THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE FRIDAY, JUNE 10, 1960 U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL POLICY MACHINERY, Washington, D.C. The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10 a.m., in room 3302, New Senate Office Building, Senator Henry M. Jackson (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. Present: Senators Jackson and Muskie. Also present: Senators Stennis, Bush, Clark, and McGee. Staff members present: J. K. Mansfield, staff director; Dorothy Fosdick, Brewster C. Denny, Grenville Garside, and Howard E. Haugerud, professional staff members, and Edmund E. Pendleton, minority counsel. Senator JACKSON. The subcommittee will be in order. The Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery is continuing today its series of hearings focusing upon the problems of coordination between the Departments of State and Defense and upon the National Security Council and its subordinate agencies. We are seeking counsel on these three questions: Is our Government now effectively organized to identify and plan ahead on the critical issues of national survival? Are we now adequately organized for effective coordination of policy? Where is there room for constructive reform? Recent events have further contributed to focusing attention on the process of national policymaking and upon a need for a governmental structure to meet the issues and challenges in all their complexity. In this connection, I might say that specific testimony on the U-2 incident as it relates to the national security policy process will be taken in executive session. As the members all know, we have agreed with the President that testimony by former or present Government officials who served on the National Security Council or its subordinate bodies regarding the National Security Council and its subordinate machinery will be taken first in executive session. The subcommittee welcomes to its session this morning the Honorable Christian Herter, Secretary of State. Mr. Herter over a period of 44 years has been concerned with the foreign policy of this country. During the critical years of the First World War he served abroad and in the State Department. I believe he was in Berlin at the time that war broke out as far as the United States is concerned. He has had a long and constructive career in elective offices. He served as a member of the Massachusetts State 52710-60-pt. 5-6 695 House of Representatives from 1931 to 1943 and as a Representative in Congress from the 78th to the 82d Congress. Some of us had the fine opportunity to serve in the House with Christian Herter, to work with him closely and to count on him as a good friend. He then served as Governor of Massachusetts. Our witness continued his distinguished career first as Under Secretary of State and then as Secretary of State since April 1959. Mr. Secretary, we are very happy to have you with us today. You may now proceed in your own way. I believe you have a prepared statement. STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTIAN A. HERTER, SECRETARY OF STATE, ACCOMPANIED BY WILLIAM B. MACOMBER, JR., ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE Secretary HERTER. Thank you. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I welcome the opportunity to offer this committee my views on those aspects of the national policy machinery with which I am most familiar. My comments are based on reflections arising from my service as Under Secretary and Secretary of State, and of course as a member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives. It seems to me that several fundamental considerations underlie the questions concerning the Department of State which you have asked me to discuss today. While these are generally well understood, they might bear restating to be sure we are on common ground. First of all, under the Constitution and the historical development of our Government, executive responsibility for the conduct of foreign relations and the enunciation of foreign policy resides squarely with the President. As this committee knows so well, the course of events of the past two decades has given to these responsibilities dimensions that are awesome, to say the least. Secondly, it follows that the fundamental mission of the Secretary of State is to assist and support the President in the discharge of his responsibilities for foreign affairs. Unlike, I believe, any other major department, the basic authority of the Department of State is left completely to the discretion of the President. The basic statute of the Department of State provides that the Secretary of Stateshall perform and execute such duties as shall, from time to time, be enjoined on or entrusted to him by the President of the United States, agreeable to the Constitution * * *. Thirdly, as became evident after the conclusion of the last war, and as becomes more apparent with each passing year, international affairs no longer have an existence separate from domestic affairs, and they can no longer be treated except in the context of the entire range of governmental activities. Practically every Government department and agency has to a varying degree a proper concern, and in some instances responsibility, for one facet or another of international affairs. Conversely, the Department of State is properly concerned with facets of domestic affairs which have major impact upon our foreign relations. Before proceeding further, I should like to make several observations on the considerations I have just enumerated. The burden of the President's responsibilities for international affairs is almost indescribably heavy. "I think all of us must be sympathetic and helpful in doing what we can to provide the President with the highest possible caliber of assistance, both with respect to his immediate staff and in each of the various departments of Government concerned. The relationship between the President and the Secretary of State is, of necessity, a very personal one. It has, over the years, varied with circumstances and personalities and will undoubtedly continue to do so. The relationship