Third. The balance of the fund in] the hands of the trustee, after a proper allowance for his services, must be paid to A, and the notes surrendered to him. Lanning v. Administrator of Lanning, 228 10. Under a declaration of trust: "1. To pay to A. M., or to her order, such dividends as may be declared by said bank during her natural life. 2. At her decease, to pay the same to S. V., or to her order. 3. After the decease of said S. V., then to transfer the said stock to A. M. V., for her sole use and benefit," held,
such mortgage, and the land sold being subject to two other mort- gages in which the cestui que trust had an interest, will be declared, in equity, to enure to the benefit of the cestui que trust. Ib.
See CESTUI QUE TRUST. CORPORATIONS, 8. DEED, 12. WILL, 4, 9.
The mortgage stands as a valid security for the amount ac- tually advanced, and no more. Ad- ministrator of Auble v. Trimmer,
that the interest of A. M. V. vested 1. The withholding a part of a loan at the creation of the trust. Exec- in violation of the agreement of utors of Whitehead v. Stryker, 278 the parties, does not constitute 11. It is the recognized law of this state, that a trustee, in the exercise of his duty as trustee, cannot be- come the purchaser of the property of his cestui que trust. The rule applies, as well where the sale is 2. made by a sheriff or master, as by the trustee himself; and in the latter case, whether the sale was made by the trustee, of his own authority, or under a judicial order or decree. Staats v. Bergen, 297 12. A trustee is not relieved from his 3. incapacity to become a purchaser at the sale of the real estate of his cestui que trust, by the fact that the legal estate therein is not in him, Ib.
13. Where the subject matter of the trust is in controversy, all the trus- tees must be made parties. Sayre V. Sayre, 349 14. The mere fact that the title to trust property is deposited in trus- tees, will not deprive the grantor 4. of his control over it, if his rights are not limited, or in some way qualified, by the deed. 1b.
15. A trustee will not be permitted to derive any profit from the use of the trust funds in his hands. Staats v. Bergen,
554 16. It is the universal rule, that a trustee must not put himself in a position in which he will be tempt- ed, from the influence of self-inter- est, to take advantage of his cestui que trust. Ib. 17. A purchase of land at a sheriff's sale, by a trustee, on a bill on a mortgage held by him in trust, his bid not being sufficient to pay off
While it is the duty of the court to maintain the law against usury, and carefully to prevent its evasion, it will not enforce its severe penal- ties, without evidence entirely sat- isfactory and free from doubt. Bar- calow v. Sanderson, 460
Where usury is set up as a defence to the foreclosure of a mortgage, it must be satisfactorily proved by a clear preponderance of evidence in its favor. If the defendant swears to it himself, and the plain- tiff denies it by his evidence, in the absence of other proof, there is no preponderance of evidence in defendant's favor, and the usury is not proved. Dissenting opinion of VAN DYKE, J. Ib.
Where, however, the defence was, that the mortgage was usurious, by reason of the complainant's having exacted from the defendant notes, amounting to $5100, as a bonus for a loan of $20,000, and that the only consideration for the notes was the loan; and the complainant, in his evidence, admits the giving and receiving of the notes, and that he neither paid, nor did the defendant receive, anything for the notes, but contends that the notes were given on account of another transaction, and not on account of the mort- gage in question, the burthen of proof, that the notes were given and received in another transaction,
is shifted to the complainant. If he admits facts which, prima facie. establish the usury, but seeks to avoid that conclusion by alleging new matter, he must establish such 2. new matter by a clear preponder- ance of proof in its favor. Dissent- ing opinion of VAN DYKE, J. Ib. 5. The sheriff having advertised the complainant's property for sale, under executions, the complainant procured the defendant to advance! their amount to the plaintiffs in execution, upon an agreement that the judgments should be assigned to him, and a mortgage for the amount, given to him by the com- plainant, and that he, the defend ant, would then stay the executions -the mortgage upon foreclosure having been declared void for usury, the sheriff re-advertised. Held, that, as regards the assign- ments, the relation of borrower and lender did not exist, that the trans- action amounted in legal effect to a purchase of the judgments, and that the binding effect of the judg- ments was not affected by the mort- gage. Giveans v. McMurtry, 510
See PLEADING, 4.
