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1. Military support requested: Pick up 2000 and deliver to Waco

2. Military support provided: Picked up 2008 and delivered to Waco
3. Military Chain of Command: LIC
LTC

594

4. DLEA Chain of Command: Unknown

3. Communications Network: None Lessons Learned

1.

2.

Observations: Needed more help at Henry Post AAP, Ok to sort and load

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Discussion: Prior coordination was minimum due to hurry up nature of mission.

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ronclogy: Received request by telephone-to pick up BDU in Oklahoms and

deliver to ATP and 78: agents in Waco. Complied with request.

2. OPLAN/OPARD: None

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PURPOSE: To provide Senior DoD Staff and Congress with timely feedback concerning National Guard Support to Law Enforcement Agencies

RATING SCHEME: 1 (Poor) 2 (Good) 3 (Excellent)

It is requested that this survey be completed by the senior National Guard Member participating in this operation. Score each question with numerical score (1-2-3) as follows:

1. WAS THE SUPPORT PROVIDED AS PER LEA REQUEST ?

DID SUPPORT START ACCORDING TO LEA REQUEST ?

3. WAS THE NATIONAL GUARD PROPERLY EQUIPED TO SUPPORT THIS OPERATION ?

4. DID THE NATIONAL GUARD FEEL THAT THE OPERATION WAS SUCCESSFUL ?

5. WAS THERE A COOPERATIVE ATTITUDE AMONG ALL PARTIES ?

6. WAS THE SUPPORT OF TRAINING VALUABLE TO THE NATIONAL GUARD ?

7. WAS THERE A PRE-COMMITMENT BRIEFING CONDUCTED WHICH OUTLINED THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT AND USE OF DEADLY FORCE ?

8. DID THE NATIONAL GUARD PERSONNEL FULLY UNDERSTAND THE MISSION ?

9. WAS THERE AMPLE FLEXIBILITY IN THE NATIONAL GUARD CHAIN OF COMMAND?

10. WAS THERE ADEQUATE TIME FOR NATIONAL GUARD PERSONNEL TO PREPARE FOR THE MISSION ?

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1. This survey if completed must

Suomitted is an attachment to

the National Guard After Action Report (AAR:NGB 525-6-R).

2. Success Equals (0-10 poor) (11-19 good) (20-30 excellent)

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REPLY TO
ATTENTION OP

AOSO-SFT-CO (350-1d)

MEMORANDUM FOR SEE DISTRIBUTION

21 September 1992

SUBJECT: Special Operations Training (SOT) and Close Quarters
Battle (CQB)

1. SOT/CQB training is a non-exportable, high-risk, perishable skill developed and taught to specific units with a directed mission of specific military operations on urbanized-terrain. 3rd SFG (A) does not have a Mission Essential Task List (METL) which encompasses this skill. The course Memorandum of Instruction (MOI) specifies for a good reason that foreign students are not eligible for the training. The proliferation of the tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) disseminated in this course has adverse consequences for the units tasked with maintaining and using these skills in a hostile environment.

2. 3rd SFG(A) will continue to participate in schools teaching the basic marksmanship and operations associated with SOT in order to incorporate the ancillary benefits of this training in our day to day operations. This training is specifically allowed for internal use only and will not be disseminated outside the Group. There is a wide gulf between infantry Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT) and SOT/CQB. MOUT is defined in FM 7-8 and does not involve mixed friend/foe situations or the need for discriminatory 'shooting. I

3. The Group cannot hope to maintain the level of proficiency, currency and skill necessary to effectively teach and disseminate this skill on an on-going basis without adversely diverting assets needed elsewhere. rd SPG(A) VIII ́not solicit or accept ad hoc requests for this type of training. No other type of high-risk, perishable skill training would be undertaken with less than adequate trainingy this will not be an exception.

4. The following will be strictly adhered to with respect to inquiries and discussions of SOT/CQB:

a) 3rd SFG(A) will not teach, discuss, or disseminate TTP associated with SOT/CQB without the specific written permission of the Group Commander.

b) SOT/CQB will not be discussed during planning conferences or exercise.pre-deployment site surveys. If queried 3rd SEG(A) representatives will explain MOUT as defined in FM 7-8 and the skills which can be taught No discussion of comparisons. .cr contrasts between MOUT and SOT/COB will be entered into

c) SOT/CQB should not be a subject for unit training

afforded training resources only after all other METL skills have reached a high level of proficiency. Battalion Commanders will specifically approve unit SOT/CQB training and then discuss it with the Group Commander prior to execution.

d) ŠOT/CQB training, when allowed, will not be conducted with either participation or observation by individuals or units other than 3rd SFG(A).

e) No mention of SOT/CQB training or proficiency will be made in unit After Action Reports (AARS). Recommendation referring to this type of training/proficiency will not be made (verbally or in writing)..

4. I cannot overemphasize the importance and sincerity with which I view this type of training. Unit commanders will ensure this policy is disseminated and understood by all principle staff members as well as every 18-series individual in the Group prior to 30 September 1992. Battalion Commanders and principle staff elements in the Group Headquarters will Reply by Indorsement (RBI). that this has been accomplished.

DISTRIBUTION:

A

фи,

LIKENSINGER JR.

Commanding

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SUBJECT:

કર

50

FEB 2 3 1993

United States Army Special Forces Command Airborne) Policy for Conducting CONUS Counterdrug Operations

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1. The United States Army Special Forces .Command (Airborne) (USASFC (A)) supports the United States Special Operations Command and the United States Army Special: Operations Command commanders' guidance for conducting counterdrug, operations in support of Drug Law Enforcement Agencies (DLEA) within the United States. Our primary mission is to support all warfighting CINCs, which includes Commander in Chief, Forces Command. The USASFC (A) views CONUS counterdrug support as an outstanding training opportunity that is as important as operational missions: Therefore, it is the position of this command that all Special Forces groups participate in the President's war on drugs:

2. Effective immediately all Special Forces groups will include support to Joint Task Force-8ix (JTP-6), Project North Star (PNS), and the Continental United States.;Armies: (GONUSA) as part of your annual training, requirements. This headquarters does not intend to set a minimum number of counterdrug missions that your units should support; however we do expect all MSUs to participate. Training opportunities exist for special reconnaissance missions, multiple subject MTTS.. area assessments, intelligence analyst support. linguistic support and other special forces Mission Essential Task List (METL)-related missions. This headquarters will not forward requests to your units that do not fall within your METL.

3.

The Commanding General...USASFC (A). also desires all active component M8Us to participate in our Rapid Support Unit (RSUT .support requirement to JTF-6. Once this command is tasked by USSOCOM1 and USASOC to provide fiscal year 1994 RSU mission support, we will schedule quarterly RSU rotations supported by all MSUS. As previously planned, the 5th 8pecial Forces Group will provide support for the 3d and 4th quarters of fiscal year 1993 RSU iterations.

4. Discussions have taken place concerning USASFC.(A) MSU participation in conducting close quanters bartlaƒspecial operations atraining (COB/BOT) Aforstking Law-enforcement agencies. The Commander'AUBASOC;ţia” \16formed') the Commander, JTF-6 in a

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