of securing it should be borne by him. 16 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 318.

U. S. Dist. Ct. Vermont; In re Bruce,

Trust: what bankrupt takes as trustee apportionment of share.—Where the income of trust-moneys is to be paid to the bankrupt during his life, to be applied to the support of himself and wife, and the education and support of their children, the trust declaring that the principal and income should be inalienable, the bankrupt takes it as sub-trustee, and is bound to apply it to the purposes named, and, therefore, it will not, upon his bankruptcy, pass to the assignee. The court can not apportion such income and give the assignee an aliquot share. U. S. Dist. Ct. Massachusetts; Durant vs. The Hospital Life Ins. Co., 16 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 324.

Supreme Court Proceedings.

SACRAMENTO, WEDNESDAY, November 21st.

People vs. Royal-On motion of Jo Hamilton and stipulation on file, ordered that the transcript and briefs on file be withdrawn from the files during the time within which the respective parties have to file briefs.

5706-Bennett vs. Hoff-Continued by consent, and stipulation on file. 5522-Rosecrans vs. Ellsworth-Argument concluded by Brunson for respondent, Ellsworth and McConnell for appellant, and submitted.

5555-Lockhart vs. Spurgeon-Argued by Brunson for appellant, and Bicknell for respondent, and submitted.

5591-Baker vs. Carrillo-Argued by Godfrey for appellant, and Brunson for respondent, and submitted.

5612-In the Matter of the Estate of John Goller, deceased-Argued by Smith for appellant, and Bicknell for respondent, and submitted.

Eugene Bonner was admitted to practice on motion of Darwin C. Allen, and

a license from the Supreme Court of Illinois.

5841-Covarrubias vs. Supervisors Santa Barbara County-Argued by Haight for respondent and petitioner, and submitted.

THURSDAY, November 22d.

5670-Schacht vs. Odell-Motion denied.

5541-Yoakum vs. Brower-Judgment reversed and cause remanded, with directions. Remittitur forthwith.

5542-Yoakum vs. Brower-Judgment reversed and cause remanded, with directions. Remittitur forthwith.

5597-Gardner vs. Yoakum-Judgment reversed and cause remanded, with directions. Remittitur forthwith.

2539-Plath vs. Kitzmuller-On motion of Catlin, for M. G. Cobb, to recall remittitur, denied.

5747-Alvarez vs. Camacho-On motion for counsel for appellant, cause dismissed at the cost of respondent, counsel for respondent consenting thereto, and the case of Leonis vs. Marilus et al. (No. 5844) substituted in place thereof.

5051-Estate of Stott-On motion of Merrill for appellant, and filing a petition for rehearing, ordered that a stay of proceedings be granted until the same is determined.

5617-Freeman et al. vs. Bouton-Argued by Smith for appellants, and Ross for respondent, and submitted.

5025-Cota vs. Briswalter—Argued by Allen for appellant, and judgment affirmed.

4567-Morenhaut et al. vs. Wilson et al.-Continued.

5659-Douglass vs. Gould et al.-Argued by Bicknell for appellants, and Hartman for respondent, and submitted.

5660-Newmark vs. Cohn-Argued by Hartman and Howard for appellant, and Smith for respondent, and submitted.

SACRAMENTO, Tuesday, November 27th.

5703-Sepulveda vs. Johnson-Judgment referred and cause remanded for a new trial.

10,305—People vs. Sprague-Judgment affirmed.

5773-Temple vs. Alexander-Judgment affirmed.

5856-St. John vs. Meyerstein-Motion to dismiss the appeal herein argued by Rowell for respondent, and motion denied; cause ordered on calendar of present term, with cases from San Bernardino.

file.

5857-Burkhardt vs. Meyerstein-Same order as St. John vs. Meyerstein. 10,313-People vs. McCormic- Submitted upon points and authorities on

10,293-People vs. Gaines-On motion of Carey for people, ordered that the remittitur herein issue forthwith.

5581-Putnam vs. Clark-Continued by consent.

