Churchill and Finland: A Study in Anticommunism and GeopoliticsThis book examines the intertwined dynamics of Churchill's anticommunist and geopolitical thought. It looks at the ways in which he attempted to use Finland as both tool and ally in the anticommunist projects of the twentieth century. Finland appeared a staunch ally in Churchill's recurring efforts to destroy or negate international communism, but the broader concerns of geopolitics and Great Power diplomacy complicated what might have been a simple task of teaming up with like-minded Finns. The resulting tensions are explored and explained in this study of comparative anticommunism based on Churchill's private papers and on additional British, Finnish and American documents. |
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Contents
Churchill Finland and the Russian intervention | 17 |
The travails of anticommunism in the interwar years | 45 |
The anticommunist challenge of the Winter War | 70 |
Churchill as ally of the Soviet Union enemy of Finland | 103 |
Churchill Finland and the early Cold War 19441955 | 144 |
Other editions - View all
Churchill and Finland: A Study in Anticommunism and Geopolitics Markku Ruotsila Limited preview - 2004 |
Churchill and Finland: A Study in Anticommunism and Geopolitics Markku Ruotsila Limited preview - 2004 |
Churchill and Finland: A Study in Anticommunism and Geopolitics Markku Ruotsila No preview available - 2012 |
Common terms and phrases
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