can never be considered fixed beyond the tenure of either incumbent, and any effort to make it so would hamper rather than enhance effective performance. Every President, in his own way, has defined the role he wishes the Secretary of State to carry out. President Eisenhower has set forth quite clearly on repeated occasions his concept of the function of the Secretary of State. Typically, he stated on June 1, 1953, that— I personally wish to emphasize that I shall regard the Secretary of State as the Cabinet officer responsible for advising and assisting me in the formulation and control of foreign policy. It will be my practice to employ the Secretary of State as my channel of authority within the executive branch on foreign policy. Other officials of the executive branch will work with and through the Secretary of State on matters of foreign policy. These principles have been adhered to in succeeding years. I would doubt that any more explicit or enlarged statement is necessary. а I do not wish to leave the impression by my emphasis on the discretion that must be available to the President that there are not enduring guideposts within which we can approach the questions we are considering today. In my opinion the Secretary of State should, under the President, have in his relations with other Departments a clear primacy in foreign relations and in all matters with a substantial effect upon foreign relations. This is not to say that the Secretary of State should be charged with operating all of the programs carried on abroad in support of our national security goals, but that he should have clear primacy as to policy on these programs. Nor is it to say that the Secretary of State should normally have the power of decision upon matters crossing departmental jurisdiction simply because they involve foreign affairs. Rather, the Secretary of State should be looked to for formulation of recommendations to the President, when appropriate through the NSC mechanism, which take into account the considerations and views set forth by other departments. Assistance of this nature enables the President to focus effectively on foreign affairs problems of transcendent importance. In following through on these principles, it is hard to state general rules which will be selfenforcing. It is more a matter of recognizing that the activities and programs are for a foreign affairs purpose and should therefore be guided by the official responsible for foreign affairs. In my opinion good organization alone will not suffice for the solution of foreign affairs problems of the magnitude and complexity which confront us today. While I am well aware of the value of good organization and soundly conceived relationships, I find that I subscribe to the sentiments of those who place even greater value on the human element-on the devotion, ability, and experience of the personnel of the Department of State and the other principal depart ments of Government. This is why I have been such a strong advocate of the moves made in recent years to strengthen the Foreign Service and, indeed, the entire Department of State. While I have been pleased with the progress made in matters such as training and integration of the foreign and domestic officer corps, I have recognized that there is much that remains to be done. This is a long-range program, and I very much hope that it will continue to have the support of my successors and of the future Congresses of the United States. The ability of any Secretary of State to serve the President is dependent not only on his own capacities but also on the support available to him from the Department of State. The responsibilities customarily assigned to the Secretary of State for providing leadership to the Government as a whole in the international field require the participation of many parts of the Department. The capacity of the Department of State to provide leadership at all levels is dependent, in the final analysis, not upon fiat but rather upon the competence, judgment, energy, and comprehension of the many officers who are involved. I should now like to speak to the questions relating to the Department of State which were posed in the interim report of this subcommittee. First are those concerned with whether the Secretary of State should have a more dominant role in the formulation of overall national security policy. Are the responsibilities of the State and Defense Departments in national security policymaking now correctly defined and divided? If not, what changes are needed? In my judgment, they are correctly defined, and the division is working well. I do not believe that any major improvement in the relationships between the Department of State and the Department of Defense would result from further efforts to define their respective responsibilities. A more immediate and profitable target is for the Department of State to seek to improve its capacity to provide timely political guidance to the Department of Defense and, reciprocally, for the latter to seek to improve its capacity to provide timely military advice. I should emphasize that this is being done not only at the senior levels but at all levels in the two Departments. The advice worked into problems at the lower levels is frequently the most helpful. The functional and organizational aspects of State-Defense relations are, of course, important. More important, however, is the continning development of personnel in both Departments who share understanding and perspective in the gray area where foreign policy and military policy come in contact or overlap. In this regard, the common experience shared by personnel of the two Departments who attend the war colleges and the Foreign Service Institute, is very helpful. In addition, I think it would be worthwhile to have a greater exchange of personnel between the two Departments. The men loaned would function as an integral part of the host agency, contributing their own special knowledge, and would return to their parent agency at the end of the tour with the broadened perspective which is acquired through shoulder-to-shoulder work. We might,, |