PRACTICE, 27, 28, 29, 31, 32.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER. Equity regards a contract for land, of which a specific execution will be decreed, for most purposes, as if it had been specifically executed. 4. The purchaser is regarded as the equitable owner of the land, and the vendor of the money. Huffman v. Hummer, 263
years; and that she is entitled to interest on the legacy from the death of the testator. Executor of Kearney v. Kearney, The codicil to the will contained the following clause: "I do hereby de- vise to my daughter, Virginia, lately born to me, $500 per annum during her natural life, to be paid to her quarterly in advance by my exccu- tor, commencing with her attaining her fifteenth year." Held, that Virginia is not entitled to mainte- nance out of the testator's estate; she has no interest in the estate be- yond the annuity itself, which cannot be anticipated. Ib. The codicil also contained the fol- lowing clause: "It is my will that my wife shall have the right to oc- cupy and possess my estate called Bellegrove, in New Jersey, as well as all my furniture, household goods, silver, books, paintings, stat- uary, and other works in the fine arts, there or elsewhere, to hold to her during her natural life and widowhood." Held, that this is an estate of freehold with all its rights and incidents; the gift is of the right to possess the property, real and personal, during the life of the widow, if she remain unmarried; and if she marry, during widow. hood only. It necessarily involves the right to use the personal prop- erty upon the estate or elsewhere, at her pleasure. The widow is bound to repair only to the extent of preventing waste.
A direction to an executor, soon as convenient after the testa- tor's death, to have the residuary estate allotted and set off in sepa- rate portions, and to hold the same severally in trust until the coming of age of each of the sons, and as each son comes of age, to execute and deliver to him a sufficient fee- simple deed therefor," does not vest in the executor an estate in fee to be held by him in trust for the purposes specified in the will, where the manifest design of the testator was that the residuary estate should vest in his surviving son in posses- sion and enjoyment, upon his at- taining the age of twenty-one years. Ib.
1. A testator, by his will gave and bequeathed as follows: "I give and bequeath to Susan K. the sum of $10,000, to be paid to her on her reaching the age of sixteen years." Held, that the legatee takes a vested interest in the legacy, liable to be defeated by her death before reaching the age of sixteen 5. A testator, by his will, devised as
Held-That M. D. takes one-eighth of the estate, and not one-eighth of a share, more than the other lega- tees; the remainded to be equally divided between the three. Tuttle v. Howell, 176
follows: "I do give the residue of my real estate to my children, share and share alike, but the shares which may fall to my sons, George and Michael; I do give to them only during their natural lives, and after their death, to go to their 9. children, share and share alike, and if any of their children shall die: before their father, leaving children, then the children to take their father's or mother's part. George died leaving no issue. Held-
1. George and Michael, the de- visees for life as well as the other children of the testator, take several, not joint interests in the residuary
2. The estate of each tenant con-1 tinues during his life, and upon his death, goes to his children. If he have no children, the devise over fails, and as to that reversionary in- terest, the testator died intestate.
3. The remainder of the share de- vised to George, vests not in the sur- viving children of the testator, but in his heirs-at-law. Vreeland v. Van Ryper,
6. Where, by the residuary clause of his will, after numerous specific de- vises of portions of his real estate, a testator directs all the residue of his estate, both real and personal, to be divided into equal shares or parts, which he gives and be- queaths to his children and grand- children, it is fairly to be inferred, that the testator designed that the entire residue, real as well as per- sonal, should be sold, and the pro-l ceeds distributed among the resid- uary legatees. Executors of Van- ness v. Jacobus,
7. A direction by the will, to divide the residue of the testator's lands will not be construed technically as a devise, where the testator has expressly directed the executors to sell the lands not devised. Ib. 8. A testator gave the residue of his estate, real and personal, in trust to receive the rents and income," and to pay over the net interest and income in three and one eighth parts, to wit: one-third part to my daughter C. H., one-third part 10 my daughter S. B., and one-third and one-eighth parts to my daughter| M. D."
