Petersburg from the army, for the second time; but on this occasion he was the bearer of the joyful intelligence of the victory of Tarontin, which had taken place on the 6th of October. The envoy also informed the emperor of the army's desire that he should take the command of it in person. The emperor replied as follows:

All men are ambitious, and I frankly acknowledge that I am no less ambitious than others; were I to listen to this feeling alone, I should get into a carriage with you and set off to the army. Taking into consideration the disadvantageous position into which we have induced the enemy, the excellent spirit by which the army is animated, the inexhaustible resources of the empire, the numerous troops in reserve, which I have lying in readiness, and the orders that I have despatched to the army of Moldavia-I feel undoubtingly sure that the victory must be inalienably ours, and that it only remains for us, as you say, to gather the laurels. I know that if I were with the army all the glory would be attributed to me, and that I should occupy a place in history; but when I think how little experience I have in the art of war in comparison with my adversary, and that in spite of my good will I might make a mistake, through which the precious blood of my children might be shed, then setting aside my ambition, I am ready willingly to sacrifice my glory for the good of the army. Let those gather the laurels who are worthier of them than I; go back to headquarters, congratulate Prince Michael Larionovitch with his victory, and tell him to drive the enemy out of Russia and then I will come to meet him and will lead him triumphantly into the capital."

At that time the fate of the grande armée was already definitively decided. Having lost all hope of the peace he so desired, Napoleon began to prepare

[1812 A.D.]

for retreat. The defeat of his vanguard at Tarontin on the 6th of October hastened the departure of the French from Moscow; it began in the evening of the same day. Napoleon's intention was first to move along the old Kaluga road, to join Murat's vanguard, and then go on to the new Kaluga road; the emperor thus hoped to go round the Russian army and open a free access for himself to Kaluga. But the partisan Seslavin, who had boldly made his way through on to the Borovsk route discovered Napoleon's movements. Standing behind a tree in the road, he saw the carriage in which was the emperor himself, surrounded by his marshals and his guards. Not satisfied with this exploit, Seslavin besides caught a non-commissioned officer of the Old Guard, who had got separated from the others in the thickness of the wood, bound him, and throwing him across his saddle, galloped off with him. The intelligence obtained by Seslavin had for consequences the immediate move of Dokhtorov's corps to Malo-Iaroslavetz; at the same time Kutuzov decided to follow from Tarontin with the whole army, and these arrangements led, on the 12th of October, to the battle near Malo-Iaroslavetz. The town passed from the hands of one side to the other eight times, and although after a conflict of eighteen hours it was finally given up to the French, yet Kutuzov succeeded in opportunely concentrating the whole army to the south of it, at a distance of two and one-half versts.

Here, as Ségur justly remarks, was stopped the conquest of the universe, here vanished the fruits of twenty years of victory and began the destruction of all that Napoleon had hoped to create. The author of this success, Seslavin, writes: "The enemy was forestalled at Malo-Iaroslavetz; the French were exterminated, Russia was saved, Europe set free, and universal peace established: such are the consequences of this great discovery."

The field-marshal had now to decide the question whether a general battle should be attempted for the annihilation of the French army, or whether endeavours should be made to attain this object by more cautious means. The leader stopped at the latter decision. "It will all fall through without me," said Kutuzov, in reply to the impatient partisans of decisive action. He expressed his idea more definitely on this occasion to the English general Wilson, who was then at the Russian headquarters: "I prefer to build a 'golden bridge,' as you call it, for my adversary, than to put myself in such a position that I might receive a blow on the neck' from him. Besides this, I again repeat to you what I have already several times told you -I am not at all sure that the complete annihilation of the emperor Napoleon and his army would be such a great benefit to the universe. His inheritance would give the continent not to Russia or any other power, but to that power which now already rules the seas; and then her predominance would be unbearable." Wilson replied: "Do what you ought, come what may." The Russian army began to depart on the night between the 13th and 14th of October for Detchina.g

Napoleon on the Road to Smolensk

When, on the 14th of October, Kutuzov and his army approached Detchina, Napoleon turned again from Gorodni in the direction of Malo-Iaroslavetz. Half-way there, a report was brought to him which announced that the Russian out-posts had quitted this latter town. Napoleon stopped, and, seating himself near a fire which had been lighted in the open: "What design,' he said, "had Kutuzov in abandoning Malo-Iaroslavetz?" He was silent for a