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It has been speculated that KORESH's religious beliefs are nothing more than a con, in order to get power, money, women, etc., and that a strong show of force (tanks, APC's, weapons, etc.) will crumble that resolve, causing him to surrender. fact, the opposite very well may also occur, whereby the presence of that show of force will draw DAVID KORESH and his followers closer together in the "bunker mentality", and they would rather die than surrender.

It is natural for law enforcement to feel frustrated at the pace of negotiations and the perceived attitude that DAVID KORESH is "pushing us around", and, "we are not going to take it anymore". The strong show of force response is to be expected from law enforcement personnel, who are action oriented. However, in this situation KORESH's arrogant, recalcitrant demeanor may be part of his scheme to manipulate law enforcement commanders, so as to provoke a confrontation, in fulfillment of his interpretation of the 7 seals. The first seal in KORESH's mind is symbolized by the "attack" by ATF on 2-28-93; the second seal is war and bloodshed; the third seal he interprets as famine (where he apparently, currently feels is his immediate situation); and the fourth seal is death. We are approaching this 4th seal and it would appear that we may unintentionally sake his prophesy come true, if we take what he perceives to be hostile or aggressive action.

KORESH always talks about the "end", suggesting to his followers that "it is closer than you think". If KORESH dies before his followers, the women are to kill themselves and the children. If the women are unable, the men are to help them. KÖREDR teaches his followers that they must follow him to the "end", even if that means killing themselves. Persons thus far interviewed, have emphatically stated that his followers would not hesitate to die, in order to protect KORESH. This is further evidence of KORESH's psychopathic manipulation and control over his followers. KORESH realizes that in an environment outside of the compound, without his control over the followers, he would lose his status as the Messiah, thus a mass suicide ordered by KORESH cannot be discounted. His orders for a mass suicide would be his effort to maintain the ultimate control over his group, in the event of his death.

In traditional hostage negotiations with people who are psychopaths, the goal is to wrest control away from the individual and give him a face saving scenario, so he can surrender. with DAVID KORESH, however, perhaps one way to take control away from him is to do the OPPOSITE of what he is

expecting. Instead of moving towards him, we consider moving back. This may appear to be appeasement to his wishes, but in reality, it is taking power away from him. He has told his followers that an attack is imminent, and this will show them that he was wrong.

Secondly, lately the news media has been producing stories depicting people who are supporting KORESH's right to religious freedom (regardless of how strange), his right to bear arms, and his right to defend his property from illegal search and seizures. We could show him this material.

The bottom line is that we can always resort to tactical pressure, but it should be the absolute last option we should consider.

Memorandum

To :

From :

Subject:

SAC's WAC MUR (89B-SA-33851) (MC 80) Date 3/9/93

X

Negotiations to date have met with limited success because of KORESH's psychopathic tendencies to control and manipulate his situation and our inability to develop a face saving scenario which would convince him to surrender.

It is

Efforts should be made to break the spirit of DAVID KORESH and the control he exercises over his followers. time to consider other measures to wield control of the situation, such as:

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

Sporadic terminating and reinstating of
utilities.

Unpredictable movement of equipment and manpower. Downplay importance of KORESH in press conferences and emphasize others (SCHNEIDER & MARTIN).

Execute absolute control over the television and radio reception of the compound. (Very Important)

Deny negotiations with KORESH, until he is willing to discuss the issues.

taking these non-offensive actions we would be monstrating to KORESH that he is no longer in charge and that if wants Nia story told,“ must surrender.

This would buy time, the most critical factor in successfully resolving hostage/barricade situations. The passage of time tends to physically and psychologically wear the subject down and makes him more willing to surrender.

FBI personnel should exercise extreme caution since KORESH has threatened violence if he perceives authorities are infringing on his property. Any aggressive action initiated by KORESH should be responded to in a manner consistent with

Any loss of life, as a result of hostile action nitiated by KORESH would then be his responsibility.

The above is based on information available as of -9-93. The behavior of KORESH and his followers is subject to hange as a result of circumstances within our control and beyond ur control.

la are currently in the 22nd day of the Mt. Carmel Intensivi hayotiation.g have resulted in the daparture of 34 Individuals trem tre ceascuna. The first 23 paople departað belkeen 2/25/93 and 3/5/9). A pan and a woman dapartad on 3/12/53, two pin on 3/15/9), and six women and one man on 3/21/93. At a rata of sevan par day it would take an additional fourteen days to resolve this incident.

Cespita encouraging comments from STEVE SCHNEIDER and DAVID KORESH regarding forthcoming departures, there is no clear indication that large numbers of individuals will depart shortly fon the compound. SCHNEIDER and KORESH continue to indicate ai vi71 aventually come out, yet they rusist all efforts by the negotiators to provide spacific names, numbers, or time frames for such action.

"It should be noted that the negotiation team believes the long term prospect for a peaceful resolution razains good. This belief is based on the le suicide potantial of individuals within the compound, the 120% of direct threats, substantiva danands or deadlines, and tha, absence of further viclenca. However, the short tara prospect for total resolution is not encouraging.

The attitude of both CAVID KORESH, STEVE SCHNEIDER and others during tha course of negotiations has changed from a gancrally unrepentant, defiant position tɔ one of verbal acquiescance and hesitant compliance. The siege is giving this an increased sense of isolation and hopelessness. Curing recar. conversations with reget:aters both CRISH ard SCHNEIDER have stated a willingness on everyones' part to ccad cut. The probla is the pace of surrender.

KCRESH, while somewhat compliant, remains manipulative and continues to try to control this situation. Absent KCRESK's Zedical deterioration it is cur opinion that he will continue to stall as long as possible, conceding only what he absolutely

Aust.

Despite the loneliness, isolation, insacurity and inadequacy the majority of the individuals in the cɔapound relɛin