A testator, by his will, ordered and directed as follows, viz: "I do hereby appoint and declare my ex- ecutors, hereinafter named, to be trustees of all property, estate, or interests, herein given or devised to any of my children, or that any
my children may be entitled to by virtue of any provision in this my last will, during the life of such child (excepting the life estate in the mansion-house devised to my son) with full power to retain all such property in their hands unsold and undivided, until after the year eighteen hundred and sixty-seven, and I do authorize my said execu- tors to sell or convey all or any part of my real estate, and all real estate that may be purchased by them, &c. Held, that the power of sale extends to any and every part of the testator's estate, and not to the trust estate only. Bacot v. Wetmore,
10. An express disposition, though probably involving an oversight or mistake by the testator, cannot be controlled by inference which is not necessary and indubitable. Ib. 11. The first provision of a will was a direction to the executors to pay off all debts. Among other gifts, the testator gave to his daughter- in-law the sole and exclusive use of all the rents and profits of a certain farm, known as the "Bid- dle farm," to be held by her from the time of his decease until the 25th March, immediately preceding the time when his grandson, J. S., should arrive at twenty-one, with a proviso that the daughter-in-law should release to his executors all claims she might have against his estate. From the 25th day of March, before designated, the Bid- dle farm was devised to testator's two grandsons. By a residuary clause, the testator gave all the residue and remainder of his estate (undisposed of) to his four daugh- ters, subject (in the language of the will) only to the payment of
all just claims against me on note] or book account, funeral charges, testamentary and incidental ex penses, and commissions." estate was indebted to the daugh ter in law by bond, in the sum of $5000, which she refused to re- lease, and consequently did not take the term in the Biddle farm left to her, held- First. That the term in the Biddle farm was not specially appropria ted to the payment of the debt due to the daughter in law. Second. That this term passed under the residuary clause of the will. Third. That, in the payment of debts, it was to be considered as a part of the personal estate, and, by the terms of the residuary clause, was made subject to the simple contract debts. Shreve v. Shreve, 12. As a general rule, a direction by a testator that all his debts shall be paid, will serve to charge such debts on the realty. But where the direction is that the executors shall pay such debts, such effect will not be produced. Ib.
13. A debt due by specialty is, pro- prio vigore, a burden, equally, upon specific legacies and lands devised. Ib. 14. The testator directed his trustees to pay over the income of his es tate in three and one-eighth parts, to wit: one-third part to his daugh- ter, C. H., one-third part to his daughter, S. B., and one-third and one eighth parts to his daughter, M. D. Held, that M. D. was en- titled to one-eighth more of the whole estate than either of her sis- ters, making ten twenty-fourths for M. D., and seven twenty-fourths for C. H. and S. B., each. Howell V. Tuttle, 15. The testator also directed, in case of the death of either daughter, without children, that his trustees should pay the income arising from his estate, in the proportions aforesaid, to his surviving daugh ters, stating his intention that the share of such daughter should sink into, and constitute a part of his estate in the hands of his trustees, and the income arising therefrom,|
be divided among his surviving daughters in manner aforesaid. Held, that if C. H. should die without children, her share would be a part of the whole income, and M. D. entitled to one-eighth more of the whole than S. B, and not to one-eighth more of the whole, and one-eighth more be- sides, than S. B., of the share of C. H. Ib. 16 The same rules apply to the dis- position of the principal sum un- der this will. Ib. 17. The testator, in 1846, devised his farm to his daughter, Lydia, wife of N. E., during her natural life, and, after her death, to her chil- dren, subject to certain charges, and also, if she should be dispos- sessed of the farm in any way or manner whatever, that his execu- tors should take charge of her es- tate, and rent out the land to the best advantage, and pay over to her the rents and interest money yearly, and her receipt, and hers only, should be sufficient for the same. Held, that there was a legal estate in the wife, limited upon the contingency of disposses- sion, subject to the marital rights of the husband till then, but when that occurred, a trust estate be- gan in the executors for the rest of the life of the wife, to her sole and separate use. Emery v. Van Syckel, 564 18. The husband alone obtained let- ters testamentary. Judgments were recovered against him by his creditors, and his interest in the farm was sold by the sheriff to Van Syckel; the court enjoined Van Syckel from proceeding in ejectment to recover possession, upon the ground that the dispos- session, in equity, occurred at the delivery of the deed to Van Syckel, and that from that time N. E., the husband, was in possession, as trustee, for the sole and separate use of the wife. Ib.
See EVIDENCE, 6, 9, 14, 15, 16.
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