5615-James vs. Center-Continued, with leave to set aside continuance, and submitted.

5697-Gelcich vs. Moriarty-Continued; no appearance.

5698-Maude vs. Chester-Submitted upon points and authorities on file. 5790-Conlin vs. Quimby—Argument concluded by McConnell for appellant and Bicknell for respondent, and judgment reversed and cause remanded for a new trial. Remittitur forthwith.

5801-Land and Loan Company vs. Stoneman-Argued by McConnell for appellant and Godfrey for respondent, and judgment affirmed.

5800-Land and Loan Company vs. Stoneman--Argued by McConnell for appellant and Godfrey for respondent, and cause submitted.

5656-Elliott vs. Leopard Mining Company et al.-Submitted by stipulation upon points and authorities on file.

5241-Ferreira vs. Pacific Mail Steamship Company - Upon motion of Brooks for appellant and filing of a petition for rehearing, ordered that a stay of proceedings be granted until the same is determined.

5519-Bailey vs. Clark-Upon motion for Crane for appellant and filing of a petition for rehearing, ordered that a stay of proceedings be granted until the same is determined."

5662-Meeks vs. Southern Pacific Railroad Company-Argued by Sanderson for appellants and Rowell for respondent, and further argument continued until to-morrow.

VOL. I.

DECEMBER 22, 1877.

No. 17

Current Topics.

THE following bills have been introduced in the Legislature and referred to the Judiciary Committee: To amend section 666 of the Political Code; to amend sections 275 and 279 of the Code of Civil Procedure (permit women to practice law); to add another section to the Code, authorizing clergymen to marry, without a license, persons who have been living together as man and wife; to amend section 1560 and 1561 of the Political Code; to amend section 3764 of the Political Code (extends, the time of publication of delinquent taxlist, in San Francisco, from first Monday in February to first Monday in March, of each year); to amend section 60 of the Civil Code (provides that all marriages of white persons with mulattos, negroes, or Chinese, are illegal and void); to amend section 3787 of the Political Code (permits any person to become purchaser at tax-sales); to amend sections 537 and 538 of the Code of Civil Procedure (extends the right to attach property in all cases where a party might be entitled to a money-judgment where it does not arise upon contract, either express or implied, except in cases of injury to person, property, or character).

OUR law-makers are determined they will not be lacking in any of the gallantry shown by the nation's law-makers at Washington, in regard to a zealous care and protection of all the rights of the opposite sex. Following the lead of Congress, Mr. Murphy, of Santa Clara, has introduced a bill in the Senate, permitting women to practice law. The rules should be suspended, upon a favorable report from the committee to whom it has been referred, and the bill passed at once-not that we think the sacred rights of the sex, or the ends of justice, or the well-being of society demand it, but to hush the clamor for rights that exist only in theory, their exercise being utterly impracticable—and to save that time to legislators that is constantly being consumed by the introduction of such measures. There are laws to be made protecting rights of intrinsic value, and redressing grievous wrongs, and time should not be wasted in the introduction and discussion of such a bill as introduced by Mr. Murphy.

THE important question whether or not a married woman can execute a promissory note, without reference to her separate estate, so as to bind her, was decided in the case of Wood vs. Orford, at the September term of our Supreme Court. The opinion was reported in the JOURNAL (No. 8), but the facts were not stated in the opinion, and as the question is of such importance, we now reprint the decision in this issue, giving the facts as they appear upon the records. Mary J. Orford executed a note during the life-time of her former husband, Fogg, signing the note Mary J. Fogg. She afterward married Orford.

Wood, the holder of the note, brought suit against the husband and wife, to recover the same. The only defense made was coverture-Mrs. Orford pleading her marriage with Fogg at the date of the execution of the note. The court below held both liable. The Supreme Court modified the judgment, limiting it to Mary J. Orford. The issue was certain, and it is now settled that coverture is no defense to an action on a promissory note made by a married woman. There can be but little doubt that this decision in effect removes all the disabilities of married women except such only as may be made by express

statute.

THE Legislature has adjourned for the holidays. But little of interest to the profession has been done, but there have been many bills of more or less importance already introduced, which will be acted upon at an early day after they convene.

WE will, in our next number, publish a very interesting communication on the subject of our Judiciary-suggesting the necessary changes that should be made by the Constitutional Convention.

THE bill permitting women to become notaries failed to receive the necessary vote for its passage, and was indefinitely postponed.

Supreme Court of California.

[September Term, 1877.]

[No. 5026.]

WOOD vs. ORFORD.

MARRIED WOMAN-LIABILITY ON PROMISSORY NOTE-COVERTURE NO DEFENSE.-A married woman

can not effectually plead coverture to a note signed by her. Her liability is the same as

a femme sole.

LIABILITY OF HUSBAND.-The husband is not liable for the note of wife when made during marriage with former husband.

Mary J. Orford executed a promissory note for $1000 during her marriage with her former husband, Fogg—she afterward married Orford. This suit was brought against both to recover the amount of the note and interest. The plea of coverture only was made, and, upon motion for judgment, the court below gave judgment against both. Upon appeal the court modifies the judgment, limiting it to the defendant, Mary J. Orford.

By the Court.

On the facts disclosed by the pleadings there can be no personal judgment against the husband. It is therefore ordered that the judgment be, and it is hereby modified by limiting the same to the defendant, Mary J. Orford.

United States Circuit Court.

(District of Oregon.)

[DECEMBER 10, 1877.)

THE WALLAMET FALLS C. & L. CO. vs. JONATHAN KITTREDGE.

ACTION TO RECOVER DAMAGES.

1.

2.

CORPORATION, TERMINATION OF.--The Corporation Act of Oregon, sec. 16 (Or. Laws, p. 528), declares that if any corporation shall neglect and cease to carry on its business for any period of six months, its corporate powers shall cease; HELD, that such neglect did not terminate the existence of the corporation as by lapse of time, but that it worked a forfeiture of the corporate privileges of which no one but the State conld complain or take advantage.

CORPORATION-DISSOLUTION OF.-The corporation Act aforesaid, sec. 19, provides that a majority of the stockholders may authorize the dissolution of a corporation; HELD, that a vote of the stockholders authorizing a dissolution did not of itself dissolve the corporation nor compel the directors to do so, and that the act of dissolution must proceed from the directors, who alone can exercise the corporate powers.

DEADY, J., delivered the opinion of the court.

The plaintiff is a corporation formed under the laws of Oregon, to construct a canal and locks at the Wallamet Falls, near Oregon City. The defendant is a citizen of California, and a party with F. L. A. Pioche, John Morris, E. N. Robinson, and A. H. Jordan, to a bond given on March 20, 1871, conditioned for the performance of a contract of the same date between the plaintiff and said Morris, Robinson, and Jordan, for the construction of said work by the latter.

The contractors having failed, as it is alleged, to complete the canal and locks according to the contract, this action was brought on September 7, 1874, against the defendant, to recover the penalty of said bond-$30,000.

Among other defenses, the amended answer, filed May 17th, contains the following:

1. That, since the commencement of this action, the plaintiff, at a meeting of its stockholders, called for that purpose, "authorized dissolution of said corporation without authorizing or providing for settling its business; and said corporation has thereby ceased to exist."

2. That on May 1, 1876, the plaintiff ceased to carry on the business for which it was formed, and has not since transacted or carried on any of such business; and has ceased to exist.

The plaintiff demurs to these pleas as not constituting a defense to the action. The first of these pleas is founded upon section 19 of the Corporation Act (Or. Laws, p. 528), which provides that a corporation, at a meeting of its stockholders, called for snch purpose, may, by a vote of the majority of its stock, among other things, authorize the dissolution of such corporation, and the settling of its business, and the disposing of its property, and dividing its capital stock in any manner it may see proper.

The second plea is founded on section 16 of said Act (Or. Laws supra) which provides that if any corporation organized thereunder “shall, for any period of